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2Abstract
This thesis examines the development of public interest litigation (PIL) in 
Bangladesh from a constitutional perspective. PIL seeks to ensure accountability 
on the part of those in power, and socio-economic and collective justice for the 
general public, by giving priority of public interest over individual or special 
interests. Considering the socio-economic realities of Bangladesh, there is a huge 
potential for PIL to aid the poor, the deprived and the un-represented.
In Bangladesh, the development of PIL began to accelerate after the fall of 
the last autocratic regime in 1990. The Supreme Court has gradually re­
interpreted the Constitution in favour of PIL. Socio-economic and collective 
justice principles of the Constitution, it has been declared, not only inspire but 
mandate a PIL approach. However, the development of PIL in Bangladesh has 
not been a justice-focused grass-root movement. The thesis argues that the use of 
PIL in Bangladesh has been dominated by an elite whose main concern continues 
to be the re-distribution of power in the aftermath of the autocratic rule.
We analyse the use of PIL by the elite from several perspectives. First, the 
conceptual and constitutional basis of PIL, as expounded by the Bangladeshi 
courts, emphasises people's power rather than social justice. Second, the gradual 
progress of PIL cases demonstrates how it has been influenced by its close 
connection with recent constitutional and democratic developments. Third, the 
development of the rules of public interest standing illustrates the negative effects 
of the use of PIL by the elite for their own purposes. Fourth, analysis of relevant 
constitutional provisions demonstrates the extent of success of the attempts by 
constitutional activists to re-define power-relations through PIL, raising the 
question whether such attempts actually benefited the general public.
The present thesis analyses the process of recognition of PIL as an 
integrated feature of the Bangladeshi law and argues that the use of the 
techniques of PIL by the elite to participate in the power-relations debate has 
actually undennined the much-needed focus on social and economic justice for 
the poor and the deprived.
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When the work on the present thesis began in late 1993, Public Interest Litigation 
(PIL) was an obscure topic in Bangladesh, Apart from a very small number of 
socially conscious and motivated activists, hardly anyone appreciated its 
importance and potential. These activists were inspired by the advancement of 
social and collective justice through PIL in other jurisdictions, including India 
and Pakistan.1 In fact, limited unsuccessful attempts were made to introduce PIL 
in Bangladesh after the fall of the autocratic regime of General Ershad in 1990.2 
But following the long period of oppressive and uninspiring autocratic rule, the 
legal environment was still conservative. So the judges of the Supreme Court 
viewed PIL from a traditional standpoint and considered the techniques of PIL 
too alien to be applicable to Bangladesh. The problem at the time was how to 
develop PIL within the Bangladeshi legal system.
However, the situation was changing rapidly. The revival of democracy 
was followed by significant constitutional developments including free elections 
and re-introduction of a parliamentary system of government. These changes re-
1 The inspiration came mainly from the works of the Indian social activists. For an
important early essay on activism, see Baxi (1981: 31-37). Bhagwati (1984- 
1985: 561-577) analyses the nature of the judicial activism in India and terms 
it as social activism,
2 Examples of such early attempts include State v. Deputy Commissioner. Satkhira
and others 45 DLR (1993) 643; Sved Mahbub Ali and others v. Bangladesh 
unreported Writ Petition 4036/1992; Sved Borhan Kabir v. Bangladesh and 
others unreported Writ Petition 701/1993 and Rokeva Khatun v. Sub- 
Divisional Engineer and others unrenorted Writ Petition 1789/1993.
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affirmed, at least at an ideological level, the supreme status of the Constitution 
and the place of the people as the ultimate holders of power. The spirit and 
scheme of the re-energised Constitution became an important source of 
inspiration as there was a renewed sense of possessing democratic power and a 
rekindled awareness of social and collective justice. The liberal atmosphere 
encouraged social activists, along with constitutional lawyers and political 
activists, to resort to the Supreme Court with public and political causes. The 
Court started to explore new ways to accommodate PIL under the Constitution 
and gradually recognised its various aspects as compatible with the Bangladeshi 
situation.3 By 1996, the issue was how full recognition of PIL could be ensured.
Finally, in late 1996, the Supreme Court accorded comprehensive 
recognition of PIL in Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh (FAP 20).4 It was 
established that there is no bar for a citizen to litigate in the public interest since 
PIL derives its inspiration and validity directly from the Constitution of 
Bangladesh. From an obscure topic, PIL has thus suddenly become an important 
feature of the Bangladeshi law.
The main aim of the present thesis is to analyse in detail, from a 
constitutional perspective, this recent development of PIL in Bangladesh. The 
thesis examines how the Supreme Court has gradually modified its traditional
3 Leading cases of this genre include Bangladesh Retired Government Employees 
Welfare Association v. Bangladesh 46 DLR (1994) 426; Anwar Hossain Khan 
v. Speaker of Bangladesh Sangsad Bhavan and others 47 DLR (1995) 42 and 
Abu Bakar Siddique v. Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed and others 17 BLD (1997) 
31.
4 17 BLD (1997) 1.
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individualistic approach and re-interpreted the Constitution in favour of the 
techniques of PIL.
This re-interpretation is based, according to the Bangladeshi judges, on 
the aims and objectives of the Constitution, which mandates social and collective 
justice. PIL is supposed to help the 'common people' or the 'little man'. Promoters 
of PIL in Bangladesh declare that the decision makers must be accountable to the 
people for their actions and there must be socio-economic and collective justice 
for the poor and the deprived.
In reality, however, the development of PIL in Bangladesh has lacked the 
support of a people-oriented strong grass-root movement. The techniques of PIL 
were rarely used by the common man or for the purpose of the general people. 
The movement for PIL was dominated by a small group of lawyers, constitutional 
activists and judges, themselves part of the established elite, whose main concern 
was the re-distribution of political power in the aftermath of the autocratic rule. 
This was a time when the continuing process of revival of democracy and 
constitutionalism that started with fresh vigour since 1990 was in full swing. 
These constitutional developments influenced, and were influenced by, the 
development of PIL.
Thus in the development of PIL in Bangladesh, the main focus was not on 
social and economic justice but on political rights and the modalities of power- 
sharing between the privileged and decision makers. The concern was less about 
the problems of the little man and more about the rights of the privileged few. 
The techniques of PIL were used by the elite to further their own agenda in the
13
name of the people. So, rather than being a legal strategy that aims to ensure 
justice, PIL in Bangladesh has immediately become a political and establishment 
strategy. This is clearly reflected in the fact that the majority of the PIL cases in 
Bangladesh deals with issues of power-sharing.
We analyse the development of PIL in Bangladesh and the process of its 
recognition as an integrated feature of the Bangladeshi law. It is argued that the 
use of the techniques of PIL by the privileged few, especially to participate in the 
power-relations debate, has actually undermined the much-needed focus on 
socio-economic justice for the common people.
II
In the continuing process of progressive legal development in Bangladesh, PIL is a 
veiy important technique that affects both conceptual and practical aspects of law. 
PIL denotes litigation where the rights and interests of the public are concerned. It 
aims to ensure that those in power are accountable to the people for their actions. PIL 
is often regarded as a weapon to attain socio-economic justice for the backward 
sections of the community.5 From another perspective, it is a method to represent 
the un-represented or the under-represented and provides an opportunity for
5 In the sub-continent, PIL is mainly seen as a weapon to ensure social justice. For an 
Indian definition of PIL on this line, see People's Union of Democratic Rights 
v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 1473 at 1477. In Pakistan, PIL is described by 
MH Khan (1992: 84) as a task of the eradication of social evils through the 
medium of law.
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common people to participate in the decision making processes relating to public 
issues6
In PIL cases, the interest of the public is given priority over special interests, 
the court being ready to disregard the rules of the adversary model of litigation. It 
involves a public law approach with respect to the rules of standing, procedure and 
implementation so that private citizens can advance public aims through the courts.
Developments of PIL have taken, to some extent, independent and 
separate routes in different jurisdictions. In other words, PIL has travelled 
through jurisdictions. It first successfully emerged in the USA in the 1960s and 
1970s and subsequently influenced historically associated jurisdictions including 
England and Australia to various degrees.7 In the early 1980s, it developed in 
India.8 This was soon followed by Pakistan.9
6 In the western jurisdictions including the USA, 'public interest law' is mainly seen
as the representation of the unrepresented in the society. It consists of the use 
of litigation and public advocacy, i.e. lobbying by representation or 
publication, to advance the cause of the minority or disadvantaged groups, 
individuals or the entire society; see Cooper and Dhavan (1986: 5). See also 
Cooper (1991: 5-11) for a series of extracts illustrating the meaning of the 
term.
7 For the development and general account of public interest law in the USA, see
Council for Public Interest Law (1976), Weisbrod et al. (1978) and Aron 
(1989). For the situation in the UK, see Cooper and Dhavan (1986) and 
Justice/Public Law Project (1996). For an account of public interest law in 
Australia, see Roddewig (1978) and Australian Law Commission Report 
(1985).
8Baxi (1985a) gives an authoritative early account of PIL in India. In the Annual 
Survey of Indian Law, Prakash (1984: 324-332) and Parmanand Singh (1985b, 
1986b, 1987-1993) provide a continuing appraisal of the development of PIL. 
For more recent assessment, see Peiris (1991), Vish (1995), and Janata Dal v. 
HS Chowdharv AIR 1993 SC 893 at 908.
9MH Khan (1993) provides the most comprehensive work on the Pakistani 
development. See also Faqir Hussain (1993) and SM Hussain (1994).
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However, situations and circumstances differ in various jurisdictions as 
well as the constitutional schemes.10 The result is that PIL from one country can 
not be blindly copied to another. Attempts to import US-style public interest law in 
England failed while developments in Australia and Canada have followed their own 
patterns.11 Similar observations have been made while comparing the American PIL 
with the sub-continental one.12 Even the Indian and Pakistani versions of PIL are 
clearly not the same.13
It follows that any examination of the development of PIL in Bangladesh 
must take into account the particular Bangladeshi situations and circumstances. 
To understand PIL in its Bangladeshi context, we need to consider the 
background of the Bangladeshi legal system, the interaction of PIL with the 
continuing constitutional developments that started after 1990 and the objectives 
and scheme of the Constitution itself.
As to the background of the legal system, it must be taken into account 
that it is an inheritance from the British colonial period, although in practice it has
10 See Feldman (1992: 44-72) for a discussion on PEL and constitutional theory in a
comparative perspective.
11 Harlow (1986: 91) argues that attempts to import US-style PIL without considering
the local situation of England is an important cause of the disillusion 
experienced by many of its keenest advocates.
12 Cunningham (1987; 494-523) provides a comparative analysis of the American and
Indian PIL. Even at the initial stage of PIL in India, Baxi (1985a: 290) 
cautioned that blind imitation will destroy the movement for PIL if the ‘vital 
political cultural differences’ between the USA and Indian societies are 
ignored.
13 MHKhan (1993: 29-59).
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both indigenous and foreign elements.14 This explains why Bangladesh is apt to be 
influenced by Britain and its former colonies with respect to legal development. 
Especially, there is much in common among India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, all 
third world South Asian countries, with respect to culture, economy, politics and 
society. The common legal background means that as regards principles and 
practices of law, they have many identical elements so that the experience of legal 
development in one country can be used by another. The influence of the Indian and 
Pakistani developments on the progress of PEL in Bangladesh is thus not an isolated 
event but part of a continuing process of sharing of ideas and techniques among 
these jurisdictions.
As regards the continuing constitutional development, there are a number of 
issues which require detailed analysis. What was the legal situation as regards PIL 
after the adoption of the Constitution in 1972? What were the factors that prevented 
development of PIL prior to the resignation of the autocratic regime in 1990? What 
were the effects of the constitutional developments after 1990 on the progress of 
PIL? In fact, the process of revival of democracy and constitutionalism has 
dominated the minds of the lawyers, constitutional activists and judges at the 
time when PIL was promoted. They focused not so much on issues of basic socio­
economic justice, as on the problems of participation in the political process.
Whatever was the motive, one can not litigate in the name of the people 
unless it is endorsed by the Constitution. In fact, as to the particular Bangladeshi
14 In a recent doctoral thesis, Malik (1994) has demonstrated the 'unlocality’ of the 
laws made by the colonial government in British India.
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situations and circumstances, we argue that the most important factor in the 
development of PIL is the Constitution. Bangladesh adopted a modem Constitution 
in l^T ^ 'h ich  emphasises social and collective justice principles and operates as the 
supreme law of the land.13 The Constitution provides for writ jurisdiction under 
Article 102, which enables private citizens to petition the Supreme Court for public 
aims. The development of PEL in Bangladesh has been, as elsewhere in South Asia, 
focused on the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Since PEL in Bangladesh is principally a constitutional phenomenon so far, 
the present study confines itself to constitutional litigation in the Supreme Court.16 
This narrows down the scope of the thesis in two ways. First, unless directly 
relevant, rules and principles of civil and criminal laws including cases and statutes 
are not dealt with.17 Second, the focus is oi^hl^ation only and no attempt has been 
made to explore various other strategies of 'public interest law1. Thus lobbying, 
formation of public opinion etc., included within the meaning of'public interest law* 
as defined in the USA and in India, are not our concern.18
An analysis of the development of PIL in Bangladesh so far requires detailed 
consideration of the aims, objectives, structure and scheme of the Constitution. This
13 For a history of constitutional development in Bangladesh, see Dilara Choudhury
(1995) and Moudud Ahmed (1992).
16 The situation may be contrasted with India where PEL has revolutionised and
virtually created whole new areas of law including environmental and 
consumer protection law. See Ahuja (1997).
17 PIL-related legal provisions in laws other than the Constitution are not within the
scope of the present thesis and thus have not been included. Mahmudur 
Rahman (1992: 1-7 and 1997: 79-86) critically discussed a number of such 
statutes.
18 For an example of these strategies in the Indian context, see Gurjeet Singh (1996).
18
raises a number of questions. Is the Bangladeshi brand of constitutionalism 
compatible with the socio-economic and collective justice approach of PIL? In what 
ways does the Supreme Court interpret the underlying constitutional principles in 
favour of PIL? Is the constitutional support for a social and collective justice 
approach sufficient for its continued success? How have the courts interpreted 
this power to accept petitions and issue writs in PIL cases?
While the high and lofty constitutional principles supporting social and 
collective justice were expounded in favour of PIL, the apparent aim was to serve 
the interests of the common man. In light of our arguments, this thesis needs to 
analyse to what extent the general people, as opposed to the privileged few, have 
been benefited. This involves several issues. The persons who promoted PIL are 
the lawyers, judges and constitutional activists. To what extent have they 
represented the interests of the common people? What are their respective 
contributions and what are the types of cases they brought?
PIL cases have resulted in the re-interpretation of specific provisions of 
the Constitution. These include rules of standing and respective jurisdictions of 
governmental departments. The thesis analyses the extent to which these re­
interpretations have been influenced by cases that dealt with the interests of the 
elite rather than those of the general people. We need to examine in detail, 
therefore, how and to what extent the elite were able to use PIL to further their 
own agenda in the prevailing power struggle.
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III
Chapter 2 of the present thesis examines and analyses the conceptual and 
constitutional background of PIL. The discussion begins with an outline of the 
western and sub-continental ideas, concepts and theories relating to PIL along 
with their constitutional relevance. While the focus in the West is on the assertion 
of collective rights, the activists in the sub-continent emphasise social justice as 
envisaged by the constitutions of India and Pakistan. But the social justice of the 
Indian Constitution is of a secular nature, while in Pakistan its content is Islamic.
We need to explore why, under the Bangladeshi constitutional scheme, 
neither the Indian nor the Pakistani version could be followed without 
qualification. Bangladeshi judges emphasised ultimately the distinct and unique 
nature of the country's Constitution on the basis of its autochthony. This 
autochthonous nature of the Constitution is regarded as a basis that empowers the 
people to assert their constitutional rights. The primary focus is not on social 
justice but on the power of the people to assert their political authority.
The gradual evolution of the issues, cases and activities relating to PIL in 
Bangladesh has been explored in chapter 3. Since the independence of 
Bangladesh, followed by the adoption of the Constitution, there has always been 
a weak but steady flow of judgements encouraging a social and collective justice 
approach. But mainly due to autocratic rules and martial laws, creative or 
progressive interpretation of the Constitution was prevented for a long time.
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The third chapter draws on this background to explain why PIL did not 
develop before the fall of the last autocratic regime in 1990. When PIL started to 
develop, the revival of democracy and constitutionalism was the focus of 
attention in Bangladesh. Our analysis illustrates how and to what extent these 
particular political and constitutional developments led the elite to use PIL in 
furtherance of their political strategy.
We analyse the progress of PIL from several perspectives. First, we 
examine the types of cases filed in the name of PIL to determine to what extent 
they advance genuine social and collective justice issues as distinct from political 
aims. Second, we analyse the extent to which PIL in Bangladesh has been a 
collective effort of activist individuals, lawyers, judges and voluntary sector 
organisations to evaluate their respective contributions. Third, we explore the 
close relation between the ongoing constitutional developments and the number 
and type of PIL cases pleaded before the court.
Chapter 4 analyses the problem of standing of PIL petitioners in its 
Bangladeshi context. Article 102 of the Constitution enables the people to have 
direct access to the Supreme Court through constitutional writs. Traditionally, the 
petitioner was required to be personally aggrieved. This was an inherited 
principle which created a threshold problem for PIL. The traditional legal 
position has been gradually modified to allow PIL in Bangladesh.
Our analysis includes cases where misuse of PIL by the elite resulted in 
the denial of standing and actually hindered the progress of PIL. in its earlier 
stage. We also examine the effects, in the later stage of the development of PIL,
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of elite-led cases on the rules of public interest standing which have been 
ultimately adopted by the Court.
Chapter 5 examines, by analysing specific constitutional provisions, the 
efforts by the dlite to use PIL to influence the arrangement of power-relationship 
among governmental organs. This demonstrates and confirms the preoccupation 
of the Bangladeshi lawyers and constitutional activists with the concerns of the 
privileged rather than those of the common people.
PIL petitioners, while challenging the jurisdictional boundaries that 
separate the areas of the various organs of the government, rely upon the doctrine 
of 'separation of powers'. This doctrine has been recognised by the Constitution 
and it is the duty of the Supreme Court, as constitutional interpreter, to define 
and protect the power-separation scheme. However, this provides an opportunity 
for the political activists to raise political issues for judicial consideration in the 
guise of public interest. As a result, our analysis demonstrates, despite the Court's 
attempts to project a neutral image, the influence of the continuing power 
struggle in the national politics is often reflected in its actions and decisions 
relating to PIL cases.
The chapter also examines PIL cases relating to the law making power of 
the parliament and its privileges. The discussion illustrates that statutes and 
constitutional amendments have rarely been challenged by the PIL petitioners on 
the ground of social or economic welfare of the people. The majority of the PIL 
cases have attempted to curb the domain of the executive. In some cases, the 
court was asked to define the meaning of the term 'state' to determine where the
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public domain ends and the private sphere begins. We examine whether social 
and economic justice considerations of PIL have expanded that definition 
resulting in more areas being amenable under the writ jurisdiction. PIL has also 
been used with the aim to restrict executive encroachment upon the judicial 
arena, especially in relation to appointment, promotion and transfer of acting and 
retired judges. Finally,/wi examine to what extent the judiciary is, in its turn, 
encroaching upon the province of the executive with regard to implementation of 
PIL decisions. The chapter illustrates that the attempts by political and 
constitutional activists involving power-sharing issues have achieved very limited 
success and there has been little or no benefit for the common people.
In chapter 6, our concluding analysis critically examines the findings of 
each chapter with the object of identifying the stresses and strains of the 
development of PIL in Bangladesh. We focus on the argument that the 
development of PIL in Bangladesh has been dominated from the very beginning 
by the elite. They used the techniques of PIL to further their own agenda, 
especially to participate in the power-relations debate. As a result the 
development and use of PIL for genuine social and collective justice issues have 
been seriously impaired. After analysing the current trends, our discussion also 
indicates the future of the development of PIL in Bangladesh.
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual issues and constitutional basis of PIL
The present chapter discusses the background of PIL in the light of the developments 
of relevant ideas, concepts and assumptions that furnish its moral justifications and 
inspire and motivate its promoters. It analyses how PIL has drawn its legal basis, 
validity and inspiration from the constitutions of India and Pakistan and compares 
this with the Bangladeshi situation. Our aim is to explore the development of the 
general rules of interpretation of the Constitution that are applicable in Bangladesh 
when public interest is concerned.
The development of PIL in Bangladesh has been greatly influenced by its 
earlier developments in other jurisdictions. The first part of the chapter begins with a 
discussion of some of the ideas, theories and concepts of PIL, as they have been 
advanced in the West, especially in the USA. This is followed by an outline of the 
Indian and Pakistani situations where the developments of PEL owe much to the 
social consciousness of activist judges and lawyers. We explore how this social 
consciousness was translated into action to develop PIL in harmony with the 
constitutional provisions.
Finally, we analyse in detail the ways in which the conceptual aspects of PIL 
found their basis in the context of the Bangladeshi Constitution. We examine 
relevant constitutional provisions that support a social and collective justice 
approach. This social justice bias is analysed in the light of its actual role in 
influencing the judges and lawyers. We argue that the Bangladeshi judges are less
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inclined to depend on a social justice approach in comparison with their Indian or 
Pakistani counterparts. In Bangladesh, the judges advanced the so called 'people's 
power' theory which is based on the autochthonic nature of the Constitution. They 
emphasise on the fact that the people hold the real political power and as such the 
Constitution must be interpreted in favour of the collective interest of the people. 
!i The primary focus is thus not on social justice for the poor, but on the paramount 
place of the people in the power sharing scheme. This conceptual approach has, in
\[
I practice, influenced all aspects of the development of PIL either directly or 
indirectly.
2.1 PIL in the USA and other western jurisdictions: Some relevant 
ideas and theories
In the USA, ’public interest law1 is said to be the outgrowth of diverse efforts 
stretching deep into American legal history to secure legal representation for the 
powerless and disenfranchised.1 The legal aid movement of the 1800s, efforts of the 
Progressive era reformers, the civil liberties activism of the American Civil Liberties 
Union in the early 1900s and the Watershed civil rights cases of the 1950s are some 
of the roots of public interest law.2 Finally in the 1960s and 1970s, many social 
movements emerged which dealt with civil rights, poverty, social injustice, hazards
1 For the development and general account of public interest law in the USA, see
Council for Public Interest Law (1976), Weisbrod et al. (1978) and Aron 
(1989).
2 Aron (1989: 6) points out that although the term 'public interest law' was coined no
more than two decades ago, it is not a new phenomenon and owes its patterns 
of organisation, modes of financing and choices of strategies to the earlier 
movements.
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of modem technologies and so on. In the advanced industrial capitalistic society of 
the USA, PIL mainly represented interests without groups such as consumerism, 
environment and so on. Private foundations, the federal government, private bars and 
law schools worked hand in hand.3
But with success came controversy and sceptics worried whether any real 
change is possible through public interest law.4 In the 1980s, the political pendulum 
swang to the right.5 The overall situation in the American society changed - instead 
of social advancement approach, individualism gained prominence. Campaigns 
against public interest law started gaining momentum and at the same time the 
government and a number of major organisations started withdrawing huge amounts 
of funds. The results of these changes are perceived by many as a failure or at least a 
shrinking of public interest law in America.6 But perhaps these perceptions of failure 
have been due to too many expectations. The fact remains that public interest law 
has brought profound changes in the American legal system which have definitely 
come to stay.
The American development influenced historically associated jurisdictions
3 See in detail Ibid. at 10-14.
4 For example, Kessler (1987) argues that publicly funded legal services are unlikely
vehicle for the promotion of social reform and wealth redistribution in favour 
of the poor.
3 Aron (1989: 14-21), It is observed that the political philosophy of the Reagan 
administration called for a drastic reduction in the domestic role of the federal 
government. Public interest lawyering was seen as incompatible with this aim.
6 For example, Ariola and Wolinsky (1983: 1207-1227) argued that the attempts to 
secure relief for public interest clients often involve legal victories, only to 
have real relief elude them.
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including England, Australia and Canada to various degrees,7 But the growth of PIL 
in these jurisdictions was either partial or restricted, nothing that can be compared 
with the American experience of PIL materialised.
PIL is generally considered by the Western writers as a reflection in the 
field of law of the emerging, growing and lasting need of modem societies. In this 
line, in 1978, Cappelletti advanced the so-called ‘massification theory5.8 He used 
comparative analysis and assumed that some basic socio-economic and political 
needs are shared by all advanced societies and on this premise he examined the 
legal answers given to those common needs.
According to Cappelletti, our contemporary society or more ambitiously, 
our civilisation, may be characterised as a mass-production mass-consumption 
civilisation. But this massification extends far beyond the economic sector and 
embraces all spheres of our lives in society including the field of law. Cappelletti 
says:
More and more frequently, because of the “massification55 phenomena, 
human actions and relationships assume a collective, rather than a 
merely individual character; they refer to groups, categories and 
classes of people, rather than to one or a few individuals alone. Even 
basic rights and duties are no longer exclusively the individual rights 
and duties of the 18th or 19th century declarations of human rights 
inspired by natural law concepts, but rather meta-individual, collective, 
“social55 rights and duties of associations, communities and classes.
This is not to say that individual rights no longer have a vital place in 
our societies; rather, it is to suggest that these rights are practically
7 For the situation in England, see Cooper and Dhavan (1986) and Justice/Public Law
Project (1996). For an account of public interest law in Australia, see 
Roddewig (1978) and Australian Law Commission Report (1985).
8 Cappelletti (1978-79: 513 564). This essay is an adapted version of an earlier
lecture, see Cappelletti (1976: 643-690). He has carefully revised this essay 
from time to time to take into account continuous developments. For a recent 
republication of an edited version, see Cappelletti (1989: 268-308).
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meaningless in today’s setting unless accompanied by the social rights 
necessary to make them effective and really accessible to all.9
Cappelletti says that the complexity of modem societies generates situations in 
which a single action can be beneficial or prejudicial to a large number of people. 
This makes the traditional scheme of litigation as a two party affair quite 
inadequate because an individual alone is unable to protect himself efficiently in 
these cases. His interest is either too small, so that a legal action would not pay, 
or too diffuse, so that his rights are denied by the court or he may even be 
unaware of his rights. To protect his new social, collective and diffuse rights, 
therefore, it is necessary to abandon the individualistic traditional approach. New 
social, collective, diffuse remedies and procedures are required. The quest for 
these new remedies and procedures is responsible, among other things, for the 
development of public interest law.
Cappelletti’s theory is not jurisdiction-specific. The use of the term 
’modem societies' is somewhat vague and does not take into account the 
historical, economic and social differences between western and third world 
countries. But his description of the massification phenomenon provided 
justification for the work of PIL promoters everywhere, including the activists 
and judges of the sub-continent.10
If the focus is on the Western jurisdictions, emergence of public interest 
law can be found closely connected with the development of the conceptions of
9 Cappelletti (1978: 518).
10 Sub-continental writers and judges were well aware of Cappelletti’s arguments; see
below chapter 2.2.1.
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‘rights5.11 Contemporary notions are said to be dominated by a package of rights 
produced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.12 Consistent with the 
expectations of an evolving capitalist society, this classical liberal package 
concentrated on the rights to life, liberty and property which were considered as 
‘preferred5 freedoms. It had two uneasy addenda, rights to equality and rights to 
process - uneasy because if implemented stringently, they tended to violate the 
status quo of the capitalistic society.13
This liberal package in effect ignored the problems faced by the poor, the 
disadvantaged and minorities. Similarly, it was not concerned with the diffused 
or community rights. But as such needs of society gradually became too great to 
ignore, the poor and the disadvantaged were given a number of new rights. 
According to Dhavan and Partington, these are specific legal entitlements and 
were not treated as preferred rights.14 They were regarded as politically negotiable 
and easily alterable entitlements doled out by a welfare state.
These new rights include social welfare rights, social justice rights and 
civil and political rights. Social welfare rights, at the individual level, consist of 
specific welfare entitlements such as right to social security, housing etc. At the 
collective level, it includes diffused interests such as those of consumers or 
environmental issues. Social justice rights aim to give more shape and substance
11 Cooper (1991: 14), while providing a select biblopgraphy on this issue, observes
that the relationship between rights theory and public interest law is covert 
rather than explicit.
12 Dhavan and Partington (1986: 236).
13 Id
14 Ibid. at 237.
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to social aspects of the right to equality. Instead of formal equality a new and
complex social justice jurisprudence aims to provide substantial and real
equality. Civil rights are concerned with the manner in which people are treated
in a civil society and the circumstances under which people can be deprived of
their freedom while political rights deal with the important aspects of democratic
participation in public life such as rights to fair elections.15
These new rights involve a number of new challenges. As they relate to
very complex social issues, the traditional system of law found it very difficult to
recognise and define these rights in order to make them available to those who
are entitled to them. This challenge had to be answered by searching for ways
how they can be articulated, processed and obtained. Public interest law, observe
Dhavan and Partington, is thus a consequence of the new rights attained by
Western societies during this century.16
Assertion of rights as the basis of public interest activities is nowhere
more apparent than in the USA where the so-called ‘classic’ ideology of public
interest law approach mainly dealt with the participation of unorganised interests.
The focal point is civil justice, or as recast by Trubek and Trubek, civic justice.17
Civic justice, according to them, means a full opportunity for all citizens to
participate in the life of the commonwealth. They say:
This approach was based on a critique of the American political 
system. The critique took as a given that it was essential to provide 
greater protection to the rights of citizens in their roles as consumers,
15 Id
16 Ibid at 240.
17 Trubek and Trubek (1981: 119-144).
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and users of the environment, and to categories like children, women, 
etc. It concluded that the operation of the American system of 
“pluralist” bargaining hampered, rather than helped, the effort to 
protect these interests. Pluralism was supposed to ensure democracy, 
but it did not. While pluralist politics worked well for organised 
groups, who could bargain with each other and with government for 
rights and privileges, it worked against such unorganised interests
which were excluded from a decision-making process open only to
18people who could speak for organised constituencies.
Tliis problem was sought to be solved by reforming the legal system and by 
giving equal access to the unorganised. Access meant legal representation; public 
interest law became a device for ensuring equal access. This approach thus 
assumed that if unorganised groups were properly represented, their due rights 
and privileges could be safeguarded, it was seen as a matter of equalising the 
resources available to organised and unorganised groups.
This ‘classic5 approach however gave \away to a more rational 
understanding of public interest law. Out of proportion reliance on litigation and 
legal advocacy was required to be replaced by a more sensible view of promoting 
other types of public interest activity and combining all the strategies together. 
Trubek and Trubek proposed that only such a wider strategy can ensure 
significant progress towards civic justice.19
Public interest law in the USA has also been analysed from an economist’s 
standpoint by Weisbrod and others in 1978.20 They discussed pursuit of the
18 Ibid. at 122.
19 Trubek and Trubek (1981; 144) sum up the elements of such a strategy. For further
elaboration, see Trubek and Trubek (1980).
20 Weisbrod et al (1978; 2) declared at the very beginning that the conceptual
framework of the analysis was fundamentally that of an economist. But this 
economic perspective was a broad one encompassing a wide range of social 
goals.
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public interest in terms of efficiency and equity. Accordingly, public interest 
includes the pursuit of greater efficiency in the allocation of resources among 
alternative uses and greater equity in individuals’ access to the fruits of the socio­
economic system’s activities. The study also assumes that there are likely to be 
both efficiency and equity failures in the private market and suggested that the 
government, which is expected to correct such failures, is not always able to do 
so.21 Failures in the governmental sector might give rise to a need for a voluntary 
sector, including public interest law activities. Thus, Weisbrod says:
‘. . .  the voluntary sector is not unique in its role, but rather is part of 
an interdependent system which determines the location of resources 
and the distribution of incomes and opportunities’.22
The importance of Weisbrod’s explanation lies in the fact that he gives an 
economist’s explanation with the emphasis that litigation alone without any 
consideration of the economic forces at work can not bring the desired success.
While outlining above the various theoretical positions, we do not attempt 
to be comprehensive. But our discussion clearly indicates that public interest law 
enables the citizens to take part in the decision making process of the 
government, especially when it involves their social and economic concerns. In 
this process, litigation is a veiy important element even though it has its 
limitations.23 Litigation often serves its purpose indirectly and may be seen as a 
part of a greater strategy of the litigant.24
21 Ibid. at 19.
22 Ibid. at 26.
23 See for example Galanter (1976: 929-951), and Scheingold (1989: 73-91).
24 See for example, Denvir (1975-76: 113-1160).
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2.2 The conceptual and constitutional basis of PIL according to 
Indian judges and writers
In the sub-continent, the pioneering work on PIL has been done in India.25 PIL 
began to develop, in the post-emergency period of the late 1970s, when the Supreme 
Court began to demonstrate a greater awareness for social justice. A considerable 
number of cases advanced PEL through its infancy while activist volunteers, lawyers 
and especially judges, including Justices Krishna Iyer and Bhagwati, passionately 
promoted the techniques of PIL.26 It has been said that the Indian PIL is primarily 
judge-led and even judge-induced.27 The leading case was decided in 1982 when the 
Supreme Court gave a comprehensive exposition in SP Gupta v. President of India 
(Judges' Transfer).28
2.2.1 Indian social justice approach
It has been suggested that the judges and scholars pioneering PIL in India were 
influenced and inspired by the conceptual thinking of the Western writers.29
23 Baxi (1985a: 289-315) gives an authoritative early account of PIL in India. In the
Annual Survey of Indian Law, Prakash (1984) and Parmanand Singh (1985b, 
1986b, 1987-1993) provide a continuing appraisal of the development of PIL.
For more recent assessment, see Peiris (1991: 66-90), Priya (1995: 81-94), and 
Janata Dal v. HS Chowdharv AIR 1993 SC 893 at 908.
26 Cases that played a vital part in the development of PIL include, among others,
Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulvai AIR 1976 SC 1455; Ratlam Municipality 
v. Yardhi Chand AIR 1980 SC 1622; Sunil Batra II v. Delhi Administration 
AIR 1980 SC 1579 and Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of 
India AIR 1981 SC 344.
27 Baxi (1985a: 291).
28 AIR 1982 SC 149.
29 To Agrawala (1985: 8) it was obvious that the inspiration for PIL has come from
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Bhagwati J cited Cappelletti in the Judges’ Transfer case30 and favourably 
discussed his ideas in a subsequent article.31 Western scholars including 
Cappelletti were discussed by other Indian writers as well, but this generally 
happened when the concept of PIL had already been introduced and accepted in 
India.32
Perhaps the most important factor that prompted the Indian judges to act 
was a strong sense of social consciousness. By the early 1980s, even after more 
than three decades of independence, India was still an underdeveloped and poor 
third world country with millions of people barely surviving in abject poverty. 
The state not only failed to ameliorate the conditions of the poor, it faltered to 
incorporate substantial distributive or social justice for the masses. The 
legislature was seen as insensitive to the cause of the poor and a forum for 
politicians who were desperate to fulfil their personal ambitions.33 The executive 
also failed to meet the expectations of the people and there were widespread 
governmental inefficiency, mistakes and lawlessness.
the American experience. Cunningham (1987: 496) suggests that the Indian 
PIL has possibly drawn some inspiration from a seminal article by Cappelletti 
(1978-1979: 513-564). For a general discussion of the impact of Western 
scholarship on Indian law, see Dhavan (1985: 505-526).
30 Above note 28 at 192.
31 Bhagwati (1987: 21). However, he claims not only to be familiar with the
American developments but also proceeds to distinguish it from the Indian 
PEL, see Bhagwati (1984-85: 569 and 1987: 22).
32 For example see Parmanand Singh (1988: 124) who borrows Chayes’ ideas of PEL
and applies them in the Indian context.
33 Mukhoty (1985) made an assessment of the legislature’s attempts to pass
legislation for the poor and concluded that generally, the attempts did not 
succeed mainly due to bad implementation.
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The situation became all the more precarious during the emergency period 
of 1975-77. On the one hand, the democratic institutions were under pressure and 
the judiciary became increasingly subordinate to the executive and the 
legislature. On the other hand, it was a populist period led by Indira Gandhi when 
many judges, including justices Krishna Iyer and Bhagwati, became part of a 
nation-wide movement for legal services and thus became 'people-prone'.34 In the 
immediate aftermath of the emergency, the perception of failure of the 
governmental branches to solve socio-economic problems was amplified as it was 
shared and projected by the free press.35 Finding no other alternative, a number 
of conscious citizens, non-governmental organisations and social action groups 
started knocking at the door of the judiciary for remedy.36 The result was judicial 
activism, related to so called 'judicial populism', which may be understood as a 
part of the court's effort to retrieve a degree of legitimacy following the 
emergency period.37
There are numerous examples demonstrating the judicial concern as to the 
role of the judges to alleviate the sufferings of the people. One passionate expression
14 These judges organised legal aid camps in distant villages, attempted to provide de­
professionalised justice through camps and people's courts and called for a 
total restructuring of the legal system; see Baxi (1985a: 293).
35 See Baxi (1985a: 294) for the important role played by the press in the
development of PIL.
36 Rubin (1987: 371-392) provides a detailed discussion on the civil liberties
movement in India in the aftermath of the emergency period.
37 The role of judicial populism in the development of PIL in India has been strongly
emphasised by Baxi (1985a: 290). See also Cassels (1989: 510) who supports 
Baxi's arguments. Earlier, Baxi (1980) has discussed the issue of judicial 
populism in more detail and appreciated the fact that the Indian judges were 
moving in a more populist direction.
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can be found in a much important ^arlercjase where Dwivedi J said:
The Constitution is not intended to be the arena of legal quibbling for 
men with long purses. It is made for the common people. It should 
generally be so construed as that they can understand and appreciate it.
The more they understand it the more they love it and the more they 
prize it..38
This sympathy for the downtrodden and poor was shared by a number of Suprme
Court judges including the pioneers of PIL. Thus for example, Bhagwati J said:
Large population ate today living a sub-human existence in conditions 
of abject povertyCutter grinding poverty has broken their back and 
snapped their moral fibre.39
As a result of such concern for the poor and helpless, the judges turned to
activism and elaborated the reasons why such activism was needed. Krishna
Iyer’s reasoning is dramatically expressed in the following passage:
When a system keeps millions in sub-human status and millionaires in 
super-human control, practises inglorious grandeur and 
unconscionable brutality, and jaundiced justice, when a nation 
becomes submissive or communal-feudal-medieval and kilkenney-cat 
political unmindful of the masses, and the classes chase pleasure, 
position and shameless wealth, silence is a sin and dissent a duty . . .
The explosive syndrome or passivist pathology are grave risks to our 
Secular Socialist Republic. Then the therapeutic process of activist 
protest and functional dissent finds its finest hour of fulfilment. The 
day After is too late. Now, Now.40
He forcefully argued that in the competition between the courts and the streets as 
dispenser of justice, the rule of law must win the aggrieved person for the law
38 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 at 947. In the same case
(at 968), Chandrachud J cautioned not to defeat the hopes and aspirations of 
the Teeming millions - half-clad, half-starved, half-educated’.
39 People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 1473 at
1477.
40 Iyer (1985: 331), in this case, is a bit verbose, but such passionate sincerity is 
perhaps a necessary element for successful activism.
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court and wean him from the lawless street.41 Bhagwati J justified his activism in
the Judges’ case, saying that the rule of law will be substantially impaired if the
court fails to secure fundamental rights to the poor people.42 If the breach of
public duties was allowed to go unredressed by the courts, it would promote
disrespect for the rule of law.43 It will also lead to corruption, encourage
inefficiency and might create possibilities, of the political machinery itself
becoming a participant in the misuse or abuse of power. He also argued that in
the modem welfare state individual rights and duties are being replaced by
collective rights and duties of classes or groups of persons where every member
of the public should have standing to challenge the action, otherwise the injury
would go unredressed.44
Bhagwati J claimed it to be necessary to go beyond technical and juristic
activism to inquire about the purpose for which such activism is practised.45
Even when the judge adheres to formal notions of justice and claims not to be
concerned with the social consequences of what he decides, it is often a thin
disguise, for in many such cases his instrumental objective is to preserve the
status quo. Bhagwati’s purpose for such activism is made clear when he says:
We in India are trying to move away from formalism and to use juristic 
activism for achieving distributive justice or, as we in India are 
accustomed to labelling it, “social justice” . . .  I would call this
41 See already Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC
568 at 584.
42 SP Gupta above note 28 at 189.
43 Ibid. at 191.
44 Ibid at 192.
45 Bhagwati (1984-1985: 564-565).
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appropriately “social activism”- activism which is directed towards 
achievement of social justice . . . The modem judiciary can’t afford to 
hide behind notions of legal justice and plead incapacity when social 
justice issues are addressed to it. This challenge is an important one, 
not just because judges owe a duty to do justice with a view to creating 
and moulding a just society, but because a modem judiciary can no 
longer obtain social and political legitimacy without making a 
substantial contribution to issues of social justice.46
The social activism advocated by the Indian judges proceeded with the 
assumption that judges are law makers, insisting that the traditional view that 
they merely interpret the law is fundamentally wrong 47 Baxi observed that while 
the elaboration of certain values in the Constitution assists the process of 
legitimisation of the ruling elite, at the same time, it tends to expose them to new 
demands and fresh challenges to their legitimacy.48 The scope for judicial law­
making widens when the legislature and the executive fail to perform their socio­
economic functions. He further said:
In other words, an activist judge will consider herself perfectly 
justified in resorting to lawmaking power when the legislature just 
doesn’t bother to legislate. . . .  in almost all countries of the Third 
World such judicial initiatives are both necessary and desirable.49
This brings us to a number of important issues relating to the political 
aspects of PIL. First, the activists and judges emphasised on the political role of
46 Id
47 Baxi (1987: 168) claims that one does not attain jurisprudencial adulthood unless
one accepts that judges are law makers. For details of Bhagwati’s argument on 
this point, see Bhagwati (1984-1985; 562-563). Prasad (1980) shows that even 
in the pre-PIL period, the Indian Supreme Court has created not only ordinary 
law but also constitutional law in the course of the exercise of its 
interpretative powers.
48 Baxi (1987: 173).
49 Id
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the judiciary complaining that this role has often been ignored or misunderstood.
Thus, for example, Bhagwati J said:
. . . every constitutional question concerns the allocation and exercise 
of governmental power and no constitutional question can, therefore, 
fail to be political.50
Similarly Baxi, arguing that the Indian judges had started to confront the socio­
political realities with renewed vigour in the aftermath of the Emergency, said:
I believe it is time to take stock and to say what the judges regard as 
unsayable: that the Supreme Court is a centre of political power.51
This political power is not affected by the doctrine of separation of powers 
recognised by the constitutions of the sub-continent. In fact, the doctrine 
enhances this power indirectly because the Constitution declares that the Court is 
the ultimate interpreter of constitutional issues.32
Second, once this political role is recognised, it is argued that this has 
been reflected in PIL cases, although the courts are often reluctant to articulate 
their role.33 From the court's viewpoint, political activism is the inevitable result 
of the intensive judicial scrutiny of governmental action and non-action. From the 
viewpoint of the PIL petitioners, it is an alternative strategy to effect socio­
economic and political transformation from outside the conventional political 
arena.
50 State of Rajasthan v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 1361,
51 Baxi (1980: 5).
52 See chapter 5.1 for further discussion.
33 For example, see Gomez (1993: 74-110) who analyses in great detail the relation 
between PIL and political action. It is argued that PIL is a political 
phenomenon and has blurred the distinction between the political and judicial 
landscapes.
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Third, the aims and objects of the judges are not to deny their political role
or escape responsibility, but to use PIL for genuine public interest causes,
including the socio-economic interest of the poor and the deprived, as opposed to
the purposes of the privileged and the elite. Since there is no clear dividing line
between these two types of interests, it is often difficult for the judges,
considering their political role, to ensure social justice. Thus in the Indian
context, it has been observed that the use of PIL has often been dominated by the
rich and powerful for their political or other purposes.54
Another aspect of the the Indian development of PIL is the demand by the
judges to deviate from the traditional approaches based on the so called ‘colonial
Anglo-Saxon’ jurisprudence. A strong criticism of the law in practice thus
followed. The judges regretted that even after decades of independence, the
Indian judicial system had followed the path of the Anglo-Saxon legacy left
behind by the British which was framed by a colonial ruling government to suit
its class interests and had little relevance to the prevalent Indian social
conditions.^ Bhagwati J explains:
Anglo-Saxon law is transactional, highly individualistic, concerned 
with an atomistic justice incapable of responding to the claims and 
demands of collectivity, and resistant to change. Such law was 
developed and has evolved in an essentially individualistic society to 
deal with situations involving the private right/duty pattern. It cannot 
possibly meet the challenge raised by these new concerns for the social
Fra example, see Parmanand Sing (1986a: 336-347), Gomez (1993: 74-110) and 
V '---'  Ahuja (1996: 330-347).
5:> Baxi (1991) opposes the idea of a single universal theory of judicial process as
impractical and elaborates on the conflicting conceptions of legal cultures and 
conflicts of legal cultures.
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rights and collective claims of the underprivileged.36 
Pathak J noted that an insistence to administer the adversarial Anglo-Saxon law
in a political culture that highlights the mutual responsibilities of citizens in a
situation of vast differences in wealth, status and literacy can not be justified.37
New techniques were thus sought for, it was felt necessary to evolve what has
been called a ‘dalit jurisprudence5 which is more in harmony with the mores and
needs of the Indian society.38
The basis of legitimacy of this new jurisprudence lies in the Indian social
justice approach. In fact, the tradition, culture and religion of the Indians
emphasise that the interest of the community as a whole must take precedence
over individual interests. Societal obligations are emphasised and a collective
approach to solving problems is preferred. This bond of society is known, in
Indian terms, as ‘dharma" - something that holds people together.59 Krishna Iyer
says:
And Indian dharma, remember, has asserted, long before the 
sociological school in the West, that law is the Social Engineering 
Service of society. True to the genius of our indigenous culture and in 
tune with the modem dynamics of the rule of law, we have to weave 
new developmental norms and social values which bind us together in 
free India and tear up the bygone legal order of the Imperial era which 
held us prisoner.60
56 Bhagwati (1984-1985: 570).
57 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802 at 839.
58 Chandrasekharan (1986: 394).
59 Sharma (1989: 26) provides a detailed analysis cf the meaning of dharma and the
extent to which it includes and vouchsafes the concept of ‘distributive justice’.
60 Iyer (1976: 2).
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The Indian emphasis on social justice has been reflected in the suggestion by 
Upendra Baxi to use the term SAL (social action litigation) instead of PIL61 He 
argued, among other things, that PIL in the sub-continent and the USA emerged as 
representing distinctive phases of socio-legal developments of each country and 
consequently the salient characteristics of its birth and growth are not the same. This 
notion has its critics,62 but social activists, including Bhagwati J, supported it 
enthusiastically. 63 Although the term PIL is still used in general, it has been 
suggested that PIL is involved where the collective rights of the entire public are 
affected and no individual is specially affected; SAL involves a determinate group or 
class of people who has sustained the primary injury involving their socio-economic 
rights.64
The discussion so far illustrates that, although the political role of the 
judges in PIL cases has been recognised, the focus in India is on social justice. 
Also, the activists attempted to formulate an indigenous concept of social justice, 
as opposed to any colonial legacy. However, existing laws could not be 
challenged on the basis of a social justice approach unless it is supported by the
61 Baxi (1985; 290).
62 The first critique of Baxi's nomenclature came from Agrawala (1985: 7) who argued
that this nomenclature makes no essential difference in the basic content and 
philosophy of PIL. Refusing to believe that the Indian experience is qualitatively 
different, he says {Ibid. at 7-8) that to replace the widely used and understood 
nomenclature, "a philosophy of SAL as something completely distinguishable 
from PIL has first to be developed".
63 Bhagwati (1984-85; 561-577 and 1987: 20-31) is perhaps the most important supporter
of SAL. See also Massey (1990: 250, footnote 25); Hussain (1994: 7) and Meer 
(1993: 39).
64 See Sorabjee (1997: 28) for a short discussion of this distinction.
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Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land. The following sub-chapter 
discusses the constitutional endorsement of social justice, as understood and 
interpreted by the pioneers of PIL.
2.2.2 Constitutional provisions supporting social justice in India
The socialist character of the Constitution of India has been emphasised in the 
Preamble by spelling out the aspiration of the people to secure to all citizens 
social, economic and political justice. The Preamble also affirms a determination 
to secure liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship and equality of 
status and opportunity and to promote amongst the people a feeling of fraternity, 
ensuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation. In 1976, the 
42nd amendment of the constitution added the words ‘socialist5 and ‘secular5 
making India a ‘sovereign socialist secular democratic republic5.63 The 
constitution incorporates in Part III a range of Fundamental Rights which are 
legally enforceable and in Part IV a range of Directive Principles of State Policy 
which are not enforceable by any court, but are declared to be fundamental in the 
governance of the country and which the state has a duty to apply in making 
laws.66 It is the Directive Principles of the Constitution which elaborate the 
provisions relating to distributive and social justice.
65 Indira Gandhi’s Congress party brought the Constitution (Forty-Second
Amendment) Act 1976 which replaced ‘sovereign democratic republic’ with 
the new terms.
66 See Jagat Narain (1985: 198-222) for a discussion on the place of the Directive
Principles in the Indian Constitution. For a more recent evaluation of the 
relationship between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles, see 
Gokulesh Sharma (1993: 75-77).
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The Preamble, together with the Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles of State Policy constitute the most creative part of the Indian 
constitution. Bhagwati says: ‘They encapsulate the social and economic rights of 
the people and hold out social justice as the central feature of the new 
Constitutional order’.67 Incorporation of the term ‘socialist’ and its effect was 
recognised by the Supreme Court in the Nakara case,68 where the judges 
considered ‘socialism’ as the core basis of the decision itself, not as a mere 
rhetorical framework and declared that the principal aim of the socialist state is 
to eliminate inequality in income and status and the basic framework of socialism 
is to provide a decent standard of life to the working people and especially 
economic security from the cradle to the grave.
However, the framers of the Indian Constitution were not bound by any 
specific ideology or method of socialism. A mixed economy, with a great deal of 
industrial democracy and small scale industries, tending towards small self- 
sufficient units and self-determination for the individual in the Gandhian sense 
appears to have been encouraged. The term ‘socialist’ thus appears to have been 
used in a specifically Indian sense to ensure that continuous endeavour is made 
through various means such as nationalisation, taxation, public expenditure and 
public and private industries in accordance with the demand of time. It represents 
a process in the evolution of Indian society, says Narain,
67 Bhagwati (1984-1985: 568).
Nakara v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 130. For an earlier exposition of socialism
by the court, see Excel Wear v. Union of India (1978) 4 SCC 225. For 
examples of decisions in line with the Nakara case see Lingappa v. State of 
Maharashtra AIR 1985 SC 389 and Sadhuram v. Polin AIR 1984 SC 1471.
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. . .  to ensure that the wealth and means of production exist for the 
benefit of all persons in the society rather than for the selfish interest 
of a few individuals and that the individual is a trustee for the entire 
society so that the distribution of the material resources subserves the 
common good.69
The above description of the so-called ‘Indian socialism’ is however a 
simplification for the purpose of convenience. It may be criticised that this 
approach makes the constitutional provisions obscure and is but a half-hearted 
attempt to satisfy both the capitalist and socialist sections of the political 
spectrum. In Baxi’s words, “the motif of socialism looms large in an otherwise 
bourgeois constitutional text and context”.70 For the activist judges, however, the 
choice was socialism with strong emphasis on social justice.
It has been claimed that the changes brought forth by the 42nd 
Amendment and the inclusion of the word ‘socialist’ in the Preamble can neither 
be said to have been used in the Marxist or doctrinaire socialist sense nor does it 
resemble the sense carried by Fabian socialism.71 Baxi, however, finds in it a 
mature movement in the Constitutional conception of socialism from the Fabian 
to Marxist socialism and a systematic class bias towards socialist justice.72 
Likewise, Krishna Iyer has shown his strong reverence for Marx and advocated a 
cross-pollination of positivism and Marxism.73
69 Narain (1985: 202).
70 Baxi (1983: 3) noted that even though the Constitution is avowedly socialistic since
the amendment of 1976, judicial interpretation of the Constitution and the 
major economic legislation continue to betray strong capitalistic bias.
71 Narain (1985: 202).
72 Baxi (1983: 3).
73 Iyer (1992: 18) declares, “All great truths begin as blasphemies and one such great
truth is Marxism”. For Iyer’s approach to legal reform from a socialist
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This socialistic bias of the activist judges continues to be vehemently 
criticised on the ground that they misunderstand the nature of the Indian polity 
and the intents of the framers of the constitution.74 Criticisms have also been 
made that to stretch the constitution in favour of judicial socialism inevitably 
leads to tall claims, controversy and confusion with very little actual success.75 
Still, the charges of socialism appear to be exaggerated because the courts are 
fully aware of the limits within which they must operate and are conscious that 
they cannot significantly re-allocate public resources.76
The end result of the controversy appears to be that despite criticisms 
from the traditionalists and the difference of opinion among the activist judges as 
to the finer details, it has generally been affirmed and established that the 
Constitution of India is of a socialist nature - a combined effect of the Preamble, 
the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles. It also follows that the 
Constitution not only endorses social justice, it demands positive action towards 
that goal.
However, for the purpose of the development of PIL jurisprudence, this 
was not sufficient, because the matters relating to distributive and social justice 
found their place in the ‘unenforceable5 Directive Principles of State Policy and 
there arose the important question of how to translate into law the socialist
perspective, see also Iyer (1991b and 1985). According to Baxi (1985a: 293), 
Iyer is a neo-Marxist.
74 See Seervai (1983: 139) and Agrawala (1985).
75 Parmanand Singh (1986a: 336-347).
76 Cassels (1989: 512).
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approach of the constitution and how to deal with the relationship between the 
‘enforceable’ rights and the ‘unenforceable’ principles.
Soon after the promulgation of the Constitution, in 1951, the court held in 
the Dorairaian case77 that the Directive Principles of State Policy have to 
conform to and run as subsidiary to the chapter on Fundamental Rights. This was 
followed in Ouareshi78 explaining that a harmonious interpretation must be 
placed upon the constitution. Accordingly, the state, while implementing the 
Directive Principles of State Policy, must do so in such a way that its laws do not 
take away or abridge the Fundamental Rights. Similarly, in re Kerala Education 
Bill.79 it was said that in determining the scope of Fundamental Rights, the court 
can not entirely ignore the Directive Principles of State Policy but should adopt 
the principle of harmonious construction and ‘should attempt to give effect to 
both as much as possible’.80 All these cases proceeded on the assumption that 
the Fundamental Rights were superior to the Principles and that there is 
apparently a conflict between the two.
A departure was made in 1970, when Hedge J elaborated the principle of 
harmonious construction in a different way, explaining that there can be no 
conflict between the rights and the principles, because ‘they are complementary
77 Judgment by SR Das J in State of Madras v. Chamnakam Dorairaian AIR 1951 SC
226 at 228. See also Aiaib Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1952 Punj 309 at 
319.
78 MH Ouareshi v. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731 at 732.
79 AIR 1958 SC 956.
80 Ibid. at 957.
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and supplementary to each other.81
In 1973, in the leading case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala82 it 
was again held that the rights and the principles supplement each other and it is 
the duty of the court to ensure the application of the principles in harmony with 
the rights so long as the basic structure of the constitution is not destroyed. The 
issue in question was whether parliament can amend the constitution curtailing 
any of the Fundamental Rights.83 The court answered in the affirmative and 
upheld the validity of the newly inserted Article 31C,84 which conferred on 
Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Directive Principles a status superior to the 
Fundamental Rights referred to in Articles 14, 19 and 31. The court observed that 
while Fundamental Rights cannot be abrogated as a whole, reasonable 
abridgements of Fundamental Rights could be effected in the public interest.83 
The position was further enhanced when the court held in Mumbai Kamgar 
Sabha v. Abdulvai86 that where two judicial choices are available, the
81 Chandra Bavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore AIR 1970 SC 2042 at
2050.
82 AIR 1973 SC 1461.
8*3' Previously, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Parliament can make such 
amendments in Shankar Prasad v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 548 and Saiian 
Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 845. But in Golak Nath v. State of 
Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643, this power was taken away. In consequence, the 
Parliament passed the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act 1971 
seeking to restore the power. The 24th Amendment, along with the 25th, 26th 
and 29th amendments affected the fundamental rights.
84 Inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act 1971, section 3.
85 Ibid at 1462-63.
86 AIR 1976 SC 1455. This was followed by State of Kerala v. NM Thomas AIR 1976
SC 490.
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construction in conformity to the social philosophy of Part IV has preference.
The next great leap was the 42nd amendment (1976) of the constitution.
As we saw, this included the word ‘socialist’ in the Preamble which strengthened
the links between the Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights and
impressed upon the judges the importance of the Directive Principles and their
obligation to assist in the realisation of social justice.87 The 42nd amendment
also amended article 31C to confer primacy on all the directive principles of state
policy over the Fundamental Rights contained in Articles 14,19 and 31,88
However, Article 31C, as amended by the 42nd amendment, was struck
down by the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. V. Union of India89 as
unconstitutional on the ground that neither the principles, nor the rights can be
given absolute supremacy and that to destroy the guarantees given by Part III in
order to achieve the goals of Part IV would subvert the constitution by destroying
its basic structure. The Court held:
The Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of balance between 
Part III and Part IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is 
to disturb the harmony of the Constitution . . . Anything that destroys 
the balance between the two parts will ipso facto destroy an essential 
element of the basic structure of the Constitution .. ,90
In a forceful dissent, Bhagwati J refused to take a formal view of the
87 Tope (1982: 254-255).
88 Subsequently, the Constitution (Forty-forth Amendment) Act 1978, as an extension
of the 42nd amendment, further strengthened the position of the Directive 
Principles by incorporating new articles and by removing the right to property 
altogether from the list of fundamental rights and by placing it elsewhere as 
Article 300A.
89 AIR 1980 SC 1789.
90 Ibid at 1790.
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constitution, especially with regard to the right to equality guaranteed by Article 
14. This guarantee does not entail mere formal equality but embodies the concept 
of real and substantive equality which struck at inequalities arising on account of 
vast social and economic differentials and is consequently “an essential 
ingredient of social and economic justice”.91 So he maintained that although a 
law giving effect to social and economic justice in pursuance of Directive 
Principles might conflict with a formal and doctrinaire view of ‘equality before 
the law’ guarantees, yet it would almost always conform to the principle of 
equality before the law in its total magnitude and dimension.
In the aftermath of Minerva, in spite of a number of well-pronounced 
judgements, the debate has not been settled.92 The notion that Fundamental 
Rights override Directive Principles is still being supported by some writers and 
judges.93 But the principle of harmonious construction is followed in most of the 
cases.94 In line with Bhagwati’s dissenting opinion affirming the priority of the 
principles, in the case of Sanieeva Coke Manufacturing Co.Cv) Bharat Coking
91 Ibid. at 1850.
92 Gokulesh Sharma (1993: 77) says that the situation remains unclear, although the
courts have shown much judicial wisdom. Asad Hossain Choudhury (1996: 
16-23), however, believes that there has been a continuous process of 
development in favour of the principles.
93 C Singh (1982: 100) says that the directive principles misrepresent and
misunderstand the function of law being a part of imperialistic and 
paternalistic ideology. Seervai (1983: 1577-1694) criticised Minerva by saying 
that it represents ‘the current fashionable view’. For a recent case, see 
Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India AIR 1990 
SC 334.
94 See for example State of Tamil Nadu v. Abu Kavur Bai AIR 1984 SC 326;
Karmachari Sangh v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 246 at 308.




Coal Ltd,95 the court severely criticised the majority view of Minerva, but it was 
not overruled. However, in a number of cases, the court upheld the importance of 
social legislation and sought to restore the Directive Principles impinging on 
Fundamental Rights.96 The Indian experience shows that despite the 
compartmentalisation of the rights and principles, there has been, in practice, a 
dynamic interaction between these two parts which gradually enhanced the status 
of the principles.
It may be summarised that in India, the ‘social consciousness’ of the 
judges led them to ‘social activism’. They rejected the ‘colonial Anglo-Saxon’ 
jurisprudence and insisted that they possess law-making power. They advocated 
a social justice approach that has drawn its legitimacy from the socio-cultural 
norms of the country and from the Constitution. Since these social justice 
principles of the Constitution are placed as non-enforceable Directive Principles, 
a gradual enhancement of the status of the principles vis-a-vis the Fundamental 
Rights has been observed. This has enabled the court to emphasise social and 
collective rights and thus construct the rules of PIL.
2.3 The conceptual and constitutional basis of PIL in Pakistan and 
the Islamic approach
Pakistan was soon to follow the Indian example when PIL developed in the late
95 AIR 1982 SC 239.
96 See for example: Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 873;
Sonia Bhatia v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 1274 and Daktar 
Mazdoor Manch v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 2342.
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1980s.97 In 1988, the decision of the Supreme Court in Miss Benazir Bhutto v. 
Federation of Pakistan98 paved the way for PIL. This was followed by the leading 
case of Darshan Masih alias Rehmatay and others v. The State."  Afzal Zullah CJ, 
followed by Nasim Hasan Shah CJ, played vital role in the development of PIL as 
they invited PIL cases and attempted to establish a procedural framework to deal 
with PIL petitions.100 The argument that India has been influenced by the West in 
the development of PIL can be applied to the Pakistani scenario by saying that 
Pakistan has been influenced by the West and India, especially the latter.101
Pakistan, being an underdeveloped country like India, has the same 
problems of poverty and social injustice. Executive lawlessness combined with 
the failure of the legislature to ensure the progress of law has given rise to similar 
types of frustrations as have been experienced by the Indians. But perhaps the 
situation has been even more complicated in Pakistan because of the failure of 
democracy for prolonged periods due to the imposition of martial law.102 While
97 MH Khan (1993) provides the most comprehensive work on the Pakistani
development. See also Faqir Hussain (1993) and Syed Mushtaq Hussain 
(1994).
98 PLD 1988 SC 416.
99 PLD 1990 SC 513.
100 See Quetta Conference (1991: 126-152). The judges attempted to create a special
procedural structure within the judiciary, with the help of the administration, 
to receive and consider PIL petitions promptly. However, this project appears 
to have been abandoned now.
101 See, for example, MH Khan (1993: 9) who discusses Trubek and Cappelletti, but
this is after PEL has already been introduced in Pakistan.
102 Pakistan gained its independence also in 1947. It had its first Constitution only in
1956 which was annulled in 1958 by the first Martial Law. The second 
Constitution was adopted in 1962, but was abrogated in 1969 by the second 
Martial law. In 1973, came the third Constitution but it was kept in abeyance
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Pakistan had three Constitutions in the formal sense of the term, there were 
several interim Constitutions in between.103 One consequence of this chaos was 
the pathetic plight of the status of the fundamental rights of the people. Annulled, 
curbed or declared non-applicable, these rights could not be claimed by the 
aggrieved for long periods at a time. Whenever the Constitution was restored, the 
judiciary started to move towards establishing its authority till the next Martial 
Law came to halt everything once again.
This situation resulted in the popular perception that the traditional 
litigation was failing in many respects. The realisation dawned that ". . . the 
weaker sections of society because of their economic or social position, remain 
cut off from the rest of the society and thereby suffer hardships"104. The integrity 
of the entire legal system was in question, as Khan observed that the people 
seemingly do not respect the "Common Law" which they feel has been imported 
into the country.105 This feeling, it has been noted, was shared by a number of
from 1977 to 1985 by another Martial Law regime. For a constitutional history 
of Pakistan, see GW Choudhury (1969), Masud Ahmad (1978), Riaz Ahmad 
(1981), and Newberg (1995).
103 MH Khan (1993: footnote 2 at p.29), referring to the arguments forwarded by 
Shah (1986: 70) and Munir (1976: 62), argues that Pakistan has experienced 
nine constitutional arrangements since its independence in 1947. These are: (i) 
Government of India Act 1935 as adopted by Pakistan (Provisional 
Constitution) Order 1947; (ii) Constitution of 1956; (iii) The Laws 
(Continuance in Force) Order 1958; (iv) Constitution of 1962; (v) Provisional 
Constitution Order 1969; (vi) The Interim Constitution of 1972; (vii) 
Constitution of 1973; (viii) The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977; and 
(ix) Provisional Constitution Order *981.




The situation started changing as soon as the Martial Law was lifted in 
1985. In fact, this may be compared with the Indian situation in the aftermath of 
the emergency.107 The media came forward and started exposing social evils of 
the country.108 Investigative journalism was becoming very successful. Theatres, 
television programmes, books and articles all played their part in augmenting 
social consciousness.
At the same time, Pakistan witnessed a newly heightened social 
consciousness of the judiciary, the same factor that earlier played an important 
part in the development of PIL in India. Having the Constitution working with all 
the Fundamental Rights fully restored, the Judges began to appreciate their role 
and responsibility. This re-evaluation generated a change of attitude of the 
judiciary, termed by Mahmood and Shaukat as 'judicial glasnosf;109 a conscious 
effort to resort to judicial activism when necessary. The court gradually started 
not only self-criticism, but allowed criticism and fair comment from the legal 
scholars and even from the press.110
106 MH Khan (1993: 51) quotes Hamood-ur-Rahman CJ who in 1975 appealed to
discard the principles of administration of justice based on Anglo-Saxon ideas. 
Similarly, Justice Afzal Zullah has repeatedly refused to apply English legal 
principles on the ground that they are inadequate to ensure justice. See for 
example, Haii Nizam Khan v. Additional District Judge PLD 1976 Lah 930 
and Ghulam Ali v. Ghulam Sarwar Naavi PLD 1990 SC 1.
107 See above, pp. 28-29.
108 While describing the role of the media in detail MH Khan (1993: 54) says: "The
PIL which we are witnessing in Pakistan today is, to quite some extent, media 
spurred".
109 Mahmood and Shaukat (1992: Preface iv).
110 See MH Khan (1993: 40-43) for further discussion. One of the examples he cites
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The role of this social consciousness of the judges in the development of
PIL is apparent from the way they describe PIL. In Pakistan, PIL has been
consistently described as a task of the eradication of social evils through the
medium of law.111 Justice Shah says:
Law is a dynamic instrument fashioned by society for the purpose of 
achieving harmonious adjustment of human relations by eliminating 
social tensions and conflicts. If the law fails to respond to the needs of 
a changing society then either it will stifle the growth of the society 
and choke its progress or if the society is vigorous enough, it will cast 
away the law which stands in the way of its growth. Let me emphasise 
that if law is to earn the respect of the people and achieve its purpose 
of correcting injustices and to restore social equilibrium in the society 
it must accord with the concept of social justice.112
Although the promoters of PIL in Pakistan shared the notion of social 
consciousness with their Indian counterparts, one distinguishing element was 
apparent from the very beginning - the emphasis on Islam. While the Indians, 
under their secular Constitution, could not directly resort to the notions of 
‘D h a r m a the Pakistanis having an Islamic constitution, could not ignore Islam. 
Especially because, by the time PIL was being introduced, Islamisation of 
Pakistan was in full swing.
In spite of the different ways of interpretation, Islamisation is, in its broad 
sense, an attempt to hannonise different aspects of the life of individuals, 
societies and nations in accordance with the Islamic tenets. Kaushik says:
to prove his point involves a case where a lawyer moved an application for 
contempt of court against a Chief Justice because some of the judges were 
seen queuing up "just to receive the favour of a handshake from the ruler of 
the day". This appears to be an aggressive attempt by an activist to uphold the 
di gnity of the j udiciary.
111 MH Khan (1992: 84); Shah (1993b: 31).
112 Shah (1993a: 29).
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Islamization can broadly be identified as a historic process of religious 
socialisation in accordance with Islamic norms, precepts, value 
postulates and rituals. In other words, it underlines a process of 
religious orientation, indoctrination and enforcement of Islamic 
beliefs, traditions and thought processes. Owing to the pervasive nature 
of Islam, Islamization as a process assumes a wider scope and 
perspective encompassing philosophical, socio-economic and political 
strands of an individual follower of Islam or a Muslim community.113
In Pakistan, Islamisation has its roots in the very creation of the State.114 
When British India gained its independence from colonial rule, Islam was the 
basis on which two countries emerged instead of one. Pakistan was advocated 
and realised with the perceived notion that British Indian Muslims have their 
own history, culture, world view and aspirations sufficiently distinct from that of 
the Hindu majority to consider them as a separate nation. But at the time of its 
creation, due to the essentially modernist consensus of the leadership about the 
place of Islam, Pakistan was more secular than religious. As a compromise 
between the demands of the Islamists and the secularists, a commitment to Islam 
was acknowledged. Successive Pakistani Constitutions declared that Sovereignty 
belongs to Allah, the laws of Pakistan would be in accordance with the Quran and 
Sunna and provided for certain Islamic institutions. A slow headway towards 
Islamisation resulted due to the constant pressure from the Islamists and attempts 
by dictators or failing leadership to gain legitimacy by championing Islam.115
113 Kaushik (1993: 8).
114 Taylor (1983: 181-194) provides a summarised version of the background of
Islamisation in general. For more detailed account see Iqbal (1986). For 
Islamisation of law in Pakistan see Patel (1986), Mehdi (1994) and Shah 
(1995: 37-53).
115 According to Taylor (1983: 181) this is ‘Islamic symbolism’; Richter (1986: 131)
terms it ‘defensive Islamisation’.
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Effective Islamisation of Pakistan started in 1977 when the secular 
leadership of Bhutto was replaced by General Zia-ul-Haque. General Zia took 
several years to implement his ideas covering various aspects of the national life. 
The Constitution was changed affecting the structure of the government, 
introducing institutions like Shariat Courts and Majlis-i-Shura.116 Statutes were 
amended, repealed and promulgated effecting various aspects such as the penal 
laws, employment laws and the land laws of the country.117 The force of 
Islamisation was felt in the legal field not only as new Islamic laws but a number 
of judges started Islamising the law through their judgements.118
While introducing PIL, as they were under the Islamisation process, a 
most important issue for the pioneering judges was whether PIL conforms with 
the Islamic principles. They established this conformity and proceeded further by 
showing that the inspiration and rationale of PIL can be drawn from Islam 
itself.119 A Muslim individually and a society collectively must encourage and 
fight for good deeds and discourage and prevent bad deeds - the duty to uphold 
human rights, or haqite-ul-abad, is a paramount duty.120 This concept of human 
rights is much wider than the notions of a number of Fundamental Rights
116 For a comprehensive list of the Islamic provisions in the Constitution of Pakistan,
see Khosa (1995a: 17-22).
117 Shah (1995: 37-53) furnishes an overview of these statutes and concludes that by
1995, practically all the laws in force in Pakistan have been brought in accord 
with the Islamic injunctions.
118 MH Khan (1993: 48-55).
119 Awan (1992: 68) and MH Khan (1993: 48-53).
1 90‘ This is known as the principle of amer bil maroof and nehi anil munkir. See Awan 
(1992: 67-68).
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declared in the Constitution. It is a constitutional obligation of an Islamic State to
protect the rights of every individual and for this purpose justice based on Adi
and Ahsan fully meets the requirements of social, economic and political justice.
A1-Quran, the sacred book, says:
O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah as witness to fair dealing, 
and let not the hatred of others to you made you swerve to wrong and 
depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and fear Allah, for 
Allah is well acquainted with all that ye do.121
This and many other similar declarations provide the validity and legality of a 
social justice approach.
In the light of this special status of Islam in Pakistan, PIL activists were 
required to establish that the concept and techniques of PIL are in conformity 
with the Islamic provisions as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan.122 
Pakistan is an Islamic Republic where Islam is the state religion, it is not a 
secular state like India.123 The Constitution contains a number of very important 
Islamic provisions.124 Out of these, the Preamble or the Objectives Resolution 
and the principles of policy are very significant.
The Preamble, containing the Objectives Resolution, declares the 
sovereignty of Allah alone which is delegated to the State of Pakistan through its 
people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust.
121 Al-Quran Chapter 5 Ayat 8. For further examples, see Chapter 2 Ayat 195, 
Chapter 7 Ayat 29, and Chapter 31 Ayat 92.
1 7 7 *For a discussion about the constitutionality of PIL in Pakistan, see Hussain (1993: 
76-83) and MH Khan (1993: 43-48).
123 Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.
124 Khosa (1995a: 17-22) outlines the Islamic provisions of the Constitution of 1973
and compares them with the Islamic provisions of the earlier Constitutions.
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It also declares that the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and 
social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed and that the Muslims 
shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in 
accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy 
Quran and the Sunna. Chapter 2 of the Constitution provides for the Principles of 
Policy. They include, among other things, the duty of the State to take steps to 
ensure the Islamic way of life (Article 31), promotion of social justice and 
eradication of social evils (Article 37) and the promotion of social and economic 
well-being of the people (Article 38).
The Fundamental Rights as guaranteed by the Constitution have been 
discussed in Part II, Chapter I ( Articles 8-28). They generally provide first 
generation or political rights, such as the right to life or liberty, freedom of 
movement, assembly and speech, right to property, right to equality and non­
discrimination etc. Article 199 provides for the writ jurisdiction of the High 
Court giving it power to make orders to enforce the Fundamental Rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court has similar powers to issue 
writs under Article 184(3) when it considers that a question of public importance 
with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights is involved.
The Preamble and the Principles of Policy in the Constitution do not have 
the same status as the Fundamental Rights, even though they contain the bulk of 
the social and collective rights. In the Constitution of 1956, Article 23 declared 
that the State was to be guided in the formation of its policies by the Directive 
Principles but such provisions could not be enforced in any Court. Article 7 of
59
the Constitution of 1962 and Article 29 of the Constitution of 1973 said, with
respect to the Principles of Policy, that it is the responsibility of each organ and
authority of the State, and of each person performing functions on behalf of an
organ or authority of the State, to act in accordance with those principles in so far
as they relate to the functions of the organ or authority.
Despite the non-enforceability,, the court proceeded to interpret the
provisions creatively in Haii Nizam Khan v. Additional District Judge:
The judiciary which is not included in the definition of the State 
cannot direct the organs, authorities and persons included in the 
definition of the State to act in accordance with the principles of 
policy. But this does not mean that the Superior Judiciary would not be 
able, on account of the said bar, either: (i) to set down a rule for itself 
to follow the Principles of Policy: or (ii) to declare it for the 
subordinate judiciary to act in accordance therewith.125
With the insertion of Article 2A in the Constitution in 1985, the 
responsibility to act in accordance with the principles has gained further 
support.126 Article 2A declares that the principles and provisions set out in the 
Objectives Resolution are a substantive part of the Constitution and shall have 
effect accordingly. If any organ of the State fails to implement the sacred pledge 
as set out in the Principles of Policy, then there is no impediment on the judiciary 
to give effect to these principles. The Preamble and Article 2A, which 
emphasises the rights guaranteed by Islam, thus became powerful weapons to be 
used by activist judges.
Accordingly, in the case of Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan127 the
125 Above note 106 at 979.
126 Revival of the Constitution 1973 Order, 1985 (Presidential Order 14 of 1985).
127 Above note 98.
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Supreme Court extended the scope of Fundamental Rights and observed that such
rights include the rights guaranteed by Article 2A as well as the rights available
under the Directive Principles of Policy. The court explained:
While construing Article 184(3), the interpretative approach should not 
be ceremonious observance of the rules or usage of interpretation, but 
regard should be had to the object and the purpose for which this 
Article is enacted i.e. this interpretative approach must receive 
inspiration from the triad of provisions which saturate and invigorate 
the entire Constitution, namely, the Objectives Resolution (Article 
2A), the fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State 
Policy so as to achieve democracy, tolerance, equality and social 
justice according to Islam.128
This is a very wide approach and enables the court to assume an activist role in 
promoting Islamic socio-economic and political justice declared in the non- 
enforceable Objectives Resolution and Directive Principles. Subsequently, in 
Darshan Masih v. The State.129 the Court held that any conceivable just and 
proper order can be passed which is deemed to be appropriate for enforcement of 
these rights. This opened the gates for PIL and soon afterwards, in the Quetta 
conference, the judges invited PIL cases by declaring a procedural structure to 
receive and consider PIL petitions.130
It may be summarised that in Pakistan, similar to India, the judges were 
motivated by a strong sense o f ‘social consciousness5. They were ready to discard 
traditional principles through social activism. Due to the ongoing Islamisation of 
the laws, they demonstrated that PIL is not contradictory to Islamic principles and 
further proceeded to show that PIL draws its inspiration and legitimacy from the
128 Ibid; at 421.
129 Above note 99.
130 Quetta Conference (1991: 126-152).
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Islamic social justice tenets as has been declared by the Constitution. The non- 
enforceable principles of policy, which contain the Islamic social justice rights, 
were given a very high status in relation to the Fundamental Rights. This enabled 
the judges to promote economic and social rights and formulate the principles of 
PIL.
2.4 Conceptual and constitutional basis of PIL in Bangladesh
As regards the background of the development of PIL, the Bangladeshi situation 
is similar to that of Pakistan and India in several respects. First, there is a 
common historical heritage. Bangladesh was a part of British India till 1947 and 
then of Pakistan till 1971. Second, the social and economic conditions in 
Bangladesh are very similar to the two neighbours - all of them are third world 
developing countries. Third, as PIL developed in India after the withdrawal of 
Emergency and in Pakistan after the termination of martial law, it developed in 
Bangladesh after the restoration of democracy in 1990.
Due to these similarities, it may be assumed that the Bangladeshi lawyers 
and judges advocated the same type of social justice approach as in India or 
Pakistan. But in practice, the constitutional provisions as well as the 
constitutional developments are distinct enough for the Bangladeshi Court to 
proceed in a somewhat different direction. The present sub-chapter analyses the 
ways in which the spirit of the Constitution is explained and understood by the 
Bangladeshi Supreme Court. We argue that the result has been a theoretical basis 
of PIL where the primary emphasis is not on social and economic justice of the
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people but on the place of the citizen applicants in the power-relations debate.
The development and growth of the cases and activities relating to PIL 
will be analysed in detail in chapter 3. Here, our concern is to examine the rules 
of interpretation of the constitutional provisions in favour of the recognition of 
PIL.
2.4.1 Social and collective justice provisions in the Constitution of 
Bangladesh
The bias towards social and collective justice in the Constitution of Bangladesh 
can be traced back to its origin. In April 1971, the Proclamation of Independence
131was issued. This historic document proclaimed independence against unjust
war and genocide and acclaimed heroism, bravery and revolutionary fervour of
the people. A major aim was .. to ensure for the people of Bangladesh equality,
human dignity and social justice."132 So the document envisaged was an
'autochthonous' and 'social justice' Constitution. In December 1972, the
Constitution was adopted. The Preamble of the Constitution of Bangladesh says:
We, the people of Bangladesh, having proclaimed our independence 
on the 26th day of March, 1971 and through a historic war for national 
independence, established the independent sovereign People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh;
Pledging that the high ideals of absolute trust and faith in the 
Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning 
economic and social justice, which inspired our heroic people to 
dedicate themselves to, and our brave martyrs to sacrifice their lives in, 
the war for national independence, shall be fundamental principles of 
the Constitution;
131 See AP Blaustein et al. (eds.) (1977: 59-61) for the text of the Proclamation.
132 Ibid. at 60.
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Further pledging that it shall be a fundamental aim of the State 
to realise through the democratic process a socialist society, free from 
exploitation - a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human 
rights and freedom, equality and justice, political, economic and 
social, will be secured for all citizens;
Affirming that it is our sacred duty to safeguard, protect and 
defend this Constitution and to maintain its supremacy as the 
embodiment of the will of the people of Bangladesh so that we may 
prosper in freedom and may make our full contribution towards 
international peace and co-operation in keeping with the progressive 
aspirations of mankind;
In our Constituent Assembly, this eighteenth day of Kartick, 
1379 B.S. corresponding to the fourth day of November, 1972 A.D., do 
hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.
There are certain general rules of interpretation of the Preamble.133 It is neither a 
source of power nor a limitation on the enacting provisions of the Constitution. It 
can not be used to modify the clear language of the Constitution but if the 
language indicates more than one meaning, the meaning which is nearest to the 
purpose of the Constitution is to be preferred. In cases of ambiguity of the 
enacting part, the Preamble may be considered in order to resolve the doubt.
Despite these general rules, judges in the 8th Amendment case134 held 
that it is the intention of the makers of the original Constitution, as expressed in 
the Preamble, that is the guide to its interpretation - they regard the Preamble as 
the pole star and a part of the Constitution.135 This is declared on the basis that
133 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 44) examines these principles with reference to the
Bangladesh Constitution.
134 Anwar Hossain Chowdhurv v. Bangladesh 1989 BLD (Spl) 1.
135 Ibid. at 59, 147 and 174.
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the Preamble can only be amended by referendum.136 Thus when a constitutional
provision is clear but runs counter to the Preamble, the intention of the framers of
the Constitution must be considered.137
As a result the intention of the framers to attain a socialist society through
democratic means becomes very important. 'Socialism meaning economic and
social justice' requires to be attained. In the 8th Amendment case. BH
Chowdhury J boasts that few constitutions have a Preamble like this one and
observes that the Preamble under the Bangladesh Constitution is given a status
higher than it enjoys in the Indian or Pakistani Constitution.138 In a recent case,
Mustafa Kamal J says:
. . .  the Preamble of our constitution stands on a different footing from 
that of other Constitutions by the very fact of the essence of its birth 
which is different from others.139
While interpreting the Preamble in favour of social and collective justice, 
it must be read along with Article 7. It declares:
(1) All powers in the Republic belong to the people, and their 
exercise on behalf of the people shall be effected only under, and by 
the authority of, this Constitution.
(2) This Constitution is, as the solemn expression of the will of 
the people, the supreme law of the Republic, and if any other law is 
inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of 
the inconsistency, be void.
1‘ Under Article 142(1 A), an amendment of the Preamble, along with some other 
important Articles, requires a referendum.
111 This does not, however, mean that the Court can stretch the meaning so as to 
support any interpretation it wants to give.
138 Above note 134 at 59.
139 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh and others (TAP 20") 17 BLD (AD) (1997)
1.
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The various functionaries and institutions created by the Constitution exercise
people's power, not their own indigenous or native powers. Mustafa Kamal J
regards this Article as a cornerstone of the Constitution and a proud expression of
constitutionalism.140 Latifur Rahman J observed recently in FAP 20:
This supremacy of the Constitution is a special and unique feature in 
our Constitution. Neither in the constitution of India nor in the 
Constitution of Pakistan there is reassertion of the supremacy of the 
Constitution. This is a substantive provision which contemplates 
exercise of all powers in the Republic through the authority of the 
Constitution.141
Since the ultimate power belongs to the people, the priority must be given to their
collective rights and interests. This is in harmony with the aims and objectives of
the Constitution as declared in the Preamble.
As to the rights and interests of the people that are to be upheld in
accordance with Article 7, the Constitution declares certain matters to be
fundamental. Part II of the Constitution (Articles 8-25) contains the Fundamental
Principles of State Policy while Part III (Articles 26-47) sets out the Fundamental
Rights. These provisions are very much similar to those of the Indian and
Pakistani constitutions.142
Regarding the Fundamental Principles, Article 8(2) says:
The principles set out in this Part shall be fundamental to the 
governance of Bangladesh, shall be applied by the State in the making 
of laws, shall be a guide to the interpretation of the Constitution and of 
the other laws of Bangladesh, and shall fonn the basis of the work of 
the State and of its citizens, but shall not be judicially enforceable.
140 Mustafa Kamal (1995:9).
141 Above note 139 at 23. However, it must be noted that although Article 7
emphasises supremacy of the Constitution, such supremacy is automatically 
preserved in a written Constitution whether or not expressly declared.
142 See above chapters 2.2.2 and 2.3.
66
Article 8(1) says that the principles of absolute trust and faith in the Almighty 
Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social 
justice, together with the principles derived from them as set out in Part II 
constitute the Fundamental Principles of state policy. It also states that absolute 
trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions.
BH Chowdhury J notes in the 8th Amendment case that Article 8 is a 
protected Article and cannot be amended without referendum.143 This shows the 
importance attached to this Article. Kamal Hossain says that the Bangladesh 
Constitution has gone beyond both the Indian and Pakistani Constitution in this 
regard.144 It not only lays down that these principles would be applied in law 
making as provided in the Indian Constitution, but it also declares the Principles 
as guide to the interpretation of laws and basis of the work of the State and its 
citizens.
The Constitution sets out the Fundamental Principles under the following 
heads: promotion of local government institutions (Article 9), participation of 
women in national life (Article 10), democracy and human rights (Article 11), 
principles of ownership (Article 13), emancipation of peasants and workers 
(Article 14), provision of basic necessities (Article 15), rural development and 
agricultural revolution (Article 16), free and compulsory education (Article 17), 
public health and morality (Article 18), equality of opportunity (Article 19), work 
as a right and duty (Article 20), duties of citizens and of public servants (Article
143 Above note 134 at 61.
144 Kamal Hossain (1992: 9 and 1997: 49).
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21), separation of judiciary from the executive (Article 22), national culture 
(Article 23), national monuments (Article 24), promotion of international peace, 
security and solidarity (Article 25).
The Fundamental Principles contain a charter for extensive affirmative 
action. They are re-distributory rather than conservative in character and aim to 
bring change in a constitutional way. Ishtiaq Ahmed goes so far as to say that 
they are the nation's dream of social revolution.145
As regards the Fundamental Rights, Art 26 declares that all existing and 
newly made laws must conform with Part III containing Fundamenta^rights and 
any inconsistent law will become void to the extent of such inconsistency. The 
Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III include: equality before law 
(Article 27), discrimination on grounds of religion, etc. (Article 28), equality of 
opportunity in public employment (Article 29), prohibition of foreign titles, etc. 
(Article 30), right to protection of law (Article 31), protection of right to life and 
personal liberty (Article 32), safeguards as to arrest and detention (Article 33), 
prohibition of forced labour (Article 34), protection in respect of trial and 
punishment (Article 35), freedom of movement (Article 36), freedom of assembly 
(Article 37), freedom of association (Article 38), freedom of thought and 
conscience, and of speech (Article 39), freedom of profession or occupation 
(Article 40), freedom of religion (Article 41), rights to property (Article 42) and 
protection of home and correspondence (Article 43).
145 Ishtiaq Ahmed (1993: 36).
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Article 44 declares that the right to move the High Court Division for the 
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III is guaranteed.146 
Powers of the High Court Division to issue ‘certain orders and directions’ in 
order to enforce the Fundamental Rights are elaborated in Article 102.147 
Although the word ‘writ’ is not used, this Article specifically deals with all the 
five types of writs known and used in common law jurisdictions.148 This Article 
provides a mechanism to enforce public rights and interests.
2.4.2 Inter-relation between principles and rights
Apparently, the broad provisions of the Constitution of Bangladesh are similar to 
the comparable provisions of the Indian and Pakistani constitutions. Accordingly, 
the point of demarcation between the rights and the principles is judicial 
enforceability.149 Similarly, the Rights guaranteed under Part III are political in 
nature while the Principles declared in Part II relate to economic, social and 
cultural matters.
We have already analysed the ways in which the unenforceable Principles
146 It has been held in Haii Jovnal Abedin v. State 30 DLR (1978) 375 that the right to
enforce the Fundamental Rights is itself a Fundamental Right. See also 
Government of Bangladesh v. Ahmad Naiir 33 DLR (AD) (1981) 257. The 
effect is clearly demonstrated in the recent case of Jobon Nahar and other v. 
Bangladesh and others 49 DLR (1997) 108. In this case the Court held that 
since the right to enforce a Fundamental Right is another Fundamental Right, 
the petitioner can move the Court even though his application was rejected by 
the Court of Settlement on the ground of limitation. In India, the situation is 
the same under Article 32 of the Constitution.
147 For the text of Article 102, see below chapter 4.3.
148 For further discussion, see below chapter 4.3.
149 Article 8(2) and 26 of the Constitution of Bangladesh.
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are given very high status in India and Pakistan.150 Such an emphasis on the 
Principles enables the Court to give priority to social and economic matters and 
serves the interest of the people. In fact, the extent of the importance given to the 
Principles is indicative of the Court's commitment to social justice. In the 
Bangladeshi context, the issue is to what extent the Court is emphasising on the 
importance of the Fundamental Principles vis-a-vis the Fundamental Rights.
Generally, the position of the Principles as regards the interpretation of the 
Bangladesh Constitution is the same as in India. The Principles are a guide to 
interpretation and the Court must construe constitutional and legal provisions in 
conformity with the Principles.131 Any law made to further the Principles is 
prima facie constitutional. The Principles are used to test the reasonableness of 
legal and constitutional provisions and in cases of vagueness or double meaning 
of any law, the meaning close to the Principles must be taken. In cases of a 
provision apparently repugnant to the Principles, the Court must attempt to 
interpret the provision in conformity with the Principles.
This raises the question of conflict between Principles and Rights. We 
have already seen the Indian position where the judges have discarded the 
’supremacy of rights’ doctrine and have gradually adopted a liberal 'harmonious 
interpretation' rule, giving the Principles higher importance.152 Mahmudul Islam 
observes that since the Bangladeshi and Indian constitutional scheme in this
150 See above chapters 2.2.2 and 2.3.
151 For a discussion in the context of the Bangladeshi Constitution, see Mahmudul
Islam (1995: 49).
132 See above chapter 2.2.2.
70
regard is the same, "the same position should obtain under our constitutional 
dispensation."153
However, in anticipation of possible conflicts in cases where welfare
measures of the State might conflict with the Fundamental Rights, the framers of
the Constitution provided some exceptions in Article 47(1).154 In matters
specified in that Article, any law made shall be immune from challenge on the
ground of inconsistency with the Fundamental Rights if the Parliament declares
that such law has been made to give effect to any of the Fundamental
Principles.155 Accordingly, classification of statutes by the Parliament will
prevent a conflicting situation. Sultan Hossain Khan J declared that the Court has
wide powers in this matter because the reasonableness of such classification is
justiciable by the Court:
In case of conflict between Fundamental Rights and Fundamental 
Principles of State Policy, the Fundamental Rights shall prevail and 
laws so made which are inconsistent with Fundamental Rights should 
be declared void by this court. It is, however, to be noticed that in 
order to strike a balance between public good and fundamental right of 
an individual, harmony is to be established between a statute seeking 
welfare of the community and fundamental right and to that end the 
executive is authorised to make a reasonable classification as to the 
subject matter of the statute. This reasonableness of the classification
153 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 50).
154 The exceptions include: acquisition, nationalisation, requisition or taking over
control or management of property; amalgamation of commercial or other 
bodies; controlling the rights of administrators or executives of such bodies; 
controlling rights to search mineral wealth; protection of government ventures 
through monopoly; controlling rights to property and any right in respect of 
profession, occupation, trade or business including rights of employers or 
employees.
155 According to Gajendragadkar (1975: 4) this provision shows that the founding
fathers attached great importance to the Principles and they wanted to reserve 
to Parliament full freedom to regulate or control, within reasonable limits, the 
Fundamental Rights in order to achieve the objectives mentioned in Part II.
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is justiciable by Superior Court and must be judged by standards of an 
ordinary, prudent and reasonable man.156
This does not, however, conclusively answer the question of enforceability
of the Fundamental Principles where there is no conflict with the Rights. In
Sheikh Abdus Sabur v. Returning Officer and others.157 BH Chowdhury CJ held
that the Fundamental Principles of State Policy cannot be judicially enforced
despite the supremacy of the Constitution recognised by the Constitution itself.
However, a more elaborate discussion can be found in the recent case of Kudrat-
E-Elahi Panir v. Bangladesh,158 where Shahabuddin J said:
The reason for not making these principles judicially "enforceable is 
obvious. They are in the nature of People’s programme for socio­
economic development of the countiyvin. peaceful "hianner, not 
overnight, but gradually. Implementation of these Programmes require 
resources, technical know-how and many other things including mass- 
education. Whether all these pre-requisites for a peaceful socio­
economic revolution exist is for the State to decide.159
The Court discussed the claim that even if the Principles are not enforceable, the
Court can declare a law void on the ground of manifest inconsistency with any
provision of the Constitution including the Principles. The Court examined a
number of Indian PIL cases and concluded that they are not relevant since no law
was made in contravention of any Directive Principle in those cases. In a
concurring opinion, Mustafa Kamal J explained:
It is the Law of the Constitution itself that the fundamental principles 
of state policy are not laws themselves but ‘principles’. To equate 
‘principles’ with Taws’ is to go against the Law of the Constitution 
itself. These principles shall be applied by the State in the making of
156 Hamidul Huq Chowdhury v. Bangladesh 34 DLR (1982) 190 at 200.
157 41 DLR (AD) (1989) 30.
158 44 DLR (AD) (1992) 319.
159 Ibid. at 331.
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laws, i.e., principles of policy will serve as a beacon of light in the 
making of laws, shall be a guide to the interpretation of the 
Constitution and of the other laws of Bangladesh, and shall form the 
basis of the work of the State and of its citizens. Not being laws, these 
principles shall not be judicially enforceable.160
He refused to accept an interpretation which would bring the principles at par 
with the rights on two grounds: first, the framers of the Constitution, if they so 
wished, would have provided for such an expression - the omission was 
‘deliberate and calculativeh Second, Article 8(2) proclaims the Fundamental 
Principles of State Policy as principles, not laws and that is the mandate of the 
Constitution.
This rather traditional stance of the Appellate Division appears to be rigid 
and unfavourable to creative interpretation of the provisions of the Fundamental 
Principles. The only way for the progressive judges is to resort to the rule that the 
Principles are a guide to interpretation, and avoid any dispute as to the primacy of 
Rights over the Principles.
The leading example on the matter is Kudrat-E-Elahi Panir161 where the 
Appellate Division was asked to interpret Article 59 relating to local government. 
The Court took the help of the Fundamental Principles enumerated in Articles 9 
and 11 relating to popular representation and democracy and consequently held 
that there was no scope for forming a local government body composed of non­
elected persons.162 Recently, in Aftab Uddin v. Bangladesh.163 the issue was the
160 Ibid. at 346.
161 Above note 158.
162 Ibid. at 336.
163 48 DLR (1996) 1.
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interpretation of Article 116 relating to the control and discipline of the sub­
ordinate courts. Naimuddin Ahmed J interpreted the Article in favour of the 
constitutional aim of separation of judiciary as has been enunciated in the 
Preamble and the Fundamental Principles.
This technique of expanding the scope of Fundamental Rights has been 
used in a few public interest cases. In Danish Milk.164 the right to life has been 
expanded to mean right to protection of health and normal longevity of an 
ordinary human being.163 Kazi Ebadul Hoque J expanded the meaning of Articles 
31 and 32 with the help of Article 18(1), which contains the Principle relating to 
public health and morality. In FAP 20.166 BB Roy Choudhury declared that right 
to life encompasses within its ambit the protection and preservation of 
environment and ecological balance. The fact that the Bangladeshi Constitution 
has no provision relating to environment similar to Article 48A of the Indian 
Constitution did not prevent the judge from making this expansion.
Our discussion illustrates that the most peculiar feature, in the inter­
relation between the Rights and the Principles in Bangladesh, is the provision of 
Article 47(1). Laws relating to specific matters are granted immunity even if they 
contradict the Rights if the Parliament declares that such law has been made to 
give effect to any of the Principles. Article 47(1) has enhanced the position and
164 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh, represented by Secretary of the Ministry 
of Commerce and others 48 DLR (1996) 438 at 442.
163 The judge followed a number of Indian decisions including Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802 and Olga Tellis v. Bombay 
Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180.
166 Above note 139 at 33.
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status of the Principles as Parliament has been given express power to make laws 
to attain the objectives of the Principles. This has helped to avoid possible 
confrontations between Rights and Principles in many cases. However, protection 
of Article 47(1) means that the judges can not challenge a considerable amount of 
legislation in spite of violation of Fundamental Rights. There is less room for 
them to manoeuvre.
As to the emphasis of the Bangladeshi Court on the Principles, it appears 
that strict adherence to the rule of non-enforceability in Kudrat-E-Elahi Panir167 
has limited the scope of judicial activism. The position of the Supreme Court 
appears to be less activist than that of the Indian courts. Progressive judges 
resorted to the only way open for creative interpretation - using the Principles as a 
guide to widen the scope of the Rights. Although some progress has been made, 
especially in recent decisions, this avenue still remains under-exploited.
2.4.3 Gradual decline of the extent of social justice bias in the Constitution
The Constitution of Bangladesh, when it first came into operation, declared four 
Fundamental Principles in the Preamble: nationalism, socialism, democracy and 
secularism. It was further declared in the Preamble, as we have seen, that it shall 
be a fundamental aim of the State to realise through the democratic process a 
socialist society, free from exploitation - a society in which the rule of law, 
fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice, political, economic 
and social will be secured for all citizens. While the social, economic and cultural
167 Above note 158.
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rights were recognised as Fundamental Principles of State Policy, Article 10 in its
original form declared:
A socialist economic system shall be established with a view to 
ensuring the attainment of a just and egalitarian society, free from 
exploitation of man by man.
An important feature of this socialism was its secular nature. As Article 12 said:
The principle of secularism shall be realised by the elimination of:
(a) communalism in all its forms,
(b) the granting by the State of political status in form of any religion,
(c) the abuse of religion for political purposes and
(d) any discrimination against or persecution of, persons practising a 
particular religion.
Thus the similarity with the Indian Constitution is apparent - a Constitution with
strong tendency towards secularism and socialism. In the University of Dacca v.
Pr S Hussain.168 BH Chowdhury J said:
Revolutions are the locomotives of history and the national liberation 
struggle is a phase in Democratic Revolution for achieving an 
egalitarian society where class contractions are eliminated and 
socialist means of production and distribution is achieved. Our heroic 
war of liberation was launched in that spirit and the nation was 
baptised in blood.169
The framers of the Constitution, like in India, did not declare any specific 
ideology or mode of socialism. The Constitution actually envisaged a welfare 
democracy. It has been argued that with respect to the Preamble of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh, analogy can not be drawn from communist
168 34 DLR (AD) (1982) 1.
169 Ibid. at 18.
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philosophy.170 The Constitution envisages a traditional democratic process and a
Welfare State and its language cannot be construed with reference to a radically
different political philosophy. As to the expressions of ‘socialism’ and ‘socialist
society’, Mahmudul Islam says:
Apparently these expressions are vague, but the vagueness disappears 
when we pay attention to the fact that the framers not only used these 
expressions but also stated the mode of achieving it by using the 
expression ‘through democratic process’ and providing in the 
substantive part of the Constitution a 18th Century tripartite form of 
government. Read in the proper perspective, there remains no doubt 
that the framers did not allude to the communist philosophy of State 
organisation, but conceived of a democratically run welfare State to 
eliminate inequality of income and status and standards of life, and to 
provide a decent standard of living to the working mass of the
171country.
So the term ‘socialist society’ in the Preamble does not indicate socialism in the 
sense in which it was practised in the East European countries or in the former 
Soviet Union.
There was a shift from left to right after 1975 when the ruling party 
(Awami League) was replaced by General Zia and his party. The scheme of 
welfare democracy was not altered. But, after the mid-1970s, while India, from a 
‘sovereign democratic republic’ became a ‘sovereign socialist secular democratic 
republic’,172 Bangladesh was moving towards the opposite direction. In the 
Preamble, secularism was replaced by ‘Absolute faith and trust in the Almighty 
Allah’ and the term socialism was substituted by ‘socialism meaning economic
170 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 46) criticises BH Chowdhury’s reliance on the
communist philosophy in University of Dacca v. Dr S Hussain above note 168.
171 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 46).
172 The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act 1976.
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and social justice5.173 Article 10 and 12, relating to socialism and secularism
respectively, were changed or thrown away.174 Replacement of the term
'socialism1 was an attempt by the new regime to demonstrate its rightist stand. It
was also stressed that the aim is more important than the ideology or method of
achieving it and that no particular doctrine of socialism is adhered to. Actually,
this appears to be a veiled indication that the future chosen path is that of market
economy and multi-party democracy.
The right to property is the best example that demonstrates the change.173
Article 42(2), as originally adopted, provided for acquisition, nationalisation or
requisition of property with or without compensation. It was accordingly
observed in Md Shoib v. Government of Bangladesh176 that:
A socialistic economic system in which instruments and means of 
production and distribution shall be under the ownership or control of 
the people is a Fundamental Principle of State Policy.177
In 1977, the option to provide for acquisition, nationalisation or requisition 
without compensation was taken away.178 As we have seen, in order to give
173 This was done in 1977 by the Proclamations Order No.l and later ratified by the
Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act (No. 1 of 1979).
174 Article 10 now deals with participation of women in national life while Article 12
remains omitted from the Constitution.
175 Article 13, which remains unaltered, declares the Fundamental Principle relating
to ownership. It says that the people shall own or control the instruments and 
means of production and distribution and with this end in view, three types of 
ownership are recognised - state ownership, co-operative ownership and 
private ownership.
176 27 DLR (1975) 315.
177 Ibid. at 326.
178 Proclamations Order No. 1 of 1977.
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priority to the collective rights over individual rights, the right to property in 
India has been deleted from the chapter of Fundamental Rights to elsewhere in 
1978.179 Unlike in India, the right to property is still a Fundamental Right in 
Bangladesh. But the Parliament has the option, in case of land reform legislation, 
to declare a particular statute to be made under the protection of Article 47(1). 
This is to avoid any possible conflict with a judiciary enforcing individual 
citizen's right to property. Kamal Hossain compares this with India and notes the 
absence of the long struggle between the legislature and the judiciary regarding 
land reform legislation.180
Our discussion illustrates that the Bangladeshi Constitution, like the 
Indian one, envisages welfare democracy and contains ample provisions to 
inspire and direct the Court to embark on social justice issues - there is no major 
difference in the two constitutions in this regard. But the historical experience of 
the Bangladeshi Court is different. Also, especially after the Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution, the social justice bias seems to be less pronounced compared to 
the Indian Constitution. Finally, while PIL was being introduced, the Indian 
Constitution was gradually increasing its socialist tendency. In Bangladesh, on 
the other hand, it appears that the socialist bias in the Constitution is gradually on 
the wane due to the efforts of the law makers. The Indian activists focused on
179 See above chapter 2.2.2.
180 Kamal Hossain (1992: 7 and 1997: 48). He observes that, unlike India, in the
1950s, a challenge in the High Court of Dhaka impugning the constitutionality 
of Zamindari abolition legislation resulted in the Court upholding the validity 
of such legislation and the Supreme Court had affirmed the judgement of the 
High Court. See Jibendra Kishor Acharva v. East Pakistan 9 DLR (SC) (1957) 
21 .
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social justice because that was the issue of the day. For the Bangladeshi activists, 
there was already less emphasis on social justice constitutionally when PIL was 
about to be introduced.
2.4.4 The place of Islam in the Constitution and its influence on social justice 
issues
In Pakistan, as we have already examined, Islamic principles are given high 
status and socio-economic issues, being endorsed and inspired by Islam, have 
enabled PIL to develop.181 A comparison with Pakistan is required not only 
because Bangladesh has a majority of Muslim population but also because it was 
a part of Pakistan till 1971.
Although the people of Bangladesh are pre-dominantly Muslim, there is a 
strong tradition of harmony with other religious communities and the religion 
practised is liberal in outlook.182 In 1972, the victorious Awami League and its 
allies clearly opted for a secular system.183 But subsequently, the Military 
regimes found it politically expedient to de-secularise the Constitution.184 Since 
Islam is a part of the national identity, these changes were generally supported or
181 See above chapter 2.3.
182 Wright (1987: 15-27) believes that the local culture has more influence on
Bangladeshi Muslims than it has on the people of other Muslim countries. 
This is mainly due to the traditional pacifist ideologies of Sufis and hermits 
who preached Islam in Bengal. See also Banu (1992).
183 See Maniruzzaman (1983: 184-219) for a comparative analysis of the secular and
Islamic trends.
184 Emajuddin Ahamed (1983: 1114-1119) and Emajuddin Ahamed and Nazneen
(1990: 795-808) examine whether this pro-Islamic trend is revivalism or 
power-politics.
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at least tolerated by the general public and protests by the opponents were too 
weak to stop the process. Even subsequent democratic governments found it 
unwise to re-secularise - such is the political reality. However the changes 
brought in the Constitution are cosmetic in nature and nothing like the Pakistani 
Islamisation process. The secular structure and outlook of the constitutional 
scheme remains largely intact.
The Constitution of Bangladesh now begins with the words ‘In the name 
of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful5. This was inserted in 1977 when the 
expression ‘absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah5 replaced the term 
‘secularism5 in the Preamble.185 At the same time, Article 8(1) had the principle 
of 'absolute faith' inserted and the newly created Article 8(1 A) declared the 
absolute faith principle to be the basis of all actions. Article 12 containing the 
principle of secularism was omitted. Article 25(2) was inserted directing the State 
to endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among 
Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity. In 1988, General Ershad inserted 
Article 2A declaring that the state religion of the Republic is Islam, but other 
religions may be practised in peace and harmony.186
We have seen earlier that the Preamble and the Fundamental Principles, 
although not enforceable, are very important in the interpretation and application 
of constitutional and legal rules. Since it has been inserted both in the Preamble
185 Proclamation Order No. 1 of 1977.
186 The Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act (No. XXX of 1988), section 2. Shah
Alam (1991: 209-225) provides a critical analysis of the State-religion 
amendment and argues that the proclamation of Islam as the State-religion is 
contrary to the democratic and secular commitments of the Constitution.
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and the Principles, the 'absolute faith' principle has become very significant.
A number of recent decisions reflect the impact of the 'absolute faith' 
principle. The issue in Abul Kashem v. Member (Excise) NBR187 was the 
consumption of alcoholic and intoxicating drinks and drugs. Direction to prevent 
such consumption has been provided by the Fundamental Principle under Article 
18(1). The Court said that since the insertion of the ’absolute faith' rule, this 
Fundamental Principle "has undergone a further qualitative change to make such 
provision more strictly obligatory and mandatory".188 Accordingly, provision of
i
the Bengal Excise Act (No.V bf 1909) and rules made under it were declared 
void being inconsistent with Articles 7, 8 and 18(1).
This issue was raised in public interest matters as well. In the Kadiani 
case,189 the petitioner relied on the 'absolute faith' principle and claimed that 
since Islam is the State religion he has a right to defend Islam through the 
injunction of the Court. Similarly, in FAP 20.190 the petitioner argued, among 
other things, that the 'absolute faith' principle implies a duty to protect Allah's 
creation and environment and as such he had standing. In both these cases the 
Court could not find any specific law in the petitioners’ favour.
Recently in Hefzur Rahman v. Shamsun Nahar Begum191 Gholam
187 BCR 1981 HCD 279.
188 Id
189 ABM Nurul Islam v. Government of Bangladesh unreported Writ Petition
298/1993 at 4.
190 Above note 139 at 11.
191 15 BLD (1995) 34.
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Rabbani J argued that since Art. 8(1 A) establishes the 'absolute faith' principle, 
the indication is that "Qur-anic injunctions shall have to be followed strictly and 
without any deviation".192 In this particular case, the Court disregarded the rules 
laid down by earlier Muslim jurists and commentators and granted post-divorce 
maintenance to a wife. But the 'absolute faith' principle has not yet been applied 
to statutory rules or constitutional provisions.
Gholam Rabbani J's argument, if strictly followed, may initiate a whole 
new process of Islamisation.193 But this is Islamisation in its liberal form. The 
aim is to generate creative development of new rules that suit the current socio- 
legal environment of Bangladesh. So far, the activist stance of Gholam Rabbani J 
is an exception and not the general trend of the Court.
In spite of the fact that constitutional interpretation is to some extent being 
influenced by the pro-Islamic provisions, it can not be said the Constitution is 
Islamic or that the process of 'Islamisation' has started. The fact remains that the 
'absolute faith' principle, being in the Preamble and the Principles, is only 
persuasive and not obligatory or enforceable. Bangladesh is still a Peoples 
Republic and not an Islamic Republic and the Constitution has not been declared 
an Islamic Constitution. Article 7 says that all power belongs to the people and 
the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic. This is at odds with an
192 Ibid. at 36.
193 Malik (1995: 103-125), however, argues that with respect to Muslim family law in
Bangladesh, despite the constitutional 'Islamic' character of the state, the 
judiciary is applying bourgeois-liberal-egalitarian paradigm and not Islamic 
norms and principles. He also believes that this new trend towards 
secularisation of the legal system is indicative of an emerging societal 
consensus concerning the role of religion in state and polity.
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Islamic system where the sovereignty belongs to Allah and in case of a conflict 
between constitutional and Quranic provisions, the latter prevails. Finally, there 
has been no attempt to Islamise the laws, procedural or substantive, in the 
Pakistani fashion. The overall scheme as well as the laws still remain secular.
We argue that the Constitution of Bangladesh is a compromise between 
aggressive secularism and fundamentalist Islam. While it is not Islamic, the 
Constitution tries hard not to be seen as anti-Islamic. This accommodating stance 
perhaps reflects the political reality and the liberal attitude towards religion taken 
by the people. But this makes it unlikely for the Court to expound a concept of 
PIL that derives its inspiration and validity solely from the Islamic precepts.
2.4.5 Spirit of an autochthonous Constitution: Development of the guiding 
principle for PIL in Bangladesh
The case that first provided a conceptual groundwork for PIL is the 8th 
Amendment194 case of 1989 where it was declared that the Parliament cannot 
alter the basic structure of the Constitution and decentralise the Supreme Court. 
This was not a case on social justice, but related to the power relations debate. It 
came as an inspiration to the judges and lawyers favouring activism and a greater 
role for the judiciary. The judges declared the need for progressive and dynamic 
interpretation of the Constitution. They re-affirmed and re-established the 
principle that while interpreting the Constitution, the intention of its makers and 
its spirit must be taken into consideration and an Article should not be looked
194 Above note 134.
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into in isolation.195 Accordingly, an interpretation requires consideration of the so 
called 'unique features' of the Constitution of Bangladesh, one of which is its 
autochthonous nature.196 BH Chowdhury CJ says:
. . . our Constitution has proceeded from the people and it is not 
rhetorical flourish. Our Constitution is not the result of the process of 
the Indian Independence Act 1947 though we have taken inspiration 
from the wisdom of the past. Ours is an "autochthonous 
Constitution".197
This line of argument however was not adopted for PIL matters immediately. In 
1993, Naimuddin Ahmed J acknowledged the necessity to interpret the 
Constitution liberally and stressed on socio-economic issues in Welfare 
Association:
It must, however, be remembered that the Constitution of a country is 
not a morbid document but a dynamic instrument capable of being 
interpreted and applied in the ever-changing socio-economic context 
of society. The judicial function is to interpret it in such a way as to 
meet the socio-economic needs of those who are incapable, on account 
of poverty or otherwise, to seek assistance of the court which exists for 
safeguarding the rights and interests of all citizens.198
The first hint of an emerging Bangladeshi argument in favour of PIL came 
in the same year from Ishtiaq Ahmed, a leading constitutional lawyer.199 He 
argued that a Constitution always carries the spirit of the age and the Constitution
195 Ibid. at 142 and 194.
196 Ibid. at 109. BH Chowdhury CJ declares 21 'unique features'. Some of these,
according to him, are 'basic features' and are not amendable by the mere 
amending power of the Parliament. Autochthony of the Constitution is placed 
first in this list.
197 Ibid. at 59.
198 Bangladesh Retired Government Employees Welfare Association v. Bangladesh
(Welfare Association) 46 DLR (1994) 426 at 435.
199 Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed (1993: 37).
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of Bangladesh reflects the historical realities of the time of its creation and 
contain a vision and dream of the unfolding future. Framers utilised the wisdom 
of the two decades long experience gained by the Indian and Pakistani 
Constitutions and enacted a Constitution ’which is distinctively our own'.200 Then 
he said:
The emphasis is relevant and important because it is a cardinal 
principle of interpretation of a constitution that in interpreting a word 
or a provision in the constitution the constitution must be read as a 
whole, every part of it throwing light on the other, every word used 
deriving its meaning and colour from the total context of the 
constitution. The preamble and part which follows the preamble, 
particularly Article 7, the fundamental principles of state policy, the 
fundamental rights, the scheme of limited government - all these exist 
not in isolation but as parts of one whole document201
In December 1994, Quazi Shafiuddin J in Parliament Boycott202 resorted 
to one of the distinctive features of the Constitution, its autochthonous nature.203 
He observed that Article 7 declares that all powers in the Republic belong to the 
people and must be exercised on their behalf under the authority of the 
Constitution which is, as the solemn expression of the will of the people, the 
supreme law of the Republic. Therefore, a citizen and voter is a member of the 
whole people of Bangladesh and 'is a source of power along with other citizens of 
the country'.204 Since this power is to be exercised under or by the authority of 
the Constitution, any violation by anybody shall be called in question by each and
200 id.
201 Id
202 Anwar Hossain Khan v. Sneaker of Bangladesh Sangsad Bhavan and others 47
DLR (1995) 42.
203 Ibid at 45-46.
204 Id.
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every citizen of Bangladesh. He added a discussion of the Preamble in favour of 
his argument and pointed out that under the Preamble the people are to safeguard, 
protect and defend the Constitution.
Parliament Boycott was unique in the sense that it attempted to provide an 
indigenous theoretical framework without resorting to Indian or Pakistani 
constitutional arguments. This was instrumental in strengthening the 
apprehension that attempts to follow other jurisdictions without appreciating the 
local situation are preventing the success of PIL. Dr Mohiuddin Farooque 
inferred:
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) has recently been included in the 
topical talking judicial agenda (if not propaganda), perhaps, following 
or being enlightened by the trends in other legal systems and least, 
quite regrettably, as a principle originating from the aspirations of the 
land. As a result, some attempts have been made in Bangladesh, often 
in misplaced and mis-conceived manners in the name of PIL.20:>
He advocated ’autochthonic constitutional litigation* and argued that to build a 
credible national jurisprudence the functional constitutionalism should be 
autochthonic.206 Its spirit is to consider people's rights and public duties. Such 
autochthonic litigation, he argued, "would consolidate the supreme and sovereign 
authority of the people instead of disempowering them".207
In 1995, Mahmudul Islam re-iterated that an expression occurring in the 
Constitution cannot be interpreted out of context or only by reference to the
2Cb Mohiuddin Farooque (1994-1995: 1).
^06“ The tenn ACL (autochthonic constitutional litigation) reflects the constitutional 
and conceptual basis of PIL in Bangladesh, but the phrase did not catch on. 
The similarity with Baxi’s SAL (Social Action Litigation) is interesting to 
note. See Baxi (1985a).
207 Ibid. at 4.
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decisions of foreign jurisdictions "where constitutional dispensation is different 
from ours". The expression 'person aggrieved' has to be given a meaning in the 
context of the scheme and objectives of the Constitution. He discussed Articles 7 
and 8, Part II and Part III and observed that the spirit and object of the 
Constitution can not allow a restrictive view of standing.
Again in February 1995, Mahmudur Rahman J in MPs Resignation209 
observed the distinctness of the Bangladesh Constitution, especially from India 
and Pakistan, and discussed the nature of its autochthony.210 But since the issue 
in question was not pleaded in public interest, he did not use this in favour of 
expounding on PIL.
Thus by 1996, there appeared to be a consensus among activists, leading 
constitutional experts, lawyers and judges as to the uniqueness of the 
constitutional scheme, necessity of inclusive interpretation and autochthonic 
nature inspiring public interest matters. All that was needed was a 
pronouncement by the highest Court, the Appellate Division, in order to remove 
the reservations of conservative judges. However, the primary emphasis was not 
on social justice, secular or Islamic.
208 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 512). Mr Islam, a leading constitutional expert and
lawyer, is the author of the most authoritative book on the Bangladesh 
Constitution. While endorsing PIL, Latifur Rahman J cited him and adopted 
his arguments in FAP 20 above note 139 at 24.
209 Raufique (Md) Hcssain v. Speaker. Bangladesh Parliament and others 47 DLR
(1995)361.
210 Ibid. at 373.
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2.4.6 Appellate Division's interpretation in FAP 20
When FAP 20211 came to the Appellate Division, it was unlikely for the Court to
refuse PIL since that would amount to denying the considerable liberalisation
achieved in the few preceding years.212 But the possible extent or method of
liberalisation was still a matter of conjecture. The judges, however, were
delighted to have a 'proper' PIL case before them and all five concurred in its
favour. Except for Rouf J, all of the judges gave separate judgements.
The leading judgement was delivered by Mustafa Kama^J^arlier in 1991,
he refused standing in Sangbadpatra213 as not being a PIL and in the same case
declared that the Indian constitutional position is different and can not be applied
to Bangladesh.214 He further examined this theme in 1994 and was waiting to see
"how the Supreme Court of Bangladesh finds its own answer to this issue".215 In
a 1995 lecture, he took pride in the autochthonic nature of the Constitution.216
The judgement in FAP 20 is a follow up of these ideas.
In FAP 20. Mustafa Kamal J begins with the argument of inclusive
interpretation. He states:
Article 102 of our Constitution is not an isolated island standing above 
or beyond the sea-level of the other provisions of the Constitution. It is 
a part of the over-all scheme, objectives and purposes of the
211 Above note 139,
212 For the facts of the case, see ibid. at 8-9.
213 Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad (BSP) v. The Government of Bangladesh 12
BLD (AD) (1992) 153. For the facts of the case and further discussion, see see 
below chapter 3.4.
214 Ibid. at 155.
215 Mustafa Kamal (1994: 161).
216 Mustafa Kamal (1995: 7).
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Constitution. And its interpretation is inextricably linked with the (i) 
emergence of Bangladesh and framing of its Constitution, (ii) the 
Preamble and Article 7 (iii) Fundamental Principles of State Policy,
(iv) Fundamental Rights and (v) the other provisions of the 
Constitution.217
He then proceeds to discuss each of the five categories separately. 
Discussing the first point, he denies that the Bangladesh Constitution is just a 
replica with local adaptations of a Constitution of the Westminster model among 
the Commonwealth countries of Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. It is not the result of 
a negotiated settlement with a colonial power or consent or a foreign sovereign. 
Although it has been amended 13 times, it is not the last of an oft-replaced and 
oft-substituted Constitution.218 This Constitution is the fruit of a historic war of 
independence achieved with the lives and sacrifice of a telling number of people 
for a common cause, making it a class part from other Constitutions of 
comparable description. It is a Constitution in which the people feature as the 
dominant actor:
It was the people of Bangladesh who in exercise of their own self- 
proclaimed native power made a clean break from the past un­
shackling the bondage of a past statehood and adopted a Constitution 
of its own choosing. The Constitution, historically and in real terms, is 
a manifestation of what is called ’'the People’s Power". The people of 
Bangladesh, therefore, are central, as opposed to ornamental, to the 
framing of the Constitution.219
As regards the second point, the Preamble and Article 7, he again argues 
that the Bangladesh Constitution stands on a different footing by the very fact of 
the essence of its birth which is different from others. The people themselves
217 Above note 139 at 17.
218 This clearly is a reference to the Pakistani situation. See above note 103.
219 Above note 139 at 17.
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have adopted, enacted and given themselves a real and positive declaration of 
pledges reflecting the ethos of the historic war of independence. The pledges in 
the Preamble indicate the course or path that the people wish to tread. On the 
other hand, Article 7 makes it clear that all legislative, judicial and executive 
powers are conferred by the people through the Constitution. The people, again, 
are the repository of all power.220
Regarding the third point, the Fundamental Principles, Mustafa Kamal J 
says that since Part II shall be a guide to interpretation, it is constitutionally 
impermissible to leave out of consideration Part II when an interpretation of 
Article 102 needs guidance.221 As for the fourth point, regarding the 
Fundamental Rights, he observes that Article 102 is a mechanism of the 
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights which can be enjoyed by an individual 
alone and can also be shared by an individual in common with others when the 
rights pervade and extend to the entire population and territory. So Article 102(1) 
can not be divorced from Part III.222 Finally, regarding the fifth point, the judge 
observes that the other provisions of the Constitution will come to play their role 
in the interpretation of Article 102, although their importance may vary from case 
to case.~~
Mustafa Kamal J proceeds to say that the people have set out for 
themselves some objectives, purposes, policies, rights and duties and have strewn
220 Ibid. at 18.
221 Id
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these over the fabric of the Constitution. Article 102 is an instrumentality and a
mechanism by means of which the people aim to realise these constitutional
aspirations. He says:
With the power of the people looming large behind the Constitutional 
horizon it is difficult to conceive of Article 102 as a vehicle or 
mechanism for realising exclusively individual rights upon individual 
complaints. The Supreme Court being a vehicle, a medium or 
mechanism devised by the Constitution for the exercise of the judicial 
power of the people on behalf of the people, the people will always 
remain the focal point of concern of the Supreme Court while 
disposing of justice or propounding any judicial theory or interpreting 
any provision of the constitution. Viewed in this context interpreting 
the words "any person aggrieved" meaning only and exclusively 
individuals and excluding the consideration of people as a collective 
and consolidated personality will be a stand taken against the
■>24constitution.”
This principle, once established, enabled him to allow PIL and set out the 
detailed rules of standing in public interest matters.225
Chief Justice ATM Afzal agreed with Mustafa Kamal J. On the conceptual 
level, he added a 'theoretical foundation' for environmental PIL. This simple 
foundation is based, according to him, on Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
which says that environmental issues must be handled with the participation of 
all concerned citizens at the relevant level.226
Latifur Rahman J also agreed with Mustafa Kamal jLBut for him, it was 
the demand of the Constitution to ensure justice, economic and social, that is 
enough to inspire and validate PIL. He also observed the uniqueness of the
224 Id
225 See below chapter 4.4.5.
226 Above note 139 at 7. See Robinson and Dunkley (1993) for a public interest 
perspective in environmental law. The topic has been discussed with reference 
to the experiences of a number of jurisdictions including India.
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Constitutional provisions, and proceeded to argue that the entire Constitution 
must be considered in the course of interpretation.227 He discussed the Preamble, 
Article 7, Part II and Part III of the Constitution and came to the conclusion that 
the demands of social and economic justice direct the Court to allow public 
interest matters. Thus he felt no need to resort to a people's power theory. His 
recognition of the importance of social and economic justice becomes apparent 
when he says:
The language used by the framers of the constitution must be given a 
meaningful interpretation with the evolution and growth of our society.
An obligation is cast on the constitutional Court which is the apex 
court of the Country to interpret the Constitution in a manner in which 
social, economic and political justice can be advanced for the welfare 
of the state and its citizens.228
As part of his argument, Latifur Rahman J recognised the importance of judicial 
activism and felt that it is the constitutional duty of the judge to secure 
Fundamental rights and as such to act when PIL is espoused.229 The judiciary 
thus has a vast scope of social engineering.
BB Roy Choudhury J, agreeing with Mustafa Kamal J, found the spirit of 
the Constitution by discussing the Preamble, Fundamental Principles, 
Fundamental Rights and Article 102, saying that the meaning of Art 102 must not 
be understood in an isolated manner.230 Although he argued in the line of Latifur 
Rahman J, he stressed less on social justice or judicial activism. He emphasised
227 Ibid. at 22-24.
228 Ibid. at 24.
229 Ibid at 25-26.
230 Ibid. at 15.
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on the simple fact that the spirit of the Constitution, contained in these 
provisions, makes it unthinkable that the framers of the Constitution had in mind 
that the grievance of millions should go un-redressed merely because they are 
unable to come to the Court. As such, anyone "whose heart bleeds for his less 
fortunate fellow being' can initiate PIL".231
As it appears from the foregoing discussion, the basis of the legitimacy of 
PIL in Bangladesh is not radically different from the neighbouring jurisdictions. 
Social and economic justice, as enshrined and mandated by the Constitution 
inspires and validates a PIL approach. But the distinction lies in the emphasis. 
While the Indian and Pakistani judges are primarily and overwhelminglyi
; involved with social justice, Bangladeshi judges pronounced less enthusiastically 
on that theme.
Latifur Rahman J is an exception when he stressed on social justice in 
FAP 20. But Mustafa Kamal J's judgement is the most important one because it is 
the leading judgement and there is a conscious attempt to distinguish the 
Bangladeshi arguments from those of India and Pakistan. The leading judgement, 
along with the other judgements excepting that of Latifur Rahman J, appears to 
be little concerned with social or economic justice matters. The reliance is on the 
autochthonic nature of the Constitution and the supreme place of the people in 
the constitutional scheme. The 'people’s power' theory, especially as interpreted 
by Mustafa Kamal J, demonstrates the concern of the Bangladeshi judges with 
respect to the power-struggle between the dominant forces of the society. But as a
231 Ibid. at 31.
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result the primary emphasis is on the 'power of the people' to take part in the 




Development of cases, issues and activities relating to PIL in
Bangladesh
The present chapter analyses in detail the gradual progress of cases, issues and 
activities relating to PIL in Bangladesh.1 We attempt to explore the influence of 
the prevailing constitutional developments on the progress of PIL and the extent 
to which genuine social and economic justice matters have been advanced 
through PIL as opposed to frivolous and elitist causes. The analyses includes the 
respective roles played by constitutional lawyers, activists, voluntary sector 
organisations and judges.
The chapter aims to demonstrate that the advancement of PIL in 
Bangladesh is closely connected with the constitutional evolution including 
democratic and political developments. Absence of democracy and periods of 
suspension of the Constitution were the main reasons that prevented an earlier 
beginning of PIL. The constitutional developments were often major in nature. 
They involved radical changes in the constitutional set-up and transfer of power 
from autocratic regimes to democratically elected ones.
As a result, on the one hand, the lawyers and judges were not only 
influenced, but to some extent pre-occupied with this transition to democracy. On 
the other hand, the elite became busy to re-afflrm their share in the political 
power and, from the very beginning, co-opted the techniques of PIL to further
1 The discussion proceeds on a yearly basis. However this compartmentalisation is 
only for the sake of convenience and is arbitrary. Actually, many cases are 
heard in one year and the judgement is given in the next.
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their own agenda. The result has been a shortage of PIL cases with genuine social 
and economic justice issues.
3.1 The first few years and the Berubari case (1972-74)
It is very tempting to condemn the Bangladeshi legal system as a colonial legacy 
in order to explain its shortcomings. But even after gaining independence twice 
in the last fifty years, the new rulers have kept the system fundamentally 
unaltered. When the British started to reform, change and eventually transform 
the legal system inherited from the Mughals, they attempted to import and 
transplant the common law system and the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.2 In many 
cases this was compromised because of the difference of society, culture, politics 
and religion. But essentially, the rulers believed that they were introducing the 
common law system for the betterment of the colony. In any case, the prime 
motive was to create a system that would help to rule the colony effectively.
Thus in British India, we had imitations of the British bench and the bar. 
The lawyers and judges of Indian origin were important and leading members of 
a new Indian aristocracy created to facilitate the colonial rule. They were not only 
trained in English law but believed the common law system to be the best and 
utterly indispensable for the Indian society. It was, therefore, a 19th century 
colonial legal system, with all its goods and evils which the newly independent 
nations of India and Pakistan inherited in 1947.
2 For a general account of Indian legal history, see Kulshreshtha (1995).
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Muslim-dominated East Bengal joined Pakistan and the legal 
developments in Pakistan and India took two separate roads after 1947. Although 
in both countries the written constitutions attempted a conscious departure from 
the colonial mentality, Pakistan was not as successful as India in maintaining 
democratic practice in the political field.3 For Bangalis, the Pakistan period was 
full of clashes and power struggles between different interest groups and 
especially between the Western and Eastern part of the country. This was made 
worse by martial laws and the absence of democratic processes. The Constitution 
was repeatedly abrogated, discarded and written from scratch. A natural healthy 
development of law was thus frustrated.
The east-west conflict finally resulted in an armed war in 1971. East 
Pakistan seceded and Bangladesh was bom under the leadership of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, the head of the Awami League, the largest political party.4 
This thus marked the point of departure of the Bangladeshi legal system from that 
of Pakistan. The new country adopted a Constitution in 1972.
The Constitution of Bangladesh has a chequered history.5 From the very 
beginning, it was subject to major amendments which tended to restrictively
3 For the constitutional history of Pakistan, see GW Choudhury (1969) and Riaz
Ahmad (1981).
4 Hasan Zaheer (1994) provides a recent account of the birth of Bangladesh. See also
AMA Muhith (1992) and Moudud Ahmed (1992).
3 Mustafa Kamal (1994) sketches the histoiy of the Bangladeshi Constitution from a 
lawyer's perspective. For a more general analysis of political scientists, see 
Aleem A1 Razee (1988) and Dilara Choudhury (1995).
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redefine the limits of Fundamental Rights.6 One of these early amendments, the 
Third Amendment,7 was triggered by Kazi Mukhlesur Rahman v. Bangladesh 
and another, popularly known as the Berubari case.
On 16 May 1974, the Prime Ministers of Bangladesh and India signed a 
treaty in Delhi providing inter alia that India will retain the southern half of 
South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves and in exchange 
Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angarpota enclaves. This treaty was 
challenged on the ground that the agreement involved cession of territory and was 
entered into without lawful authority by the executive head of government. The 
petitioner Kazi Mukhlesur Rahman was an advocate and came to the Court as a 
citizen and as such his standing was in question.
Locus standi was granted by Sayeem CJ on the ground that Mr Rahman 
agitated a question affecting a constitutional issue of grave importance posing a 
threat to his Fundamental Rights which pervade and extend to the entire territory 
of Bangladesh. The Court decided that the question is not whether the Court has 
jurisdiction but whether the petitioner is competent to claim a hearing. So the 
question is one of discretion which the Court is to exercise upon due
6 The Constitution (First Amendment) Act (No. XV of 1973) provided for detention
and trial of war criminals keeping it out of purview of the provisions relating 
to Fundamental Rights. The Constitution (Second Amendment) Act (No. 
XXIV of 1973) inserted provisions for 'Proclamation of Emergency’ and 
suspension of Fundamental Rights during emergency situations. This 
amendment further qualified Fundamental Rights provisions by . including 
preventive detention laws for the first time in the Constitution.
7 The Constitution (Third Amendment) Act (No. LCCIV of 1974).
8 26 DLR (SC) (1974) 44.
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consideration in each case. The application, however, was rejected on the ground
, \
of being jare-lnature. But since the Court observed that a cession of territory
needs parliamentary approval and enactment, the government soon initiated the
Third Amendment of the Constitution.
The effect and influence of Berubari is enormous. It has often been
considered as the starting point of PIL in Bangladesh where "(T)he Court went
very close to the doctrine of public interest litigation”.9 Being the judgement of
the Appellate Division, Berubari was resorted and referred to whenever a
widening of the standing rule was sought. This case may be regarded as an early
achievement of the young Bangladeshi jurisdiction in its attempt to assert its
creative authority. This case, it is claimed in FAP 20.10 is unique since it
precedes the PIL developments of the neighbouring jurisdictions. This argument
is summed up by Afzal CJ in the same case as he says:
It is a matter of some pride that quite early in our Constitutional 
journey the question of locus standi was given a liberal contour in that 
decision by this Court at a time when the Blackburn cases were just 
being decided in England which established the principle of "sufficient 
interest" for a standing and the doctrine of public interest litigation or 
class action was yet to take roots in the Indian jurisdiction.11
9 Ishtiaq Ahmed (1993: 43).
10 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh and others (FAP 20) 17 BLD (AD) (1997) 1
at 14. Mustafa Kamal J says that an echo of some of the Berubari principles 
can be found in SP Gupta and others v. President of India AIR 1982 SC 149, a 
case decided in India eight years after Berubari.
11 FAP 20 above note 10 at 3.
100
3.2 The barren period (1975-1986)
The Constitution, which provided for a parliamentary democracy, was under 
serious threat due to post-war instability, natural calamities including a famine 
and deterioration of the law and order situation. A desperate ruling party brought 
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution in January 1975.12 This introduced a 
dictatorial Presidential government with a one-party political system.
The reaction was violent. In August of the same year, President Mujibur 
Rahman, leader of the liberation struggle and the Awami League, was killed. The 
government was toppled and a martial law was declared. The Constitution was to 
remain in force subject to the martial law, i.e. it was partially suspended.13 The 
martial law was administered initially by Khondoker Moshtaque, a politician and 
ASM Sayeem, a retired Supreme Court judge. But the real power was in the 
hands of the army. The Chief of the army, General Ziaur Rahman, eventually 
became the martial law administrator. He gradually formed his own political 
party and decided to run the country as an elected President. By the time this 
martial law gradually gave way to a civil government in 1979, a multi-party 
democratic system had taken shape due to systematic dismantling of the Fourth 
Amendment.14
12 Act No. II of 1975.
13 Bari (1987: 35-51 and 1989: 59-73) discusses in detail the restrictions imposed
upon the judiciary by the martial law and concludes that the judiciary had very 
little room left to manoeuvre.
14 These changes brought by various Martial Law Proclamations were later ratified by
the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act (No.l of 1979). Although many of 
the autocratic provisions, including some of the unfettered powers of the 
President, were taken away, it still remained a Presidential system.
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The civil government, which lasted till 1982, was dominated and 
controlled by Zia. Still, the political and legal environment was comparatively 
free and the Court started to give a series of bold and significant decisions.15 But 
this was again interrupted when, after the assassination of Zia in a failed coup de 
etat, the new elected President was removed by General Ershad in March 1982.
Under the new martial law the Constitution was suspended altogether. A 
mini-Constitution was inserted in the Schedule to the Martial Law Proclamation 
which was to govern the country. Again, the Court was rendered inactive as this 
new device "quietened the legal front effectively".16 General Ershad followed 
General Zia and after forming his own political party, started to transform himself 
as a political leader. Eventually, martial law was withdrawn in 1986, but the 
system remained basically an autocratic one.
The constitutional journey in the first 15 years shows that the Court did 
not have an opportunity to function properly, let alone allow for the development 
of new ideas and views under the martial law regimes. The Berubari principle 
could have marked the turning point in the Bangladeshi jurisdiction for carrying 
forward the movement of PIL, notes Ishtiaq Ahmed, but the process was thwarted 
when the Constitutional order was disrupted.17 Mustafa Kamal J explains in FAP 
20 :
What happened after Kazi Mukhlesur Rahman's case in Bangladesh
15 Mustafa Kamal (1994: 84) charts and discusses a number of significant
constitutional cases from this period, but there is no PIL or PIL-like case.
16 Ibid' at 86. See also Mutaleb (1986: 42-45) for a short account of the state of
judicial independence under Ershad's martial law.
17 Ishtiaq Ahmed (1993: 44).
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was a long period of slumber and inertia owing not to a lack of public 
spirit on the part of the lawyers and the Bench but owing to frequent 
interruptions with the working of the Constitution and owing to
intermittent de-clothing of the constitutional jurisdiction of the
18superior Courts.
Kept inactive and helpless, the Court's strategy was best described by Justice MH 
Rahman:
In some of the developing countries the very existence of judiciary as 
an institution is at stake. In that unenviable condition the primary role 
of a judge will be, if he does not decide to leave his post, to hold on. If 
he fails to roar like a lion it is understandable. If he keeps a glum face 
and gives a withering look then that will be a good work. For the time 
being the worthwhile role for him will be to do justice between a 
citizen and a citizen, so that a foundation may be laid for the future 
when a citizen will be able to expect justice against the mighty and the 
overbearing as well.19
A significant case from this period is AK Muiibur Rahman v. Returning 
Officer and others.20 General Ziaur Rahman was a presidential candidate while 
still being a member of the Armed Forces. Military laws were amended to 
facilitate his candidacy. This amendment was challenged by a voter. The petition 
was summarily rejected by Shahabuddin Ahmed J on merit but the question of 
standing was not disputed.
Standing was discussed in MG Bhuivan v. Bangladesh21 where an 
advocate challenged an Ordinance as a citizen. As he was not personally affected, 
Munim CJ denied standing following the traditional view.
Indian developments of the early 1980s had not had any noticeable effect
18 Above note 10 at 15.
19 MH Rahman (1988: 4-5).
20 31 DLR (1979) 156.
21 BCR 1981 (AD) 80. This was an appeal from MG Bhuivan v. Bangladesh BCR
1982 HCD 320.
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in Bangladesh by this time. At least there is no judgement that sheds any light in 
this regard.22 It appears that the judges were still wrapped in the traditional 
restrictive ideas of standing and public interest. In a 1987 Conference of judges, 
MH Rahman J discussed Bhagwati J's achievements but was very sceptical in 
following him.23 PIL was, in general, an unknown concept.
However, the modem legal aid movement can be traced back to this 
period. In 1978, the Madaripur Legal Aid Association was established. It was the 
first village-based and grass-root legal aid organisation of Bangladesh.24 This 
association not only spread the idea of legal rights of the poor but gradually came 
to assist public interest activists.
3.3 Beginning of public interest cases (1987-1990)
After the withdrawal of martial law, from 11th November 1986, the Supreme 
Court started functioning with respect to its original writ jurisdiction.25 General 
Ershad's democracy was controlled and guided, elections were held but failed to
22 Exceptionally, an editorial of the BCR Journal (1987b: 3-4) appealed for PIL and
stressed on learning from the Indian experience. No other legal writing of the 
time deals with PIL.
23 MH Rahman (1988: 1-10) appears to appreciate the activist role played by Justice
Bhagwati, but refuses to follow him on the traditional ground of non­
interference in political matters and economic non-viability of the 
implementation of social justice pronouncements of the Court.
24 Alimuzzaman Chowdhuiy (1987: 21-23) traces the early years of this association
and terms its activities as an attempt for 'collective legal self reliance'. See 
also Chambers et al, (eds.) (1992: 26-32) for history, organisation and 
achievements of this association.
25 The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act (No. I of 1986) ratified the Martial
Law of Ershad.
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ensure the legitimacy he desired. The limited democratic practice, however, gave 
the Court some opportunity for a more active role. In 1988, the Eighth 
Amendment26 made Islam the state religion and decentralised the higher 
judiciary.27 This decentralisation was successfully challenged in the Court and 
gave rise to one of the most important of all post liberation judgements.
In Anwar Hossain Chowdhurv v. Bangladesh (8th Amendment case)28 the 
amended Article 100 of the Constitution was challenged as ultra vires. The 
Court, by a majority judgement of three against one, declared that the basic 
structure of the Constitution can not be altered and as such the amendment is 
void.29 The Court not only confirmed its power of judicial review, it proceeded to 
discuss many aspects of constitutionalism in Bangladesh and judicial activism. In 
this judgement the principle of the supremacy of the Bangladesh Constitution, the 
validity and authority it derives from its autochthony and the imperative nature of 
its dynamism were established.
The judgement was a severe blow to Ershad's authority and enhanced the 
prestige of the Court enormously. It was also a reference for judges in future
26 The Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act (No. XXX of 1988).
" Shah Alam (1991: 209-225) analyses the state religion amendment. As regards 
decentralisation, see DLR editorial (1987a: 1-14) for a critical legal analysis.
28 1989 BLD (Spl.) 1; 41 DLR (AD) (1989) 165.
The Court followed the Indian epoch-making decision of Keshavananda v. State of
Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461. However, it was pointed out in the 8th Amendment 
case above note 28 at 168, that the basic structure doctrine was not first 
discovered in Keshavananda. This doctrine has been recognised in other 
jurisdictions from long before, including the Dhaka case of Fazlul Ouadot 
Chowdhurv v. Mohammad Abdul Hauqe PLD 1963 Dac SC 463; 18 DLR 
(SC) (1963) 69. This decision was later cited in the famous Indian case of 
Saiian Singh v. State of Raiasthan AIR 1965 SC 845,
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whenever the authority of the judiciary was to be decided vis-a-vis other 
governmental organs. As such this case is believed to be a forerunner of PIL
30cases.
Defying Ershad's autocratic regime, concerned citizens started coming to 
the Court with their petitions. The first group of petitions came in the nature of 
quo warranto, since such a proceeding does not require the petitioner to have a 
personal grievance. The position of quo warranto petitioners was strengthened in 
M Mostafa Hossain v. Sikder M Faruque and another.31 where BH Chowdhury 
CJ reaffirmed that in a writ of quo warranto challenging authority of a person 
holding public office, any citizen, irrespective of personal grievance can come to 
the Court.32 In that case, the Court even rejected a compromise petition on the 
ground that a matter of great public interest was involved.
In Saivid Munirul Huda Chowdhurv v. AKM Nurul Islam33 an advocate 
challenged the appointment of the Vice President of Bangladesh on the ground 
that he fonnerly held the office of Chief Election Commissioner and as such 
Article 118(3)(a) of the Constitution disqualifies him for a 'service of the
30 Mahmudur Rahman (1992: 5 and 1997: 83-84).
31 7 BLD (AD) (1987) 315. This was an appeal from M Mostafa Hossain v. Sikder M
Faruque and another 7 BLD (1987) 53.
32 For a more detalied discussion, see below chapter 4.6.
33 1 BLC (1996) 437. This 1987 case was reported after nine years when interest in
the issue revived after another citizen challenged the appointment of the 
President in Abu Bakar Siddique v. Justice Shahabuddin and others 1 BLC
(1996) 483; 17 BLD (1997) 31. In a comparable case, parliament members in 
India challanged the election of President Dr Zakir Hossain on the ground of 
constitutional disability in Baburao Patel v. Dr Zakir Hossain AIR 1968 SC 
904.
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Republic'. MS Ali J held that the office of the Vice President is excluded from the 
category of person holding an 'office of profit in the service of the Republic* and 
summarily dismissed the petition.
In another quo warranto matter, M Saleem Ullah v. Justice Mohammad 
Abdul Ouddus, an advocate challenged the appointment of a Supreme Court 
Judge in the post of Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Law as violative of the 
Constitution. AMK Chowdhury J decided that the appointment was valid but 
only because it was protected by a Martial Law Proclamation.35
In 1988, the Young Lawyers Forum (Jubo Ainjibi Forum) initiated KM 
Zabir v. Amanullah and others.36 The petitioner claimed that the soft drink 
company Pepsi had violated the law by resorting to lottery techniques.37 Claimed 
by the Forum to be the first of its kind, the case was fought in the name of PIL 
and won. The Court even awarded cost to the association since they had 'fought 
the case on behalf of the whole country'.38
For the first time during this period, we see a number of lawyers forming 
into groups and attempting to fight pro bono publico cases. Justice Quddus
34 46 DLR (1994) 691.
33 Martial Law Proclamation of 24/3/1982. This was later amended by the 
Proclamation (First Amendment) Order (No. 1 of 1982) and the Proclamation 
(Amendment) Order (No. 1 of 1983).
36 Unreported CMM Court Dhaka Case No. 1097A1/88.
37 In 1965, Section 294B was inserted in the Penal Code 1860 making any offering of
prize in connection with trade an offence punishable with six months 
imprisonment, or fine, or with both. This appears to be an attempt to defend 
anti-gambling principles of Islam.
38 Above note 36 at 2.
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Chowdhurv's case was the first where M Saleem Ullah and his friends appear 
before the Court as concerned citizens. Over the years they brought a 
considerable number of constitutional cases and subsequently formed the 
Association for Democratic and Constitutional Advancement of Bangladesh 
(ADCAB).39 On the other hand, the Young Lawyers Forum did not pursue their 
initial success by filing more public interest cases, perhaps because promoting 
PIL was not its main purpose. But the reason Pepsi remained relatively 
unimportant was due to the fact that it was fought in a Magistrate Court, the 
judgement having no force of judicial precedent.
However, these cases dealt mainly with the political rights of the 
applicants. Even in the few cases where the subject matter is not political, they 
represent concerns of the middle classes rather than those of the poor or the 
socially deprived.
3.4 Misconceived attempts (1991)
By 1990, the movement for democracy gained momentum. General Ershad 
resigned on 4 December, 1990. He was arrested and the then Chief Justice 
Shahabuddin Ahmed headed an interim government. Although indirectly, this 
increased the prestige of the judiciary.
Since, under the Constitution, an election was required to be held within 
180 days for the vacant posts of President and Vice President, in M Saleem Ullah
39 MI Farooqui and Mohsen Rashid are other founding members of ADCAB.
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v. Election Commission and another.40 an attempt was made to compel the 
Election Commission to proceed with an election. This writ was kept pending.
The election, which was free and fair, was conducted by Justice 
Shahabuddin’s government. This was won by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
(BNP) headed by Khaleda Zia, the widow of General Ziaur Rahman. The 
Eleventh Amendment41 of the Constitution ratified Justice Shahabuddin's interim 
government while the Twelfth Amendment42 in September 1991 restored the 
parliamentary system of government. Due to these amendments, Saleem Ullah's 
case became infractuous. The Twelfth Amendment was a major one and again 
changed certain features of the government declared in 1989 to be basic in the 
8th Amendment case. From now on, the Parliament operated under full 
democracy and there was no shadow of a dictator.
In this year came Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad v. The Government 
of Bangladesh.43 The government had constituted a wage board for fixing the 
wages of newspaper employees. An association of newspaper owners 
challenged the Constitution of the wage board and its authority and pleaded 
PIL. In the Appellate Division, Mustafa Kamal J refused standing on the ground 
that the applicant was not a 'person aggrieved'.44 It was also pointed out that the
40 Unreported Writ Petition 633/91.
41 The Constitution (Eleventh Amendment) Act (No. XXIV of 1991).
42 The Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act (No. XXVIII of 1991).
43 12 BLD (AD) (1992) 153. This was an appeal from Bangladesh Sangbadpatra
Parishad v. The Government of Bangladesh 43 DLR (1991) 424.
44 This case has been discussed in more detail from the perspective of the standing of
the applicant in chapter 4.4.2.1 below.
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Indian PIL decisions are not applicable since the Indian constitutional
provisisons are not similar to the Bangladeshi ones.
The effect of this pronouncement by the Appellate Division was perhaps
greater than anticipated. Sangbadpatra was not a PIL case. If it had been, the
decision of the Court could have been different. The judge said:
The petitioner is not espousing the cause of a downtrodden and 
deprived section of the community unable to spend money to establish 
its fundamental rights and enforce its constitutional remedies. It is not 
acting pro bono publico but in the interest of its members.45
This indication was noticed from the very beginning by a number of 
commentators. In 1992, Mahmudur Rahman regretted that the Court was unduly 
conservative, but realised that it was not a PIL case.46 Similarly Ishtiaq Ahmed in 
his analysis of Bangladeshi PIL cases, does not include Sangbadpatra.47 In 1994, 
delivering a lecture in Dhaka University, Mustafa Kamal J gave even clearer 
approval in favour of PIL.48 But still, the indication given in Sangbadpatra in 
favour of PIL was not clear enough for the judges and the majority of the lawyers 
to detect.
The judges of the High Court Division created the impression that since 
the Constitution of Bangladesh does not have provisions similar to the Indian 
one, there is no scope for PIL, Also, the use of the term 'a phrase which have 
received a meaning and a dimension over the years' caused widespread confusion
45 Ibid. 156.
46 Mahmudur Rahman (1992: 5-6 and 1997: 84).
47 Ishtiaq Ahmed (1993: 36-45).
48 Mustafa Kamal (1994; 159-166).
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at a time when very few of the lawyers and judges had any real idea or 
understanding about this new concept.49 This judgement for them meant that 
there can be no departure from the traditional view. Sangbadpatra is thus a 
perfect example where attempts by a previleged group to use the techniques of 
PIL have actually damaged the movement for cases with genuine concern for 
social justice.
3.5 Heightening of the consciousness of PIL (1992)
In the political arena, 1992 was a year of calm when the newly earned democracy 
started to function. The most significant PIL cases in this year related to personal 
liberty matters.
Anwarul Hoque Chowdhury J in Avesha Khanam and others v. Major 
Sabbir Ahmed and others30 expanded the traditional habeas corpus principle by 
giving standing in a case of private detention.51 The petitioner was a mother 
seeking custody of her child. Bangladesh Mohila Parishad\ a voluntary 
organisation, fought successfully as a party.
Hatem AIL a man aged 104, was released from prison this year as a result
49 Ishtiaq Ahmed (1996: 5) analyses in detail the intricacies of this confusion. He
argues that in different types of writs, the phrase has different meanings and in 
cases of constitutional fundamental rights, the common law rules developed in 
England do not apply. For a detailed analysis, see below chapter 4.4.3.
50 46 DLR (1994) 399.
■' This law has recently been followed in Sharon Lailv Begum Jalil v. Abdul Jalil and
others 48 DLR (1996) 460. In this case, the mother was held competent to 
seek habeas corpus when her husband kidnapped the children.
I l l
of investigative journalism.52 Arrested in 1978, he was accused of five criminal 
cases but was convicted of none. In a similar case, Falu Mia was released after 21 
years in prison.53 He had been convicted of crime, but overstayed in the prison 
for six years due to administrative callousness. The newspapers again played the 
leading role.54
Since the government responded promptly, there was no reason for Hatem
Ali or Falu Mia to come to the High Court. A precedent on PIL was to be set in
State v. Deputy Commissioner. Satkhira and others, known as Nazrul Islam's 
case.55 Nazrul Islam had been held in prison for 12 years without any trial. 
Justice MM Hoque noticed a newspaper reporting this news, initiated the 
criminal miscellaneous case suo moto and released Nazrul.56
In all these cases, we see co-operation among journalists, NGOs, judges, 
lawyers and the administration. The most important role was played by the 
journalists who were using the full potential of the newly found freedom of 
speech. As soon as these reports were published, they provoked strong public
52 This incident received considerable media coverage. For a full version, see the
report in Bovoska Punorbason Kendra Bulletin (October 1993: 9) under the
title bsfij TO?" (Who will bring back 14 years of
Hatem Ali's life?).
53 State v. Falu Mia unreported Savar PS 5(8)92 and 12(4)92. Criminal Misc.
1755/1993.
54 See for example, the Vorer Kagoz (15/11/93: 1) under the caption fm  m s  "41
tot 4I&WI (Falu Mia does not know why he has spent 21 years
in prison)".
55 45 DLR (1993) 643.
56 This was another brilliant piece of journalism by the Ittefaq (6/10/92: 1) published
under the caption ^  xmi ^ 5  wwfvs, TO1 t o  (Acquitted
from all charges, but in prison for 12 years).
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reaction and criticism of the law enforcement agencies. In Hatem Ali. a 
Government Minister became involved, in Falu Mia an NGO came forward.57 
The Court praised the co-operation of journalists and government officers in 
Nazrul Islam.58 This case was not only the first sno moto case of this kind by the 
High Court, it was also bold in the way it criticised law enforcement agencies and 
the directions it gave for further investigation into similar cases. On the whole, 
these cases demonstrated the power of PIL and the prestige it can give to the 
Court. It was difficult for law professionals to remain ignorant of these newly 
emerging public interest issues. As these personal liberty cases involved genuine 
and serious violation of Fundamental Rights, the Court was not hesitant to resort 
to a liberal approach.
However the success in detention cases was offset by failures in some 
other cases involving elitist causes where the applicants claimed that they were 
protecting their rights as concerned citizens. In Sved Mahbub Ali and others v. 
Bangladesh59 a number of subordinate court judges were promoted without 
consultation with the Supreme Court. This was challenged by a group of 
practising advocates as 'concerned citizens’. Relying on Sangbadpatra. Abdul Jalil 
J held that they had no locus standi.
57 Home Minister Mr Abdul Matin Chowdhury took personal interest in Hatem Ali.
Since Hatem Ali had no relatives, after release, he took shelter with an NGO - 
The Center for the Rehabilitation of Aged Persons (TOf Falu Mia
was assisted by the Bangladesh Human Rights Implementation Organisation 
o j r t o h  t o s t o * w ?d .
58 Above note 55 at 650.
59 Unreported Writ Petition 4036/1992; later Appeal 317/1993.
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Similarly, another failure was Dr Ahmed Hussain v. Bangladesh.60 In this 
case, an advocate was given standing to challenge the reservation of seats for 
women in the Parliament as anti-constitutional.61 But MH Rahman J held that the 
case itself had no m erit62
The steady increase of the involvement of lawyers' groups and voluntary 
sector organisations was further boosted when in October 1992, a two-day 
seminar on PIL titled 'Rights in search of remedies' was held in Dhaka.63 The 
initiative was taken by two voluntary associations: the Madaripur Legal Aid 
Association and Ain O Shalish Kendra. Eminent jurists, judges and lawyers from 
India and Pakistan joined their Bangladeshi counterparts and exchanged views. 
Wide presence and participation from the bench and the bar made it a very 
successful venture. For the first time, PIL became an issue in the discourse of 
Bangladeshi law. For a relatively close-knit legal community, this single seminar 
did more than anything else to popularise the idea of PIL and 'visibly created
60 44 DLR (AD) (1992) 109.
61 For a detailed discussion of the point of law, see below chapter 5.2.1.
62 A similar question was raised in Fazle (Md) Rabbi and others v. The Election
Commissioner 44 DLR (1992) 14. The Court observed that there is nothing 
anti-constitutional in reserving parliamentary seat for women. See Article 10 
of the Constitution containing the Fundamental Principle that the government 
shall take steps to ensure participation of women in all spheres of life. Article 
12 provides an exception to the Fundamental Right of non-discrimination 
enabling the State to make special provisions in favour of women as a 
backward section of citizens.
>r o
■ The papers from this seminar has recently been published, see Hossain et al.
(1997).
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immense interest particularly in the legal circle'.64 Senior Advocate Ishtiaq
Ahmed observed:
An international seminar recently held in Dhaka and attended by jurists 
from India and Pakistan including the Chief Justice of Pakistan and 
attended by our legal and judicial luminaries, younger generations of 
lawyers and students of law, has left behind a salutary impact on our 
minds regarding the philosophy and jurisprudence of this class of 
litigation.65
3.6 Fighting the threshold problem: Limited success through 
technical innovations (1993)
Use of the techniques of PIL by the political activists continued in 1993. A highly 
political issue came for the determination of the Court in the Kadiani case66 The 
petitioner, advocate Nurul Islam, claimed to be a 'concerned citizen' and Muslim. 
He held important posts in several religious organisations. The Court was asked 
to compel the government to declare the members of the Kadiani sect non- 
Muslims. Abdul Jalil J decided that the government has no authority to determine 
whether or not a particular sect is non-Muslim.67 However, standing was given 
and a prima facie case was recognised. Special interest religious groups almost
64 Editorial comment in Amir-ul Islam (1993: 6). The editors also declared support 
and commitment to PIL from the DLR Journal which was significant since 
DLR is the leading law reporter in Banglandesh.
6:5 Ishtiaq Ahmed (1993: 44).
66 ABM Nurul Islam v. Government of Bangladesh unreported Writ Petition
298/1993.
67 The petitioner relied on Pakistani laws where the Kadianis are considered non-
Muslim. But the Court refused to follow Pakistani cases and pointed out that 
Bangladesh has no law akin to the Anti-Islamic Activities of Kadian Group. 
Lahori Group and Ahmadias (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance (No.XX 
of 19841
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succeeded in using PIL to further their political agenda.
Continued democratic and political stability combined with increased 
activism from the Court gave rise to a number of consumer cases where the 
petitioners were more successful. In Tabani Beverage,68 like the 1989 Pepsi case, 
a form of lottery was declared by a beverage company without seeking 
permission from the government as is required under the law. This was 
successfully challenged in the lower courts. Bangladesh Legal Rights Trust 
wt=r filed the civil case while the criminal case was brought
by the Committee for the Protection of Lawyers' Rights 
*riWF). One can perhaps detect a competitive mood for media attention here.
The Committee for the Protection of Lawyers' Rights initiated another 
consumer case. The petitioner in M Ali Akand v. Shamsul Islam and others69 
came as a concerned and affected citizen and challenged a company selling 
certain Indian-made soap representing that it was made in Bangladesh. The case 
is still pending.
Since these cases were fought in the lower courts, their effect on the 
development of PIL is minimal. The opportunity to get a High Court ruling for 
PIL came in the Paracetamol case.70 A journalist, being a father of a child of four,
68 Bangladesh Ain Odhikar Trust v. Tabani Beverage & others, (Civil) 2nd Assistant
Judge Court, Dhaka, TS 324/93. M Sultan Uddin v. M Fazlul Hoaue 
(criminal) Dhaka CR case No. 2739/93. Later, a writ was filed on the same 
issue, but this was done by a rival beverage company and no public interest 
was claimed.
69 Unreported Dhaka CR Case 1721/1993.
70 Sved Borhan Kabir v. Bangladesh and others unreported Writ Petition 701/1993.
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hoped to compel the government to perform its duty to monitor the production of 
toxic Paracetamol syrup which was causing death to infants.71 But before any 
judgement could be pronounced, the medicine was withdrawn from the market 
under the direction of the government. This prompt action rendered the case 
infractuous.
These consumer cases, except for the Paracetamol case, had rather weak 
public interest elements. Although these were the first batch of consumer cases 
fought in the name of PIL, none of these cases were pursued by consumer 
associations or other organised citizen's rights groups. The young lawyers 
pursued less than well-researched briefs. The efforts were not only random, but 
mainly targeted middle-class concerns. The only genuine public interest issue 
was involved in the Paracetamol where the opportunity to get a judgement in 
favour of PIL was lost due to prompt governmental action.
A genuine issue concerning the poor was raised in the Slum Dwellers 
case.72 When Mirpur area slum duellers were ordered to vacate government lands 
within 24 hours, public-spirited lawyers helped a destitute old lady to claim that 
she must not be removed unless the government provides her with an alternative 
home. The Court's rejection of the plea that she has a right to stay or be 
alternatively provisioned was seen by the lawyers as a denial of PIL. However,
71 BELA Newsletter (Vol 1:1, p. 5) claims that in 1992, 230 infants died as their
kidneys failed due to toxic Paracetamol syrup. Instead of using PROPYLENE 
GLYCOL, the companies were using DI-ETHYLENE GLYCOL which is 
cheaper but toxic.
72 Rokeva Khatun v. Sub-Divisional Engineer and others unreported Writ Petition
1789/1993.
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the Court maintained the status quo for quite a long time, practically giving 
ample time to the slum duellers to make alternative arrangements.
A pronouncement in favour of PIL finally came in Bangladesh Retired
73Government Employees Welfare Association and others v. Bangladesh. An 
association for retired government employees sued, challenging discrimination on 
pension matters. This was recognised as a matter of public interest. Naimuddin 
Ahmed J said:
. . .  the petitioner No. 1 is an association for looking after the welfare of 
the retired government employees and the question of pension of the 
retired government employees is a question in which the common 
interest of all retired government employees are involved and, as such, 
to our view, it is an absurd proposition to suggest each individual 
pensioner to come forward and file a separate writ petition vindicating 
a common right. There is no doubt that since the petitioner No. 1 looks 
after the common interests of all retired government employees it is 
entitled to ventilate this interest before this Court in the form of public 
interest litigation.74
This judgement, however, can not be said to have established complete public 
interest standing. Even though the standing of the association was in question, 
other petitioners, i.e. the pensioners, were personally aggrieved and had clear 
standing. Also, instead of granting standing to an association as a matter of 
principle, the Court relied on the fact that this particular association is of such a 
type that it is, under operation of various laws, a 'person' and thus capable of 
bringing a petition.75 This case involved a particular interest group as opposed to 
the public in general. Finally, the Court avoided the Sangbadpatra principle by
73 46 DLR (1994) 426.
74 Ibid. at 434.
75 Id. For further discussion on this issue, see below chapter 5.3.1.2.
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pointing out that the facts of the two cases are different. So, this being a 
judgement of the High Court Division, the weight of the Appellate Division 
judgement in Sangbadpatra remained intact.
Welfare Association case was an important development in the process of 
recognition of PIL in Bangladesh. Discrimination of retired government 
employees on pension issues was considered as a matter of public interest. The 
element of public interest does not speak very strongly of social justice in the 
sense that it deals with the concerns of the middle class, not of the socially 
deprived or the poor. But a favourable judgement could be given because no 
political or frivolous cause was advocated.
3.7 New wave of PIL attempts: Gaining more grounds (1994)
Although a considerable number of cases were filed as PIL in 1994, they fall into 
two broad categories. The first type involved political issues while the second 
type dealt with environmental and consumer concerns.
3.7.1 Political issues as PIL cases
From 1 March 1994, the opposition parties started to boycott sessions of the 
Parliament. Their first complaint was against a supposedly slanderous statement 
made by a government minister in Parliament. But after a highly controversial 
parliamentary by-election, they continued the boycott on the demand of a 
caretaker government. This proposed non-party government, they explained, will 
run the country in times of parliamentary elections, eliminating the possibility of
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vote-rigging. This demand gained popular support and was accompanied by
demonstrations, processions, picketing and frequent nation-wide strikes.
The boycott was challenged by a political activist supporting the party in
power. Public interest standing rule was successfully used as he approached the
Court as a 'citizen and voter'. This was Anwar Hossain Khan v. Speaker of
Bangladesh Sangsad Bhavan and others.76 popularly known as the Parliament
Boycott case. He sought to enforce his fundamental right of being represented in
the Parliament. Quazi Shafiuddin Ahmed J said:
As Constitution is a solemn expression of the will of the people, the 
supreme law of the Republic, any violation by anybody including the 
members of the Parliament shall be called in question by each and 
every citizens of Bangladesh.77
Since the Constitution is of revolutionary origin and derives its validity and 
power from the people, locus standi can not be denied if the people come forward 
to 'safeguard, protect and defend the Constitution'. The Court also noted the 
Berubari78 principle that in questions of grave constitutional importance, any 
citizen can come to the Court. The Parliament members were ordered to return to 
the Parliament.
This decision, given on 11 December 1994, caused a huge uproar and the 
opposition parties criticised the judge as biased.79 They quickly went on appeal.
76 47 DLR (1995) 42.
77 Ibid. at 46.
78 Above note 8.
79 The political situation generated such intense feelings that a number of leaders
indicated defiance of the judgement. Their extremist followers even bombed 
the judge's house, but nobody was injured. See the Bangladesh Observer (12- 
13-14/12/1994).
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The Appellate Division, perhaps worried not to politicise the Court unreasonably, 
stayed the order of the High Court Division till disposal of the matter and 
resorted to the tactic of delaying a disposal. Soon, on 28th December, the 
opposition members resigned en masse and the appeal became infractuous.
Parliament boycott raised several problems for the movement for PIL. 
Although public interest standing was recognised, this case was too much 
politicised to become a good precedent for PIL. Controversy and media attention 
made the judges more cautious and they were under pressure not to show too 
much activism with respect to public interest standing. Also, the Appellate 
Division’s reluctance to face the problem resulted in the lingering of the bad 
effect of Sangbadpatra.
Another problem of Parliament boycott was that it gave the impression 
that political activists, being able to disguise as 'concerned citizens', could be 
granted standing to raise their preferred political debate in the judicial arena. In 
fact, PIL was soon used by the political activists in a number of cases.
In Md Kafiluddin v. Maulana Sved Fazlul Karim and another80 it 
transpired that a religious leader had declared in a public gathering that anyone 
not a fundamentalist is a bastard, not a Muslim. Md Kafiluddin, an advocate, 
claimed that this statement injured the religious feelings and belief of the public. 
This case is still pending.
M Saleem Ullah, in the Haiti Troops case,81 challenged the decision of the
80 Dhaka CMM Court, Petition Case No. 1998/1994.
81 M Saleem Ullah v. Bangladesh 47 DLR (T9951 218.
government to send peace troops to Haiti under UNO supervision without 
seeking approval from Parliament. The petitioner's standing was not discussed, 
but Mahmudur Rahman J rejected the petition on merit and also expressed his 
unwillingness to deal with policy matters.
Mr Saleem Ullah continued his assault on the government with a number 
of quo warranto cases. In the Justice Sultan Hossain case,82 the question was 
whether an ex Chief Election Commissioner can be appointed as chairman of the 
Press Council. The matter is pending. In the Settlement Court Judges case,83 the 
eligibility of two judges was challenged. The government swiftly removed both of 
them and the case became infractuous.
In Md Idrisur Rahman v. Shahiduddin Ahmed and others.84 an advocate 
claimed that the appointment of the CMM (Chief Metropolitan Magistrate) 
without prior consultation with the Supreme Court was unconstitutional. This is 
another case that is still awaiting hearing.
hi Chairman. Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh v. Kazi Abdur Rouf 
and others.8^  a headmaster's attempt to question the formation of the managing 
committee of a school was held not a case pro bono publico.
82 M. Saleem Ullah v. Justice Sultan Hossain Khan unreported Writ Petition
990/1994.
83 M Saleem Ullah v. Md Aminul Islam. Chairman. Court of Settlement No.l
unreported Writ Petition 245/1994 and M Saleem Ullah v. Khondoker 
Badruddin. Chainnan. Court of Settlement No.2 unreported Writ Petition 
820/1994. The point of law was whether the government can appoint a retired 
district judge when the statute provides for a person who is either a district 
judge or competent to be so.
84 Unreported Writ Petition 1381/94.
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In all these cases, the lawyers fought for the political rights of the 
privileged few rather than social and economic justice for the poor. The general 
failure of these cases demonstrates that the Court either doubted the elements of 
public interest or the intentions of the applicants. It is significant that in these 
cases the lawyers litigated as PIL applicants.
3.7.2 Environmental and consumer issues
Sangbadpatra adversely affected a very important environmental case in 1994. 
The Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) had been active 
since 1991. After its initial period of organisation and groundwork, it started 
initiating test litigation in the public interest. Led by Dr Mohiuddin Farooque, 
almost all the cases fought by BELA are well-researched, have genuine public or 
citizen's interest involved and are methodically and relentlessly pursued. Above 
all, this association is the first to have resources and skill to combine other public 
interest law activities such as lobbying and negotiation with litigation.
However, relying on Sangbadpatra. standing was rejected by Ismailuddin 
Sarkar J in Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh / Sikandar Ali Mondol v. 
Bangladesh.86 The Flood Action Plan 20 (FAP 20) of Tangail, claimed BELA, 
would adversely affect more than a million human lives and natural resources 
including flora and fauna. Also, the plan ignored participation of the local people. 
But BELA was held not aggrieved.
86 Unreported Writ Petition 998/1994 and 1576/1994.
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Another attempt was made in the Industrial Pollution case,87 where the 
government and a number of industries were asked to control unchecked 
pollution. This case is still pending. BELA also failed to win on merit in 
Bangladesh Environmental Lawyer's Association v. Election Commission & 
Others.88 The claim was that during the City Corporation elections, posters, 
loudspeakers etc. were polluting the environment. The petitioner's standing was 
not contested in this case.
BELA had its first success in the Doctors' Strike case.89 The Bangladesh 
Medical Association (BMA) went on strike in favour of certain demands.90 MM 
Hoque J issued an initial rule directing the doctors to refrain from striking. But 
again, since the government negotiated successfully with the doctors, the case 
became infractuous before a full judgement could be delivered. However, even 
the rule was enormously effective. It gave prestige and popular recognition to Dr 
Farooque and his organisation, which was an inspiration for subsequent PIL 
cases.91 The rule also made it difficult for organisations to go on strike.92
87 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh unreported Writ Petition 891/1994.
88 46 DLR (1994) 235.
89 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh represented by Secretary Ministry of Health
and family Welfare & Others unreported Writ Petition 1783/1994.
90 Huque and Chowdhury (1989: 67-80) discuss the nature, composition and
operation of the BMA with the intention of assessing its role in the policy­
making process in Bangladesh. They are of the opinion that there are no 
regular channels of mobilising public opinion and pressuring the government 
into accepting the demands of special interest groups.
91 Major newspapers hailed the Court Order as a great victory. See the Ittefaq
(5/10/94: 1).
92 On 8th October 1994, for example, the Engineering, Agriculture and Medical cadre
of the Bangladesh Civil Service officers, known as (.Prokrichi),
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In 1994, a number of cases were negotiated before judgement, frustrated 
by steps taken by the government or kept pending. When judgement was given, 
standing was either not discussed or rejected. Thus the search for a 
pronouncement setting general principles and guidelines for PIL was not 
successful. But exceptionally, the Parliament Boycott93 case and the Doctors' 
Strike94 case gained some important ground in favour of PIL.
3.8 The Supreme Court dragged into politics (1995)
On 28 December 1994, the opposition en-masse resigned from the Parliament 
and continued their movement. Thus they could avoid the Court's direction, given 
in the Parliament Boycott93 case, to go back to the Parliament. But the Speaker, 
in the hope of a compromise, was delaying his acceptance of their resignation. 
This caused a stalemate situation.
The result, the famous MPs Resignation case,96 comprised of two writs. 
Raufique Hossain claimed that the attempt to resign is anti-constitutional while 
Alauddin Khalid asserted that the Speaker, by not accepting the resignation, is 
violating the Constitution. The Court was again involved in a controversial 
political issue and was under tremendous pressure, as the future of democracy
postponed a proposed indefinite strike that was to begin from 10th October 
because of'legal complications'.
93 Above note 76.
94 Above note 89.
95 Above note 76.
96 Raufique (Md) Hossain v. Speaker 15 BLD (1995) 383.
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depended on its decision.
The Chief Justice constituted a special bench of three judges. In the 
leading judgement, Mahmudur Rahman J rejected the plea that the Court had no 
jurisdiction. However, both the petitioners, who came as ■ 'conscious citizens', 
were denied standing because they did not have any constitutional or legal right 
which was violated.97 Sangbadpatra provided the guiding principle.
Yet, this judgement was not particularly bad news for PIL activists for two 
reasons. First, the Court was by this time conscious that the political activists 
have hijacked the techniques of PIL for their own purposes. So it was repeatedly 
observed that this was not a PIL case.98 Second, the Court did not attempt to 
overrule the earlier decisions including the public interest standing rules declared 
in the Parliament Boycott.
Finally the government, unable to decide, asked the Supreme Court to 
advise whether the boycott rendered the seats of the members empty. This was 
the First Constitutional Reference in Bangladesh history.99 The Court declared 
the seats empty. While the prestige of the Court in the eyes of the people 
increased enormously, it was another opportunity for the Court to assert its power 
vis-a-vis the legislature.100
97 Ibid. at 389 and 392.
98 Ibid. at 382, 388 and 392. Even the petitioners did not claim that this was PIL.
99 1995 (III) (Special issue) BLT (HCD) 159; 47 DLR (AD) (1995) 111. Article 106
of the Constitution of Bangladesh provides for the 'Advisory Jurisdiction of 
- the Supreme Cotnf. ^
100 See below chapter 5.2.2 for further discussion on the impact of this decision on
the law of parliamentary privileges in Bangladesh.
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In the meantime, nation-wide processions, picketing and strike continued. 
These strikes, which are known as hartals, were challenged by an advocate. In 
the Hartal case,101 AB Siddique claimed that calling of hartal infringes his 
constitutional rights. MM Hoque J summarily rejected his petition.
The party in power attempted to counter the opposition by using publicly 
owned radio, TV and newspapers. This 'propaganda' by the government was 
challenged by Dr Farooque in the Media case.102 This petition is awaiting trial.
When the Government started to compile a voter list in order to conduct 
an election, a voter challenged the voter registration form in Md Aminul Gani 
Titu v. Election Commission.103 Again, the petition was summarily rejected.
Continued attempts by the democratically elected government to influence 
the judiciary through re-appointment of retired judges in various public posts 
gave rise to serious controversy. Furthermore, in the parliament, the government 
prevented a bill proposing more power to the Supreme Court regarding these 
matters.104 Consequently, political and constitutional activists resorted to PIL and 
raised these issues in the Court.
Appointment of justice AKM Sadeque as Chief Election Commissioner
101 Abu Bakar Siddique v. Sheikh Hasina and others unreported Writ Petition
2057/95.
102 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh unreported Writ Petition 466/95.
103 Unreported Writ Petition 1154/95.
104 See MI Farooqui (1996b: 65-68) for further discussion, where he demonstrated
that the democratically elected government had been acting in the same way 
as the previous autocratic regimes and continued to keep the judiciary under 
pressure.
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(CEC) was protested by the Opposition.105 In Justice Sadeque, Mr Ullah 
challenged his appointment on the ground that the appointment of a judge who 
has already retired is anti-constitutional.106 In Md Aminullah.107 a judge's 
promotion to the post of joint secretary in the Ministry of Law was challenged. 
These two cases are awaiting trial, but since the judges are no longer in the posts 
questioned, it appears that they have become infractuous.
The controversy relating to justice Abdur Rouf is perhaps the most 
illustrative of the problem of appointment of judges. Justice Abdur Rouf, a judge 
of the High Court Division, was appointed by the government as the CEC in 
1995. This was challenged by Mr Saleem Ullah in Justice Abdur Rouf108 on the 
ground that an acting judge can not, at the same time, hold the office of the CEC. 
The appointment was also vehemently criticised by the opposition. In response, a 
supporter of the ruling party, Dr Ahmed Hussain, approached the Court as a 
citizen petitioner in Dr Ahmed Hussain v. Shamsul Huq.109 He claimed that 
criticism by Shamsul Huq Chowdhury, chairman of the 'Co-ordination Council of 
the Lawyers' and an elected member of the Bar Council, amounted to contempt of 
court.110 While this contempt case was lost on merits, Justice Abdur Rouf 
became infractuous because, as the judge retired from the post of CEC, the
105 The Bangladesh Observer (28/4/95: 1).
106 M Saleem Ullah v. Justice AKM Sadeoue unrenorted Writ Petition 1010/95.
107 M Saleem Ullah v. Md Aminullah and others Writ Petition 93/95.
108 Saleem Ullah v. Md Abdur Rouf Chief Election Commissioner 48 DLR (1996)
144.
109 48 DLR (1996) 1.
110 See the Bangladesh Observer (22/5/995: 1).
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government reinstated him in the Appellate Division. However, this 
reinstatement was challenged by Mr Shamsul Huq Chowdhury in Shamsul Hua 
Chowdhurv v. Justice Md Abdur Rouf111 on the ground of violation of separation 
of powers. The Court held that the government has power to make such re­
appointments under the existing constitutional provisions.112
It may be said that 1995 was not a good year for PIL because no good 
social action case came before the Court. The Vehicular Pollution case113 was an 
exception where Dr Farooque sought to oblige the government to take steps to 
check hazardous smoke and unduly shrill horns of vehicles. This case is pending 
hearing.
Another activist step was taken by MM Hoque J in Eliadah McCord v. 
State.114 A sao moto rule was issued when the judge read a newspaper report that 
an American girl accused of drug smuggling was sentenced for life when she was 
a minor.113 On production before the Court, the accused admitted that she
111 49 DLR (1997) 176.
112 Chapter 5.3.2 discusses in detail the specific constitutional Articles to explore the
impact of PIL cases on existing constitutional rules of appointment and 
discipline of judges. There are some other cases which are relevant even 
though no direct public or citizens interest was claimed. For example, in Md 
Masdar Hossain and others v. Bangladesh unreported Writ Petition 2424/1995, 
the vires of certain statutory provisions supposedly detrimental to the 
independence of judiciary was challenged by 218 judges. The case is still 
pending. In Aftab Uddin (Md) v. Bangladesh 48 DLR (1996) 1, the 
promotions of three District Judges were challenged by another District Judge. 
The Court held the promotions unconstitutional for lack of prior consultation 
with the Supreme Court.
113 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh unreported Writ Petition 300/95.
114 48 DLR (1996) 495.
115 The Daily Sangram (18/7/95: 1).
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attained majority at the time of trial. But on humanitarian ground, the Court sito
moto reduced her sentence and ordered her release.116
While desperate power-struggle between the political parties created a
stalemate situation, a free press and strong public opinion prevented Army
intervention and compelled the politicians not to ignore the Constitution. WTien
the party in power finally agreed to create a caretaker system, the dispute was
focused on how to amend the Constitution. Constitutional problems became the
most important political and media issues. Mustafa Kamal J said; . . almost the
whole of the educated citizenry of the country has turned into constitutional
experts overnight."117
Supporters of political parties and constitutional activists attempted to
bypass the political stalemate through judicial pronouncements. They claimed to
represent the public interest and tried to utilise the newly found freedom the
judiciary was enjoying. But the Court had to be careful not to be seen supporting
any particular political party.118 Especially after the Parliament Boycott case, the
pressure was tremendous. The Chief Justice ATM Afzal acknowledged this in the
1st Constitutional Reference 1995:
Having regard to the questions of law raised and the nature and context 
of the Reference and particularly our anxiety to keep the Court aloof 
from political controversies that are raging outside for long and the 
constraint of the time factor, we decided to keep the hearing confined
116 The Appellate Division, however, reversed this decision in Criminal Appeal 2/96.
Subsequently, the girl was fortunate enough to obtain a Presidential pardon 
and was released in July 1996.
117 Mustafa Kamal (1995: 6).
1 1 0 For the stance of the Bangladeshi Supreme Court on the 'doctrine of political 
questions', see below chapter 5.1.
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to the representative section of and constitutional experts at the Bar. In 
order that the Court may not be held responsible for prolonging and 
thereby adding the "political crisis" by consuming a long time over the 
hearing, we decided to hear the matter with all expedition.119
The judges refused standing and rejected a number of cases like MPs 
Resignation. Hartal or Voters' Registration apparently to discourage pure political 
intentions of the petitioners. But they were still keen to decide on the matters of 
law. Thus, for example, in MPs Resignation and the Constitutional Reference 
they took a liberal view in determining the Court's jurisdiction. There was not a 
single case where the Court refused standing on the principle that PIL should not 
be allowed and no earlier pro-PIL decision was actually overruled.
Apparently, the Court's reluctance to grant full recognition to PIL was the 
result of the deluge of cases where special interests of the privileged groups were 
litigated in the name of the people. Political and constitutional activists 
effectively dominated the PIL-movement and the focus was not on social justice 
issues. While the judges did not say, in so many words, what PIL cases should be 
concerned about, they gave clear signals that the politicisation of PIL was not a 
good development.
3.9 Full recognition of PIL (1996 onwards)
Use of PIL for political purposes continued in 1996. The ruling party conducted 
an election in March that was boycotted by all major opposition parties. The new 
Parliament constitutionalised the concept of caretaker government by bringing
1,9 Above note 99 at 160.
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the Thirteenth Amendment.120 The first caretaker government was formed under 
former Chief Justice Habibur Rahman.
This government faced Md Asaduzzaman Ripon v. The State121 where the 
Court restrained the functioning of several Government officers. The petitioner, a 
student leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, claimed that these officers 
took part in the opposition movement violating their service rules. On appeal, the 
Appellate Division ordered them to resume duties till hearing of the case. This 
case is still awaiting trial.
The Caretaker government conducted a free and fair election which was 
won by the the Awami League. Democracy survived another great challenge. The 
new Awami League Government appointed Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed as the 
President, a ceremonial post.122 This appointment was challenged in Justice 
Shahabuddin123 by AB Siddique, the President of the Muslim Millat Party. Mr 
Siddique claimed that one can not join 'service of the republic' after retiring as a 
judge. He lost on merit.124 But discussing the Berubari principle, MM Hoque J 
granted standing:
120 The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act (No.l of 1996). This provides that
the person who among the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh retired last 
will be the Chief Adviser. Under the leadership of the Chief Adviser, a group 
of non-partisan advisers will run the government and conduct the 
parliamentary election. The President will remain as the titular head.
121 Unreported Writ Petition 1635/1996.
122 This is the second time Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed became President.
Previously, he headed the interim government that conducted the democratic 
election in 1990 after the fall of Ershad.
123 Abu Bakar Siddique v. Justice Shahabuddin and others 1 BLC (1996) 483.
124 This is almost an echo of Saivid Munirul Huda Chowdhurv: see above chapter 3.3.
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Following the aforesaid principle enunciated by the Supreme Court we 
hold that since several constitutional questions of great public 
importance having far-reaching consequences are involved in the
* 125present case, the present writ petition is maintainable.
Dr Farooque came in 1996 with a number of PIL cases. In Judges
Appointment,126 he sought to compel the government to appoint judges in vacant 
seats of the Supreme Court. Mahmudur Rahman J observed that this is a PIL but 
refused standing on the ground that no constitutional or legal right has been 
infringed. Although this case had a questionable public interest element and was 
lost, Dr Farooque brought a number of cases where genuine public interest was 
involved.
The right to life was extended in the Danish Milk127 case where the 
importation of radio-active milk was successfully challenged by Dr Farooque. 
Kazi Ebadul Hoque J even went on to dictate how and in what manner 
government departments should co-ordinate their monitoring system. The 
standing of Dr Farooque was not challenged by the respondents.
In the Child Trafficking case,128 Dr Farooque sought to stop kidnapping 
and trafficking of Bangladeshi children and using them as Camel jockeys, 
especially in the United Arab Emirates. This case is awaiting trial.
The standing of the petitioner was seriously contested by the government
125 Above note 123 at 489.
126 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh represented bv Secretary Ministry of Law.
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs 48 DLR (19961433.
127 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh represented bv Secretary Ministry of
Commerce and others 48 DLR (1996) 438.
128 Issa Nibras Farooque and others v. Bangladesh represented bv Secretary. Foreign
Affairs and others unreported Writ Petition 278/96.
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in the appeal of Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh / Sikandar Ali Mondol 
v. Bangladesh (TAP 20L129 a case which was previously lost in the High Court in 
1994.130 The only issue in question before the Appellate Division was the 
petitioner's standing, not the merit of the case. However, the concern of the 
petitioner was genuine because the environment of a huge area involving more 
than a million people was in issue.
The five justices of the Appellate Division found that the petitioner's 
intention was bonaflde and unanimously granted standing in an epoch-making 
judgement. It was declared that in the Constitution of Bangladesh, which is 
'autochthonous' in nature, the people are the ultimate holders of power.131 
Accordingly, social and economic justice issues must have primacy over special 
or individual interests. Thus in cases of public wrong or injury, any member of 
the public can file a writ petition on behalf of the entire public or a particular 
vulnerable section of the society.132
In FAP 20. PIL was recognised as a special type of constitutional litigation 
under the Bangladeshi legal system. As we have already analysed in chapter 2, 
the conceptual and constitutional basis of PIL was discussed in detail.133 Public 
interest standing rules were declared in a liberal manner covering almost all
129 Above note 10.
130 See above chapter 3.7.2.
131 Above note 10 at 18.
132 Ibid at 19.
133 See above chapter 2,4.6.
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aspects of locus standi of the petitioner.134 The Chief Justice invited Mustafa 
Kamal J to deliver the leading judgement, perhaps to remove confusions that 
arose after Mustafa Kamal J's decision in Sangbadpatra.133 There was, however, 
no need to overrule Sangbadpatra or any other decision since it was declared that 
Sangbadpatra was not a PIL.136
It is interesting to note that FAP 20 has not been immediately followed by 
a large number of PIL cases. BELA is almost alone in its continuous focus on 
public interest test cases. In Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Secretary. Ministry of 
Land.137 the enviromnental problems arising from operation of brick factories near 
residential areas have been challenged. In Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Secretary. 
Ministry of Housing and Public Works.138 the environmental impact of filling up a 
near Dhaka city has been questioned. These two cases are awaiting trial.
Another recent example is Ziaur Rahman Khan v. Government of 
Bangladesh.139 where a number of citizen petitioners, political activists and MPs, 
questioned a new provision inserted in three statutes relating to local 
governments of certain areas.140 This new provision empowered the government
134 See below chapter 4.4.5.
135 Ibid. at 1.
136 Ibid. at 17. Mustafa Kamal J said: "The Sangbadpatra Parishad case was decided
on the facts of that case and that is how it should be read."
137 Unreported Writ Petition 1252/1997.
138 Unreported Writ Petition 948/1997.
139 49 DLR (1997) 491.
140 The relevant statutes are Rangamati Hill Tract District Local Government Council
Act (No. XIX of 1989), Khagrachari Hill Tract District Local Government 
Council Act (No. XX of 1989) and Bandarban Hill Tract District Local
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to select the members of the councils to function for indefinite periods.141 This 
was challenged as anti-constitutional as Articles 59 and 60 of the Constitution 
provide for democratic elections for local councils. The petitions were refused, 
but the Court went on to declare that the selected members are eligible to 
function for 60 days only, after which a fresh election is mandatory. Thus the 
petitioners, albeit indirectly and partially, have succeeded in their claim.
As a result of successful pioneering work, PIL was seen as a integral 
feature of the Bangladeshi legal system in late 1996. The Bangladesh Legal Aid 
and Services Trust (BLAST), the largest legal aid NGO of the country, entered 
the field and created a cell for PIL.142 In July 26-27, A national workshop on PIL 
was held in Dhaka titled 'Public interest litigation: Sharing experiences and 
initiatives'. This was organised by BLAST, Ain O Salish Kendra and the 
Madaripur Legal Aid Association. Judges, lawyers and other PIL activists 
discussed future strategies. Instead of'a  litigation only approach, Bangladeshi 
activists were now realising the importance to diverge in order to pursue other 
types of public interest law activities.
Our discussion demonstrates that the progress of PIL in Bangladesh has 
been closely connected with the current constitutional developments. In the 
process of democratisation, political activists were eager to take part in the
Government Council Act (No. XXI of 1989). In all these statutes, section 16 
dealt with the time limit of elections.
141 Section 16A was inserted in all the three hill tracts local council statutes by
Amending Acts Nos. II, III and IV of 1997.
142 BLAST was registered in 1993 as an NGO. It is also registered as a Company
limited by guarantee. Through its eight unit offices and two legal aid clinics it 
engaged 313 lawyers in 1995.
constitutional discourse relating to power-sharing. When PIL began to advance, 
from the very beginning, applicants from privileged backgrounds including 
political activists started using the techniques of PIL to further their own causes. 
They dominated the movement for PIL to such an extent that the progress of 
genuine PIL issues has been seriously hampered. Gradual recognition of PIL was 
mainly the result of a small number of cases involving genuine social and 
economic justice issues as opposed to the cases where special or political 
interests of the elite were at stake.
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Chapter 4
Locus standi of the PIL petitioner: The Supreme Court in 
search of a new set of rules
The constitutional mechanism under Article 102, which provides for the 'writ 
jurisdiction', enables a petitioner to have direct access to the Bangladeshi 
Supreme Court where public interest is involved. Traditionally, this avenue 
remained restrictive due to the conservative principles of locus standi. These 
rigid principles posed an initial problem and a most important issue in the 
development of PIL Bangladesh. The present chapter analyses the principles and 
rules of standing and the process of recent developments to determine the impact 
of PIL on these issues. It has also been argued that the use of PIL by the elite has 
often hindered the development of the rules of public interest standing.
The background of the writ jurisdiction can be traced from the English 
courts to the courts of the sub-continent, including the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi legal system has not only inherited the broad 
principles of the English law of writs, it continues to be influenced by the recent 
English and sub-continental developments. Especially, the progress of public 
interest standing in Bangladesh have closely followed the Indian developments. 
Thus it is relevant to briefly outline the background of the writ jurisdiction, to 
trace the traditional rules of standing and to examine the recent PIL developments 
in this regard in England India and Pakistan. These issues have been discussed in 
the first part of the chapter.
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Remedies in the nature of writs provided by the Constitution of 
Bangladesh are of two broad categories depending on whether or not a person 
requires to be 'aggrieved' to come to the Court. The first category of remedies, 
where 'any person aggrieved' can approach the Court, involves remedies in the 
nature of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Our analysis demonstrates that 
since the issue of standing is a mixed question of law and fact, claims of public 
interest standing in order to promote special interests of the privileged have 
actually hindered and delayed the progress of PIL in its various stages of 
development.
The second category of remedies, where even a person not 'aggrieved' can 
approach the Court, involve remedies in the nature of habeas corpus and quo 
warranto. Traditionally, in England as well as in the sub-continental legal 
systems, this wide general rule was very cautiously applied. Our discussion 
shows that the result of the new PIL approach in Bangladesh is not to throw the 
caution away but to ensure more activism on the part of the Court leading to 
liberalisation. While the political activists have used this opportunity to petition 
the Court in a considerable number of cases, the Court has repeatedly stressed 
that relief may be granted only where bona fide  applicants approach the Court 
genuinely in the public interest.
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4.1 Judicial remedies in the nature of writs and the law of standing in 
England
The discussion of the present sub-chapter has two main themes. First, the 
backgrounds of the five writs in England have been outlined to focus on the fact 
that their origins, histories and purposes have been different and that these writs 
have been under the process of continuous development. Second, the principles 
of standing have been analysed to emphasise the lack of uniformity in traditional 
rules and somewhat unsatisfactory present situation despite recent developments. 
The impact of these issues will later be observed in chapters 4.4 and 4.5 relating 
to the development of public interest standing in Bangladesh.
4.1.1 Background of the writ jurisdiction
'Prerogative writs' originated in the English law to ensure that the public 
authorities properly carry out their duties and the inferior courts and tribunals 
function within their proper jurisdiction. Each writ has its own purpose. Habeas 
corpus is used to bring up the body of a person imprisoned or detained; certiorari 
reviews orders and convictions of inferior tribunals and removes indictments for 
trial; prohibition aims to prevent inferior tribunals from going beyond their 
jurisdiction; mandamus is issued to compel the performance of a public duty; quo 
warranto challenges the usurpation of public office.1
1 These are the five prerogative writs subsequently imported and constitutionally 
recognised in the sub-continent. De Smith (1980: 585) notes that there are a 
number of obsolete and obsolescent ones such as de non procedendo rege 
inconsulto, scire facias and ne exeat regno.
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These writs have .different historical origins and had varying degrees of 
effectiveness at different stages of their development.2 But by the sixteenth 
century, even the last of these remedies had become generally available to 
ordinary litigants. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these various writs 
came to be called 'prerogative' because they were conceived as being intimately 
connected with the rights of the Crown.3 Except for habeas corpus, they are 
discretionary and are distinct from 'writs of course’ because proper cause must be 
shown to the satisfaction of the Court why they should issue.
Prerogative remedies, it has been observed, escaped the radical reforms of 
the nineteenth century.4 There remained enormous procedural defects, anomalies 
and complexities. An attempt in 1933 resulted in certain procedural changes.J In 
1938 formalities were simplified by replacing the writs of certiorari, prohibition 
and mandamus by orders of similar title and scope.6 As an exception, habeas
2 De Smith (1980: 584-595) provides an excellent outline of the historical origins of
the prerogative writs.
3 Wade and Forsyth (1994: 614) holds the generally accepted view that these writs
were 'prerogative' because they were originally available only to the crown and 
not to the subjects. Their hallmark is that they are granted at the suit of the 
Crown. However, De Smith (1980: 584) points out that this view can be 
accepted only with a number of reservations. Thus, for example, prohibition 
and habeas corpus appear to have issued on the application of subjects from 
the very beginning. Similarly, although certiorari and mandamus were 
initially royal mandates, it seems that their earliest appearances in judicial 
proceedings were often the result of applications made by subjects.
4 Wade and Forsyth (1994: 668).
5 Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933, section 5. One
significant development was that the applicant could proceed without the 
presence of the respondent in the preliminary stage.
6 Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1938, section 7. This was
later replaced by Supreme Court Act 1981, section 29.
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corpus remained a writ.7 Information in the nature of quo warranto was replaced 
by injunction.8- The procedure was somewhat simplified, but the substantive law 
remained the same.9
During and after the Second World War, administrative law became 
conservative, static and non-adventurous.10 This situation changed in the 1960s 
and administrative law started to develop at a great pace. By the 1970s, due to the 
huge influx of administrative matters and the development of administrative law, 
the need for a radical change became apparent.
An important reform in English law was affected in 1977 by amendment 
of Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Later the Supreme Court Act 
1981, section 31 gave statutory force to these changes. Among other 
developments, by a single application for judicial review, an applicant can seek 
one or more of the remedies and the Court has option to grant either a declaration 
or injunction. This again is principally a reform of procedure. Many aspects of
7 Jackson (1977: 44) says that it was apparently thought that to meddle with habeas
corpus might be construed as subversive activity. Sharpe (1989) provides a 
comprehensive specialist literature on habeas corpus focusing on the law of 
England and referring extensively to Australia, Canada and New Zealand. He 
concludes that habeas corpus is a versatile and flexible remedy, properly seen 
as a fundamental constitutional guarantee and a cornerstone of the rule of law.
8 Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1938, section 9. Later
replaced by the Supreme Court Act 1981, section 30.
9 Even procedurally, the law remained unsatisfactory. For example, certiorari and
declaration could not be sought in one proceeding and there were no 
interlocutoiy facilities.
10 Wade and Forsyth (1994: 18-19) describe this as a gloomy period for
administrative law. They catalogue a number of judicial abdications and errors 
showing how the judges surrendered power that they previously enjoyed.
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the remedies still remain complex and dependent on the old body of laws, but the 
reformation indicates a slow progress towards a more rational system,
4.1.2 Development of the rules of standing in the English courts
Even in the traditional law, standing rules for habeas corpus are quite liberal and 
the detenue himself or any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of 
the case can approach the Court.11 Similarly, in quo warranto, a stanger whose 
motive is not improper can apply for the remedy.12 However, as to certiorari, 
prohibition and mandamus, the law of standing was quite complicated till 1977 
as different rules applied for different remedies.
With regard to certiorari, the generally accepted view stated that there is 
no strict standing requirement.13 If the applicant is a person aggrieved, the court 
will intervene ex debito justitiae, in justice to the applicant. Where the applicant 
is a stranger, the court considers whether public interest demands intervention. 
There was a second view demanding some interest of the applicant, but the 
authorities were in favour of the former view.14
11 See Sharpe (1989: 221-227) for the standing rules relating to habeas corpus in
England.
12 The leading case is R v. Soever [1916] 1KB at 595.
13 There is a long list of authorities supporting this view. In R v. Surrey Justices
[1870] LR 5 QB 466 a local inhabitant succeeded in quashing a highway order 
made without proper notice. Later authorities include R v. Butt Ex varte 
Brooke [1922] 38 TLR 537; R v. Brighton Borough Justices. Ex varte Jarvis 
[1954] 1 WLR 203; R v. Thames Magistrates' Court. Ex parte Greenbaum 
[1957] 55 LGR 129 (a news vendor successfully challenged allocation of a 
street trader's pitch by a magistrate without jurisdiction).
14 Cases supporting the second view appear to be either obiter dictum or ambiguous,
e.g. R v. Russell. Ex varte Beaverbrook Newspapers Limited [1969] 1 QB 342
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In case of prohibition one line of cases held that anyone can have locus 
standi}5 But some other cases took a more private-right approach and required a 
specific interest in the applicant.16 Still some other cases argued that the Court 
has no discretion to withhold a remedy if the jurisdictional defect is patent.17
Even though the meaning of 'particular grievance' appears to be wide, 
there were few examples of certiorari or prohibition granted to total strangers. 
One such example is R v. Greater London council Ex parte Blackburn,18 where 
prohibition was issued at the instance of a private citizen applying primarily from 
motives of public interest. Similarly, the Court granted certiorari to a trade union 
acting on behalf of one of its members.19 A citizen, having no legal right as such, 
successfully challenged a planning permission granted to his neighbour on the 
ground that the decision was vitiated by bias.20
where the newspaper was considered a person aggrieved by a magistrate's 
orders affecting the rights of the press to report criminal proceedings. See also 
R v. Bradford-on-Avon Urban District Council. Ex varte Boulton [1964] 1 
WLR 1136.
15 Leading cases include De Haber v. Queen of Portugal [1851] 17 QB 171;
Worthington v. Jeffries [1875] LR 10 CP 379.
16 Foster v. Foster and Berridge [1863] 32 LJ QB 312; R v. Twiss [1869] LR 4 QB
407.
17 Mayor and Alderman of City of London v. Cox [1867] LR 2 HL 239; Farquharson
v. Morgan [1894] 1 QB 552. But in Chambers v. Green [1875] LR 20 Eq. 552, 
Jessel MR held that the Court always had discretion to refuse prohibition to a 
stranger.
18 [1976] 1 WLR 550. Licensing of indecent films was successfully challenged.
Although the applicant's wife, the co-applicant was a rate payer and they had 
children who might have been harmed by indecent films, that interest was not 
considered decisive.
19 Minister of Social Security v. Amalgamated Engineering Union [1967] AC 725.
20 R v. Hendon RPC Ex parte Chorlev [1933] 2 KB 696.
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In mandamus, one line of authorities started with R v. Lewisham Union21 
where the applicant was required to show infringement of a legal right in the 
traditional private law sense. Some cases used the term ’right' in a private sense 
but gave it a broader meaning.22 Apparently, the courts failed to realise that 
mandamus was a public law remedy. Gradually, however, the situation improved 
as one line of authority explicitly regarded a sufficient or special interest as 
satisfying the requirements for standing. Sometimes this meant some genuine 
interest greater than that of the public at large.23 In some later cases, the Courts 
started allowing standing to an applicant whose interest was no greater than that 
of other people.24
21 [1897] 1 QB 498. A local sanitary authority unsuccessfully sought mandamus
against the guardians of a poor law union on the ground that they were 
neglecting their statutory duty to enforce the Vaccination Acts. The result of 
this judgement appears to be freedom for government departments to break 
the law. Thus in R v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise. Ex varte Cook 
[1970] 1 WLR 450 certain bookmakers were unable to enforce a statute 
against their competitors.
22 R v. Hereford Corporation. Ex varte Harrower [1970] 1 WLR 1424.
23 In R v. Manchester Corporation [1911] 1 KB 560 an insurance company was
granted a mandamus to compel the Manchester Corporation to make a by-law 
as required by a local Act, since the Company had procured the provision in 
question that gave them an interest superior to that of the general public. See 
also R v. Cotham [1898] 1 QB 802.
*)A In R v. Paddington Valuation Officer. Ex varte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd 
[1966] 1 QB 380 a company was allowed to challenge a valuation list for 
rating purposes without showing that it was more aggrieved than any other 
ratepayer; similarly in R v. Commissioner of Pobce of the Metropolis. Ex 
parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118 the police was sought to be compelled to 
take more effective action to enforce the law against gaming clubs and 
pornography.
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Interestingly, as regards the meaning of the term 'aggrieved person', a most
important authority, Ex varte Sidebotham.25 was a case relating to statutory
appeals rather than 'prerogative remedies'.26 James LJ said:
. . .  the words "person aggrieved" do not really mean a man who is 
disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some 
other order had been made. A "person aggrieved" must be a man 
who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision 
has been pronounced which has wrongly deprived him of 
something, wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully 
affected his title to something.27
Sub-continental and Bangladeshi Courts often relied on this restrictive
definition.28
By the 1970s, however, the law in England was gradually being 
liberalised. Especially, in the so called 'Blackbum/McWhirter'29 cases, 'sufficient 
interest' criteria appeared to have replaced the 'legal right' formula.30 The positive
[1880] 14 Ch. D 458, This was followed by a number of decisions including Ex 
parte Official Receiver In Re Reed Bowen & Co. [1897] 19 QBD 174 and 
Buxton v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1961] 1 QB 278.
“6 Craig (1989: 357) observes that there is no necessary reason why the interpretation 
of bankruptcy legislation should carry analytical weight in other areas, and 
ample reasons can be found for distinguishing the decision.
27 Ex parte Sidebotham above note 25 at 465.
28 Bangladeshi PIL cases that adopted this restrictive definition and denied standing
include Raufique (Md) Hossain v. Sneaker 47 DLR (1995) 361 and Dr 
Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh / Sikandar Ali Mondol v. Bangladesh
(1994) unreported Writ Petitions 998/1994 and 1576/1994. See also 
Mahmudul Islam (1995: 505) for a discussion on the issue.
79 These cases, brought in public interest, include R v. Commissioner of Police. Ex 
parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118; Blackburn v. Attorney General [1971] 1 
WLR 1037; R v. Police Commissioner. Ex parte Blackburn [1973] QB 241; 
Attorney General v. Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] QB 629 and 
R v. Greater London Council. Ex parte Blackburn above note 18.
30 Harding (1989: 196-197) however points out that the 'sufficient interest' formula
can be applied as restrictively as the 'legal right' formula - the distinction is not 
clear enough.
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role played by Lord Denning in this respect greatly influenced sub-continental 
lawyers and judges.31 While PIL was being introduced in Bangladesh, the 
activists consistently argued in the line of Lord Denning.32
In spite of some progress, the common law position in England remained 
confusing and in many cases contradictory. Some significant changes were 
brought in 1977-1981.33 The new rules introduced application for judicial 
review, a single form of proceeding for all the remedies. There is now one simple 
and uniform test of standing - the applicant must have 'sufficient interest'.
In the famous case of R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (IRCL Ex varte 
National Federation of Self-Emploved and Small Businesses Limited.34 a public 
oriented doctrine of standing, which was previously un-coordinated, gained 
attention. Their Lordships explained the new liberal law of standing and 
overruled the restrictive principle of Lewisham. Standing is declared to be a
 ^1 For example, see Bhagwati J's discussion in the famous case of SP Gupta and 
others v. Union of India and others AIR 1982 SC 149 at 193.
3 7“ Bangladeshi activists have very high regard for Lord Denning's judgements and his 
book Discipline of Law (1979). Kazi Mukhlesur Rahman v. Bangladesh 26 
DLR (SC) (1974) 44 at 52, known as Berubari discussed one of the Blackburn 
cases - Blackburn v. Attorney General above note 29. Subsequently, the 
Blackburn cases were discussed in almost all PIL cases including the leading 
case of Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh 17 BLD (AD) (1997) 1 at 12- 
13, known as FAP 20. See also Amir-ul Islam (1993: 8-10), Ishtiaq Ahmed 
(1993: 38-39) and Mahmudul Islam (1995: 508).
33 Order 53 rule 3(5) of the Rules of the Supreme Court was amended in 1977 and
was later incorporated in the Supreme Court Act 1981, section 31(3).
34 [1982] AC 617. Casual workers in Fleet Street newspapers often adopted fictitious
names and paid no taxes. IRC made a deal whereby the casuals would fill in 
tax returns for the previous two years, then the period prior to that would be 
forgotten. An association of taxpayers challenged the waiver of the large 
arrears.
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mixed question of fact and law. Thus, even if the applicant's interest is remote, he 
has a reasonable chance of succeeding if there is a clear case of default or abuse. 
This suggests that an actio popularis is in principle allowable in suitable cases.
With respect to citizen's actions brought by a total stranger, the law of 
standing still remains unsatisfactory. There is hardly anything that provides a 
coherent set of principles in favour of actio popularis. Also, there remains the 
negative influence of Gouriet,35 the modem authority on standing in injunction 
and declaration, where the House of Lords held that a private person can not 
enforce a public right substituting the Attorney General. However, it has been 
observed that the public law courts are increasingly receptive to public interest 
cases where applications are brought by persons whose own private rights are not 
affected.36
4.2 Remedies in the nature of writs in India and Pakistan and the 
rules of standing
In British India, the power to issue writs was conferred on the Supreme Courts of 
Calcutta, Madras and Bombay from the very beginning. When the successor High 
Courts were created under the High Courts Act 1861, this power was inherited. 
But the power was applicable mainly within these towns. In 1877, the Specific
3:5 Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435.
36 Justice and Public Law Project (1996: 7). Relevent cases include R v. Inspectorate 
of Pollution, ex varte Greenpeace Ltd (No. 2) [1994] 4 All ER 328; R v. 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Rees- 
Mogg [1994] 1 All ER 457 and R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte The World Development Movement Limited
[1995] 1 WLR 386.
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Relief Act took away from the three High Courts the power to issue the common 
law writ of mandamus and granted power to issue directions in the nature of 
mandamus31 Again in 1898, the Criminal Procedure Code replaced the writ of 
habeas corpus with directions in the nature of habeas corpus and extended the 
Court's territorial jurisdiction.38 In 1923, other High Courts gained the power to 
issue directions in the nature of habeas corpus39 All these changes were of form, 
not of substance.
The most significant development came when the Constitution of India 
was adopted on 26 January 1950. Under Articles 32 and 226, the Supreme Court 
and the High Courts have power to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto40 The jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court is limited to matters of Fundamental Rights - the High Courts 
have no such limitation under Article 226.
37 Sections 45 and 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1877.
jS Criminal Procedure Code 1898, Section 491. From this point, habeas corpus was 
available throughout the territory that was under the Courts appellate 
jurisdiction.
39 This was done by amending section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
40 The power of the Indian Court is not limited to issuing the five writs but include
any appropriate 'order' or 'direction'. Examples of leading cases taking 
advantage of this wider scope include Jashingbhai v. District Magistrate. 
Ahmedabad AIR 1950 Bombay 363; Ramsharan v. UP AIR 1952 All 752; Aiit 
Kumar v. Assam AIR 1963 Assam 46. Yet, it may be argued that the 
directions and orders issued in these cases are actually acknowledgement of a 
somewhat wider definition of the writ of mandamus in its Indian context. 
Seervai (1984: 1326) thus proceeds to say: "It is difficult to conceive of any 
'direction' or 'order' which would secure a result which could not be secured by 
the writs expressly mentioned."
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In Pakistan, Article 22 of the 1956 Constitution conferred power on the 
Supreme Court to enforce Fundamental Rights.41 This resembled Article 32 of 
the Indian Constitution. Again, Article 170 followed the Indian Constitution's 
Article 226 and power of judicial review was given to the High Courts 
mentioning the name of the five writs. Unlike the Supreme Court, the power of 
the High Court was discretionary. When a new Constitution came in 1962, the 
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was taken away and it could only hear 
appeals from the judgements of the High Courts. Also, Article 98, which replaced 
Article 170 of the old Constitution, did not mention the English writs by name. 
Instead, the article codified the jurisdiction incorporating the essence of the 
English writ jurisdiction.42 The power of the High Court remained discretionary. 
Finally came the Constitution of 1973 where Article 199 retained the formulation 
of Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution. Despite these changes, there is little 
difference between the provisions of the Indian and the Pakistani Constitutions 
either in substance or in form.
By the time India and Pakistan introduced the writs as constitutional 
remedies, a very large body of case law had grown up in England around 
prerogative writs and the Indian and Pakistani judges turned to English decisions
41 For Pakistani law, see S Mahmood and N Shaukat (1992).
42 Hamoodur Rahman J in Government of West Pakistan v. Begum Abdul Karim 21
DLR (SC) (1969) 1 at 11 observes with respect to habeas corpus that the new 
fonnulation frees the Court from formalities observed in the 'old prerogative 
writs'. This view appears to be too simplistic since any progressive 
development is due to changing circumstances where the judges are more 
willing to be active rather than a change of formulation or wording of the 
remedy in the Constitution.
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for guidance.43 But unfortunately, the approach 
conservative and static as a result. The reason, as we 
after the Second World War, administrative law in 
impotent condition.44
4.2.1 Law of standing under the Indian constitutional provisions
As regards habeas corpus, the traditional English rule, that even a person other 
than the detenue can approach the court, is followed in India.45 In quo warranto 
matters, from the very beginning, the Indian judges relied on R v. Soever46 and 
allowed any member of the public to apply provided that the application is made
bona fide*1
With respect to certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Indian judges had 
the opportunity to diverge from the English law of standing when 'prerogative 
writs' were incorporated as constitutional remedies. But the courts took a rather 
restrictive approach initially. It was held that the existence of a right of the
43 Although the broad principles are the same in both the countries, there are certain
very important distinctions. The Indian Court is constitutionally empowered to 
exercise judicial review of legislation and constitutional amendment through 
its writ jurisdiction. Also the Indian parliament cannot exclude the jurisdiction 
of the Court by inserting a 'no certiorari clause* in a statute.
44 See above chapter 4.1.1.
43 See Seervai (1984: 1206) for the standing rules regarding habeas corpus in India.
46 Above note 12.
47 See for example: Maseh Ullah v. Abdul Rehman AIR 1953 All 193; Raiendre
Kumar Chandanmal v. Government of State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1957
of the judges became 
have noted earlier, is that 
England relapsed into an
Madhya Pradesh 60; YD Deshnande v. Hyderabad AIR 1955 Hyderabad 36.
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petitioner is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226.48 
Similarly, the right to be enforced under Article 32 must ordinarily be a right of
i ■ ■ 49the petitioner.
Accordingly, it became an established principle that although in strict law 
any member of the public can apply for certiorari, it is unlikely that it would be 
granted to a person who was not aggrieved.50 The High Court has no option but 
to accept the application by an aggrieved party. But in case of a stranger, the 
Court must be satisfied as to the validity of his claim. So there was little practical 
difference with the old English law. The situation was the same in prohibition.5l 
In mandamus, numerous cases established that the applicant must be a person 
aggrieved.52
By the 1970s, the shortcomings of these restrictive rules became a matter 
of concern.53 One line of exceptions gave some right to ratepayers and
48 Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [1952] SCR 28 at 33; Kalinga Air Lines v. ITO AIR
1971 Cal 476 at 478.
49 Chiraniit Lai Chaudhurv v. Union AIR 1951 SC 41.
50 TT Devasthanams. Tirupathi v. Ramachandra AIR 1966 AP 112; Muidanna v.
RTA Anantapur AIR 1967 AP 137.
51 The English decision of Farquharson v. Morgan [1894] 1 QB 552 has been
repeatedly followed in India. See Govinda Menon v. Union AIR 1967 SC 
1274.
52 See for example Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta above note 48; Haii Sattar v. Joint
Commissioners of Imports & Exports AIR 1953 Cal 591; Calcutta Gas Co. 
(Prop.) Ltd. v. WB AIR 1962 SC 1044; Mani Subral Jain v. State of Haryana 
and others AIR 1977 SC 276.
53 Deshpande (1971: 153-188).
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taxpayers.54 Sometimes statutes recognised locus standi of persons not aggrieved 
in the traditional sense.55 But a series of later cases went on further to accord 
standing in cases where the person or class of persons actually aggrieved could 
not come to the Court due to social, economic or other disadvantaged position.56 
The new rules of PIL standing developed by these cases gained an authoritative 
exposition in SP Gupta and others v. Union of India and others.57 Bhagwati J 
said:
. . . where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to 
a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any 
constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in 
contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without 
authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal 
burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of 
persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or 
socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to 
approach the Court for relief, any member of the public can 
maintain an application for an appropriate direction . . ,58
When the grievance is not of any particular person or determinate number of 
people, but relates to the public in general:
54 In Varadraian v. Salem Municipality AIR 1973 Mad 55, a ratepayer questioned
misuse of funds. In KR Shenov v. Udipi Municipality AIR 1974 SC 2177, a 
ratepayer could challenge granting of cinema licence by the municipality.
55 In Ratlam Municipality v. Vardhi Chand AIR 1980 SC 1622, residents of a locality
compelled a municipality to construct drain pipes. See also JM Desai v. 
Roshan Kumar AIR 1976 SC 578.
56 See for example, Dr Upendra Baxi v. State of UP (1981) 3 SCALE 1136 (Two law
professors had standing when they wrote a letter to the Court pointing out 
constitutional violations affecting inmates of a protected home); People's 
Union of Democratic Rights v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 1473 (An 
association sought compliance with labour laws in relation of workmen in a 
construction project); Miss Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar (1982) 2 SCC 583; 
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 344.
57 Above note 31.
58 Ibid. at 188.
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. . . any member of the public having sufficient interest can 
maintain an action for judicial redress for public injuiy arising from 
breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the 
Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty 
and observance of such constitutional or legal provision.59
Thus, the 'aggrieved person' formula was abandoned in favour of the 'sufficient 
interest' doctrine in matters of PIL. What is sufficient interest is to be determined 
by the Court in each individual case, since any attempt to define it would delimit 
its scope.60 The result of these changes has been an explosion of PIL cases.
4.2.2 Law of standing under the Pakistani constitutional provisions
In habeas corpus matters, Pakistani judges follow the traditional English rules 
like their Indian counterparts and allow persons other than the detenue to 
approach the court.61 Similarly, in quo warranto matters, the rule established in 
R v. Spever62 is followed and bona fide  applications by strangers are allowed.63 
This has not been affected even after the replacement of the Latin term since the 
Constitution of 1962.
As regards certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the courts in Pakistan 
initially followed the restrictive traditional rules of standing like the Indian
59 Ibid. at 194.
60 Ibid. at 192.
61 See S Mahmood and N Shaukat (1992: 749-750) for the standing rules regarding
habeas corpus in Pakistan.
62 Above note 12.
63 SM Wali Ahmed v. Mahfuzul Haq PLD 1957 Dac 209; Mohammad Sadeque v.
Rafiaue Ali PLD 1965 Dac 330; Dr Kamal Hussain v. Seraiul Islam 21 DLR 
(SC) (1969) 23; Farzand Ali v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 98.
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judges. The Court emphasised the need for the existence of a legal right of the
petitioner to demand performance.64 Thus a direct personal interest was required
and the applicant had to be a person aggrieved. This view was taken with respect
of Article 170 of the Constitution of 1956 in Tariq Transport v. Sargodha Bus
Service.65 Later, when the Latin terms were replaced in Article 98 of the
Constitution of 1962, the old view was re-confirmed in Abdus Salam v.
Chairman, Election Authority.66
A somewhat lenient view was expressed in Fazle Din v. Lahore
Improvement Trust67 where Hamoodur Rahman CJ said:
. . .  the right considered sufficient for maintaining a proceeding of 
this nature is not necessarily a right in the strict juristic sense but it 
is enough if the applicant discloses that he had a personal interest 
in the performance of the legal duty which if not performed or 
performed in a manner not permitted by law would result in the 
loss of some personal benefit or advantage or the curtailment of a 
privilege or liberty or franchise.68
This case, however, remained an exception and the general restrictive rule 
remained unchanged.
Following the advent of PIL in India, the Pakistani Court pronounced a 
new public interest standing in Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and
64 Pakistan v. Md Saveed 13 DLR (SC) (1961) 94.
65 PLD 1958 SC 437.
66 17 DLR (1965) 191. Similar view is taken in Pakistan Steel Re-Rolling Mills
Association v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1964 Lah 138.
67 21 DLR SC (1969) 225. In this case, the petitioner felt aggrieved when, in a
residential scheme where he had his house, an adjacent plot earmarket for a 
market was given for setting up a sectarian institution.
68 Ibid. at 230.
155
another.69 Under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of 1973, the Supreme Court 
has power to make orders in the nature of writs when a question of public 
importance with reference to any of the Fundamental Rights arise. The Court thus 
held that an applicant need not be aggrieved i^  he ponies bona fide for the 
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights of a group or a class of persons who are 
unable to come to the Court.70 This case formed a basis and subsequent cases, 
both in the High Court and the Supreme Court, established PIL in Pakistan.71
The discussion so far illustrates a number of important factors of the 
development of public interest standing in India and Pakistan. The judges were 
influenced by the English situation where each 'prerogative writ' has its own 
distinct origin, purpose and history of development. To the sub-continental 
judges, a huge body of English case laws gave a false sense of security that the 
various rules and principles of writs were firmly established. But in fact, being a 
patchwork of authorities, there were numerous contradictions within this 
complexity. Also, the law was conservative, especially after the Second World 
War, when the Indian and Pakistani Courts turned to these decisions. In the sub­
continent, the distinct liberal trend advocated by the written Constitutions was 
thus overlooked for a long time.
69 PLD 1988 SC 416.
70 Ibid. at 491-493.
71 The famous case that initiated PIL is Darshan Masih v. State PLD 1990 SC 513
where the Supreme Court enforced Fundamental Rights of bonded labourers 
on the basis of a telegram.
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4.3 Remedies in the nature of writs in the Bangladesh Constitution
The Constitution of Bangladesh 1972 closely follows the Indian and Pakistani 
constitutions as regards the law of writs. Article 102 of the Constitution says:
(1) The High Court Division on the application of any person 
aggrieved, may give such directions or orders to any person or 
authority, including any person performing any function in connection 
with the affairs of the Republic, as may be appropriate for the 
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of 
this Constitution.
(2) The High Court Division may, if satisfied that no other 
equally efficacious remedy is provided by law -
(a) on the application of any person aggrieved, make an order -
(i) directing a person performing any functions in 
connection with the affairs of the Republic or of a local authority to 
refrain from doing that which he is not permitted by law to do or to do 
that which he is required by law to do; or
(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taken by a 
person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the 
Republic or of a local authority has been done or taken without lawful 
authority and is of no legal effect; or
(b) on the application of any person, make an order -
(i) directing that a person in custody be brought before it 
so that it may satisfy itself that he is not being held in custody without 
lawful authority or in an unlawful manner; or
(ii) requiring a person holding or purporting to hold a 
public office to show under what authority he claims to hold that 
office.
The first part, Article 102(1), relates to Fundamental Rights. The power of the 
Court is not discretionary since Article 44(1) declares that the right to move the 
Court to enforce Fundamental Rights is itself a Fundamental Right.72 So the 
situation is similar to Article 32 of the Indian Constitution.73
72 This has been re-iterated, among other cases, in Haii Jovnal Abedin v. State 30
DLR (1978) 375 and Government of Bangladesh v. Ahmad Naiir 33 DLR
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In cases not involving Fundamental Rights, Article 102(2) uses the same 
language and defines the same five types of writs as Article 98 of the Pakistan 
Constitution of 1962. Thus clause 2(a)(i) provides for remedies in the nature of 
prohibition and mandamus, clause 2(a)(ii) grants certiorari, clause 2(b)(i) relates 
to habeas corpus and clause 2(b)(ii) deals with quo warranto.
For the purpose of our discussion on standing, however, we have two 
broad types. In the first category are cases under clause 1 and clause 2(a) where 
the applicant must be 'any person aggrieved'. In the second category are cases 
under clause 2(b) where any person can apply, whether or not aggrieved. 
Interestingly, in cases of habeas corpus and quo warranto, the applicant is 
required to show grievance in cases of Fundamental Rights but not in cases of 
legal rights. This apparent anomaly, however, does not give legal rights more 
importance than Fundamental Rights. The Court has taken the prudent view of 
harmonious interpretation and as such no one is denied relief on this issue. 
Mahmudul Islam says:
It is very difficult to accept a contention that the condition for
enforcement of the fundamental right relating to personal liberty is
(AD) (1981) 257, The effect is clearly demonstrated in the recent case of 
Jobon Nahar and other v. Bangladesh and others 49 DLR (1997) 108. In this 
case the Court held that since the right to enforce a Fundamental Right is 
another Fundamental Right, the petitioner can move the Court even though his 
application was rejected by the Court of Settlement on the ground of 
limitation.
73 One difference is that the decisions of the Bangladeshi High Courts are not final 
and are subject to appeal under Article 103. There is another important 
difference. In India, since Article 32 only involves breach of Fundamental 
Rights, if the applicant's challenge involves both Fundamental Rights and 
legal rights, he must go to the High Courts under Article 226 where the 
remedy is discretionary. In Bangladesh, one petition containing both types of 
breach is sufficient.
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more onerous than the condition for issuance of an ordinary writ of 
habeas corpus. A reasonable and harmonious interpretation should 
be given and it should be taken that the requirement of 'aggrieved 
person' to apply for enforcement of fundamental rights is not 
applicable in respect of a petition involving detention of any 
person. In fact, the courts have not insisted on an application by an 
aggrieved person even though the petition for habeas corpus 
alleged violation of fundamental rights.74
In spite of the close resemblance with the Indian and Pakistani constitutional 
provisions, the standing rules in Bangladesh have developed through a somewhat 
different route. The following sub-chapters will examine how the Bangladesh 
Supreme Court, following the English, Indian and Pakistani Courts, gradually 
came out of the restrictive locus standi rules.
4.4 Standing rules in Bangladesh with respect to certiorari, 
prohibition and mandamus
The present sub-chapter analyses the development of public interest standing 
rules relating to the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Chapter 4.4.1 
examines relevant pre-PIL developments; chapter 4.4.2 analyses initial cases 
where liberal standing rules were refused; chapter 4.4.3 explores the arguments 
forwarded by activist lawyers and judges in favour of wider rules; and chapters
4.4.4 and 4.4.5 analyses the cases that have established new public interest 
standing principles. We focus on the principle that standing is a mixed question 
of fact and law to illustrate that the development of public interest standing has 
often been hindered because of the use of PIL for the causes of the privileged.
74 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 455).
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4.4.1 'Person aggrieved': Pre-PIL development in Bangladesh
When the Bangladesh Supreme Court started functioning under the Constitution
of 1972, there was no apparent reason to interpret the law of standing differently
from the Pakistani Courts. Nothing in the Constitution suggested a departure
from the 'well-established' constitutional principles of locus standi that are
applicable to the more or less identical provisions of the Constitutions of India
and Pakistan. In fact, the formulation of Article 102 is the same as Article 98 of
the Pakistan Constitution of 1962. So the Court remained loyal to the
conservative tradition of English, Indian and Pakistani authorities.
Thus it was held in Eastern Hosiery Mills Sramik Bahumukhi Samabava
Samitv Ltd. and another v. Government of Bangladesh75 that the petitioner must
have some right and direct personal interest in the subject matter. Later, Ruhul
Islam CJ's explanation in Dada Match Workers Union76 became an authority:
An application for an order of certiorari can only be made by an 
aggrieved party and not merely one of the public and in the case of 
mandamus it is an established principle that the applicant must 
show that there resides in himself a legal right to the performance 
of the legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is 
sought.77
This restrictive approach was followed in a number of cases even when the rules 
in other jurisdictions were being liberalised.78
75 27 DLR (1975) 674.
76 Dada Match Workers Union v. Government of Bangladesh 29 DLR (1977) 188.
77 Ibid. at 194.
78 A series of cases followed this view. See for example Khulna Shipyard Employees
Union v. General Manager. Khulna Shipyard and others 30 DLR (1978) 368 
and Zamiruddin Ahmed v. Government of Bangladesh 34 DLR (1982) 34.
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In spite of this conservative rule of standing, the Court from the very
beginning realised that there can not be any hard and fast definition of the term
'person aggrieved'. Since the facts and circumstances of each case are different,
one generalised rule would cause hardship. Even in the Pakistan period, the
Dhaka High Court expressed this opinion in Abdus Salam.79 In the Bangladeshi
period, as has been analysed later, Berubari first established this principle with
regard to the Bangladesh Constitution.80 More recently, Amir-ul Islam
Chowdhury J said:
There is no hard and fast meaning that could be ascribed to the 
term "aggrieved person". The meaning of the term "aggrieved 
person" is to be determined with reference to the facts and 
circumstances of each case.81
But despite the absence of a precise definition of the term 'person aggrieved1, the 
judges did not use the opportunity in favour of liberal interpretations. Where 
traditional principles constituted a bar, standing was not given merely on the 
strength of the merits of a case. Thus apart from the recognition that standing is a 
mixed question of fact and law, very little real progress was made. The result was 
the same whether the applicant purported to represent the aggrieved or came as a 
concerned citizen.
79 Above note 66 at 198.
80 See below 4.4.1.2.
81 Zamiruddin Ahmed above note 78 at 42. In this case, a constituted attorney was
allowed to petition on behalf of the aggrieved who was out of the country and 
was prevented by the Government from returning.
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4.4.1.1 Representative standing
Sometimes a group or an organisation seeks to take action on behalf of its 
members or to protect their interests. It has been held by the Bangladesh Supreme 
Court that a trade union,82 a society or an association83 is not a 'person aggrieved’ 
for the purpose of Article 102 when it is representing its members. This means 
that although a trade union can represent its members in industrial disputes and 
an association in various other forums - a writ in a representative capacity on 
behalf of the members is not allowed.
However, the union or society will have standing when it is not 
representing the members and is aggrieved itself.84 In case of a company, it must 
apply itself with regard to its operations, not individual members or shareholders. 
The reason is that a company has a distinct and separate legal entity and stands 
on a different footing than a society.85 Although representative applications are 
denied, a constituted attorney can apply for a person aggrieved.86
tp
“ See Dada Match Workers Union above note 76 and Khulna Shipyard Employees 
Union above note 78.
8j Bangladesh Electrical Association and others v. Bangladesh 46 DLR (19941221.
Rd —In Bangladesh Hastashilpa Samabava Federation Ltd (KARIKA) v. Bangladesh 45 
DLR (1993) 324 at 327, a society was given standing when the subject-matter 
related to the management of the society.
83 Bangladesh Jute Mills Association v. Director General of Food and others (1989)
Unreported Writ Petition No. 295/1989. See also Md Siddiqur Rahman and 
others v. The Board of Trustees. Port of Chittagong and others 27 DLR (1975)
481 (A corporate body is a person). These cases relied on the Indian case of 
Charaniit Lai Chowdhury above note 49.
86 Zamiruddin Ahmed above note 78.
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4.4.1.2 Public interest standing
The classification of public interest standing into two broad categories has been
recognised by the Bangladeshi courts.87 In representative public interest
standing, the applicant comes for a person or class of persons who by reason of
helplessness, disability or economic inability cannot move the court for relief.88
In citizen standing, a breach of public duty results in violation of collective right
of the public at large.
In Berubari.89 when the applicant challenged an international treaty, he
actually came to vindicate his own rights. His right to move freely throughout the
territory and to reside and settle in any place therein as well a his right of
franchise was threatened. But the judgement clearly re-interpreted a citizen's right
vis-a-vis the power of the State. Sayem CJ said:
It appears to us that the question of locus standi does not involve 
the Court's jurisdiction to hear a person but of the competency of 
the person to claim a hearing, so that the question is one of 
discretion which the Court exercises upon due consideration of the 
facts and circumstances of each case.90
He also added:
. . . We heard him in view of the constitutional issue of grave 
importance raised in the instant case involving an international 
treaty affecting the territory of Bangladesh and his complaint as to 
an impending threat to his certain fundamental rights guaranteed
87 Latifur Rahman J in FAP 20 above note 32 at 25.
OQ Our discussion excludes representative suits under Order 1 rule 8 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure 1908 because it falls under statutory law and not 
constitutional remedies. In a representative suit, numerous persons may have 
the same interest in the subject matter and any number of them, with the 
Court's pennission, may sue or defend on behalf of all.
89 Above note 32.
90 Ibid. at 52
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by the Constitution, namely, to move freely throughout the territory 
of Bangladesh, to reside and settle in any place therein as well as 
his right of franchise. Evidently, these rights attached to a citizen 
are not local. They pervade and extend to every inch of the territory 
of Bangladesh stretching upto the continental shelf.91
Thus we have several important propositions.92 Sayem CJ begins by pointing out 
that standing does not involve the Court's jurisdiction to hear a person. In other 
words, standing and justiciability must not be confused. Then he proceeds to 
suggest that the Court has discretionary powers to determine standing which 
involves competency of the applicant to claim a hearing.
As to this competency, there are two situations. If it is merely a question 
of law, the old rules of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus will determine 
standing depending on the type of relief sought. But if it is a question of fact, the 
old rules can be abandoned since standing will depend on the gravity of the 
situation. Although Berubari emphasised the Court's discretionary power to 
determine each case on the basis of its merits, it did not altogether reject the old 
rules or declare that the question of fact is the sole determining factor. So in 
effect, standing remains both a question of law and of fact but in certain cases a 
broader approach must be taken.
Berubari identified the cases where the Court is required to take such a 
broader approach. When the Fundamental Right of a citizen is infringed or 
threatened, it is enough if he shares the right in common with the public in 
general, he need not have a special grievance.93 Also, if a constitutional issue of
91 Ibid. at 53.
92 Afzal CJ (FAP 20 above note 32 at 3) holds that two general principles were
established while Mustafa Kamal J {ibid. at 14) identifies seven.
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grave importance affecting one's Fundamental Rights is raised, he qualifies as
Thus what started as a case to enforce one individual's Fundamental 
Rights, ended up in demolishing the ’special grievance’ formula in certain 
situations. Berubari. however, does not deal with cases where public-spirited 
individuals or groups, not affected themselves, seek to move the Court to protect 
the Fundamental Rights of others.
Berubari remained an exception even though one or two attempts were 
made to use public interest standing arguments. In Mazharul Huq v. The 
Returning Officer and others.94 a voter was denied standing when he claimed 
deprivation of right of franchise and demanded re-election. The Court examined 
the relevant statute in a mechanical way although, as a result, a substantial 
portion of the electorate was prevented from voting for their party or candidate of 
choice.93
93 One interesting factor is that the people who were residents of Berubari, the
enclave in question, probably had a special grievance. But they were under the 
administrative control of India and were unable to come to the court.
94 27 DLR (AD) (1975) 11. In this case, a candidate for a local election was declared
un-contested winner since the only opposing candidate had died before the 
polling day. The petitioner also made a failed attempt to show his personal 
interest by claiming that he had ’indomitable desire* to contest the election but 
refrained himself in support of the deceased candidate.
93 The changing attitude of the Court can be seen in the recent comparable decision 
in Sharifuddin (Md) v. Md Mofizuddin Sarker 49 DLR (1997) 86 where the 
Court directed re-election because participation of a disqualified candidate 
materially affected the result of the election.
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In a more important case, MG Bhuivan v. Bangladesh.96 an advocate 
challenged the constitutionality of an Ordinance on the ground that every citizen 
can come to the court for declaration of nullity of any law. The Appellate 
Division refused to make an exception of the traditional rules and denied 
standing because it could not find his legal right or specific grievance.
Berubari is often regarded as the first Bangladeshi PIL case and was relied 
upon by the PIL petitioners in almost all subsequent attempts to attain standing.97 
But as a 'first case’, Berubari was perhaps a poor model for public interest 
standing. It was a case by a political activist and dealt with the right to freedom of 
movement and residence. It served the purpose of the politically conscious rather 
than the socially or economically deprived. Since locus standi is a mixed 
question of law and fact, it was very difficult in subsequent cases to convince the 
Court that the issue in question was one of'grave constitutional importance’. Thus 
both in Mazharul Huq and MG Bhuivan. the petitioners were treated as 
advocating their own political causes and were denied standing.
4.4.2 Initial PIL cases refusing public interest standing
Initially, when the term PIL was used by the petitioners asking for public interest 
standing, there were two main problems. Sometimes the causes they espoused did 
not concern public interest, in some other cases, the judges were too conservative
96 BCR 1981 AD 80. This was an appeal from BCR 1982 HCD 320.
97 For observations of Bangladeshi judges on this point, see above chapter 3.1.
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to widen the traditional principles. In this respect, the leading case is 
Sangbadpatra98 which was subsequently followed by a series of cases.
4.4.2.1 Sangbadpatra
PIL, after the term was coined, was first pleaded in Sangbadpatra. a case that
generated interest in the subject and gradually included PIL in the judicial
agenda. In that case, an association of newspaper owners challenged the
Constitution and an award declared by a statutory Wage Board.
The preliminary issue in question was whether the association has
standing to bring a writ application on behalf of its members. It was claimed that
the said association was the only representative of the newspaper owners who
were undoubtedly aggrieved. The High Court division relied on the principle that
since direct personal interest is absent, an association, not being itself a 'person
aggrieved', can not come to Court on behalf of its members.99 The Court relied on
the principle established in earlier cases including Dada Match Workers Union100
and Khulna Shipyard Employees Union.101 Berubari was discussed but
considered not relevant. Abdul Jalil J observed that the association in question,
Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad,
. . .  has nothing to lose or win by the impugned award. It is the 
owners of the newspapers and the employees who are affected by
98 Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad (BSP) v. The Government of People's Republic
(^Bangladesh and others 12 BLD TAPI 119921153.
99 Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad (BSP) v. The Government of People's Republic
^ if Bangladesh and others 43 DLR (1991) 424.
100 Above note 76.
101 Above note 78.
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the award and not Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad. This 
Parishad may represent the employers anywhere but it has no locus 
standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 102 of 
the Constitution as it is not a "person aggrieved" for the purpose of 
Article 102 of the Constitution.102
When the case came to the Appellate Division, Mustafa Kamal J upheld 
this view. He re-iterated that the petitioner may represent the employers in the 
Wage Board and may even have capacity to act as the employer's representative 
in various other forums, but has no locus standi with respect to the writ 
jurisdiction. This does not mean, he further clarified, that the petitioner can never 
file a writ petition. "It can and it may, if it has a personal interest in the subject 
matter".103
Another line of argument was presented in the Appellate Division for the
first time. Public interest standing was claimed. It was argued that 'almost anyone'
can challenge the Constitution and decision of the Wage Board because it
involves violation of the Fundamental Right of freedom of the press. Mustafa
Kamal J rightly said:
. . .  the present case is definitely not a public interest litigation. The 
petitioner is not espousing the cause of a downtrodden and 
deprived section of the community unable to spend money to 
establish its fundamental rights and enforce its constitutional 
remedies. It is not acting pro bono publico but in the interest of its 
members.104
Sangbadpatra demonstrates that the techniques of PIL were taken up by the elite 
for their own purposes at the very beginning of the introduction of public interest
102 Above note 99 at 429.
103 Above note 98 at 156.
104 Id.
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standing in Bangladesh. As a result, since standing is a mixed question of law
and fact, the Court refused to modify the traditional rules in favour of opulent
media magnets. The outcome was actually unfavourable to the development of
public interest standing. In fact, the observations of the Court on PIL raised
confusions. The judge said:
In our Constitution, the petitioner, seeking enforcement of a 
fundamental right or constitutional remedies, must be a "person 
aggrieved". Our Constitution is not at pari materia with the Indian 
Constitution on this point. The Indian Constitution, either in Article 32 
or in Article 226, has not mentioned who can apply for enforcement of 
fundamental rights and constitutional remedies. The Indian Court only 
honoured a tradition in requiring that the petitioner must be an 
"aggrieved person". The emergence in India of pro bono publico 
litigation, that is litigation at the instance of a public spirited citizen 
espousing causes of others, has been facilitated by the absence of any 
constitutional provision as to who can apply for a w rit. . .
Therefore, the decisions of the Indian jurisdiction on public 
interest litigation are hardly apt in out situation. We must confine 
ourselves to asking whether the petitioner is an "aggrieved person", a 
phrase which has received a meaning and dimension over the years.105
From this observation, arguments against PIL could be drawn by inference. First, 
Indian decisions on PIL are not relevant since the constitutional dispensation in 
the two countries is not the same. So the advance of PIL in India is to be totally
ignored. Second, the petitioner mu )e a 'person aggrieved'. This is a
constitutional imperative which the judges can not ignore. The Indian situation is 
different because there is no provision as to who can apply for a writ. Third, the 
meaning of 'person aggrieved' must be taken from earlier authorities and 
traditions since it is, as stated above, "a phrase which has received a meaning and 
a dimension over the years".
105 Ibid. at 155.
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4.4.2.2 Other cases
After Sangbadpatra. the judges of the High Court took a restrictive view and 
relied heavily on the observations of Mustafa Kamal J In Sved Mahbub Ali and 
others v. Ministry of law and others.106 certain members and officials of the Bar 
challenged the promotion of subordinate courts judges by the government 
without consultation with the Supreme Court. The petitioner's reliance on 
Berubari was considered not relevant. The Court relied on Sangbadpatra and said 
that the petitioners may represent the bar elsewhere but not in writ jurisdiction.
In the High Court Division's judgement in FAP 20.107 where a 
governmental scheme to control flood was challenged, the Court again relied on 
Sangbadpatra and accordingly refused to consider Indian cases on PIL. From the 
English jurisdiction, Gouriet108 was discussed.
A culmination of this line of argument can be found in Raufique (Md) 
Hossain v. Speaker. Bangladesh Parliament and others.109 The opposition 
members resigned from the Parliament en masse, an act for which no 
constitutional provision can be found. In this case, almost all the leading 
authorities on standing from England, India and Pakistan were discussed along 
with Bangladeshi judgements. Mahmudur Rahman J heavily relied on
106 (1992) unreported Writ Petition 4036/1992.
107 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh / Sikandar Ali Mondol v. Bangladesh
(1994) Writ Petitions 998/94 and 1576/94.
108 Above note 35.
109 47 DLR (1995) 361 at 385-388.
170
Sangbadpatra and re-iterated the basic arguments that the applicant must be a
'person aggrieved' and the meaning of the term must be restrictively defined as
has been traditionally established over the years. He could not find any violation
of Fundamental Rights probably because he was looking for direct and unique
personal interest of the petitioners.
Interestingly, it was asserted in the judgement that this was not a social
action or public interest case.110 It was not social action, but as in Berubari. there
was undoubtedly a 'constitutional issue of grave importance'. It is possible that
this assertion was an attempt not to be seen as opposing the newly emerging PIL
phenomenon. In any case, the result was unfavourable for PIL because it was not
made clear what would happen if it was a public interest matter. The doubt was
further fuelled by the following observation by Mahmudur Rahman J.:
Article 102 of our Constitution because of the expression a "person 
aggrieved" and expression "enforcement of any fundamental rights 
conferred by Part III of this Constitution" has narrowed down the 
scope of this writ jurisdiction unlike that of India under Article 226 
in which the fathers of the Constitution in their attempt to meet the 
social economic condition and for enforcement of such right 
widened the jurisdiction consciously . . .  As I have examined 
several decisions cited at the Bar of the Indian jurisdiction I think 
that those are on the language employed in the Indian Constitution 
which is much wider in scope to apply high prerogative writs by 
the Supreme Court under Article 32 and by the respective High 
Courts of India under Article 226.111
Apparently, it was taken for granted that Article 102, through its requirement of 
'person aggrieved', makes a tough barrier for any liberalisation of locus standi.
1,0 Ibid. at 388.
111 Id
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While FAP 20 was an exception, the petitioners in both Sved Mahbub Ali 
and Raufique (Md) Hossain pursued their own political agenda. Thus although 
they claimed that they were representing the people, the judge was reluctant to 
grant standing. But the Court was by this time well aware that the elite were 
using the arguments of public interest standing for their own purposes. This is 
reflected in the declaration in Raufique (Md) Hossain that it was not a PIL case.
4.4.3 Examining the arguments in favour of public interest standing
Chapter 2 above already discussed in detail the new and liberal rules of 
interpretaton of the Constitution.112 These rules state that any particular 
constitutional provision must be read in the context of the entire Constitution and 
accordingly a PIL approach must be taken since the Constitution of Bangladesh 
mandates social justice and the people are the focal point of its concern. As long 
as these liberal rules were unrecognised, locus standi as well as other aspects of 
PIL could not be liberally construed. Thus we find that public interest standing 
gained gradual recognition along with the acceptance of liberal public interest 
rules of interpretation of the Constitution. The single stumbling bloc for the new 
construction was the term 'any person aggrieved' contained in clauses 1 and 2(a) 
of Article 102.
It has been observed that the Constitution does not define the term 'person 
aggrieved'.113 Ishtiaque Ahmed says:
112 See above, chapters 2.4.5 and 2.4.6.
113 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 511).
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. . .  it must be recognised that however inappropriate and inept the 
expression "person aggrieved" may be in the total context of the 
Constitution and of Art. 102, it is not a term defined by the 
Constitution.114
Thus it appears that the judges are free to define the term in consonance with the 
social and collective justice spirit of the Constitution instead of blindly following 
traditionally inherited rules.
Since the Constitution does not define the term, the judges have relied on 
the numerous authorities on the point. Too much reliance on the so called 
'established rules’ propounded by these authorities has been the cause of serious 
confusions, contradictions and conservatism. The result is Mustafa Kamal J's 
assumption in Sangbadpatra that the phrase 'person aggrieved1 has received a 
fixed meaning and dimension over the years.113
This assumption is not correct due to several reasons. In England, as we 
have already discussed, each 'prerogative writ' had its separate origin, purpose 
and history of development.116 So the rules of standing for each writ developed 
differently by the judges who were dealing with one case at a time. Thus even in 
the same writ, contradictory and confusing standards were applied in different 
cases.117 Sub-continental Courts followed this tradition and even when the 
Pakistani Constitution of 1962 discarded the Latin terms, there was no shift from 
the earlier position.118 Acceptance of restrictive English decisions by some earlier
114 Ishtiaq Ahmed (1996: 7).
115 Above note 98 at 155.
116 See above chapter 4.1.1.
117 Id.
118 See above chapter 4.2.2.
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sub-continental authorities was later followed in the majority of cases. As a 
result, the judges had more than one test to ascertain aggrievement. Thus the rule 
was expressed in various terms including 'particular grievance1, 'specific legal 
right', 'sufficient interest and 'special interest'.119 This is no proof of the phrase 
receiving a specific meaning and a particular dimension over the years.
The term 'person aggrieved' was generally used for certiorari, Thus when 
the tenn is used for the three writs under the Constitution, it is difficult to fix a 
single ascertainable meaning. Even when it is used in relation to other writs, the 
test is never the same. Recent developments in England towards a more uniform 
system also show the absence of any immutable principles.120
A main problem of identifying an all-accepted definition of the term is that 
the issue of standing is a mixed question of law and fact. Since the adoption of 
the 'sufficient interest' formula in England and India, the judges in the two 
countries have shown different degrees of willingness to grant public interest 
standing.
Also important is the fact that there is no such concept of constitutionally 
declared Fundamental Rights in England. Being fundamental and having a 
special status in the scheme of a written constitution, these rights are inviolable. 
Thus, the principles of Lewisham or Sidebotham may be relevant to legal rights, 
but it is not right to apply them unhesitatingly to all matters of Fundamental 
Rights in Bangladesh.
119 Ishtiaq Ahmed (1996: 9).
120 See R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners above note 34.
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It has been repeatedly asserted that under the Constitution, a person does 
not have to be 'personally', 'directly', or 'primarily' aggrieved.121 Amir-ul Islam 
argues on the point that the formulation is 'application of and not 'application by’ 
the applicant.122 He also argues that the term 'any person' used in the Constitution 
is quite different from the definite term 'the person'. Another argument of this 
type is that the term 'any person' should be read disjunctively from the word 
'aggrieved1.123
Under the proviso of Article 153(3), if there is any conflict between the 
Bangla and English version of the Constitution, the Bangla version will prevail. 
The word used in the Bangla version is (sangkhubdha) - a term closer to 
'concern' rather than 'aggrieved'. This unique argument was forwarded by Dr 
Mohiuddin Farooque in FAP 20 but was not accepted by the judges.124 
Apparently, the judges considered that the general meaning of the term in Bangla 
is different from its legal usage.
All these arguments, both conceptual and technical, tend to emphasise two 
points regarding the law of standing. First, the Court must follow the 
Constitutional directives and provisions rather than inherited traditions. Second,
121 Ishtiaq Ahmed (1993: 39) and Mahmudul Islam (1995: 511-512). Amir-ul Islam
(1996: 8) compares the situation with the Constitution of Sri Lanka. Under 
Article 126(2), petitions for infringement of Fundamental Rights are available 
only to the person 'himself or by an Attorney-at-law on his behalf.
122 Amir-ul Islam (1996: 8).
123 See the appellant's arguments in FAP 20 above note 32 at 11.
124 Id.
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these constitutional provisions indicate liberal rather than restrictive rules of 
interpretation.
4.4.4 Development of new rules of public interest standing: Cases in the High 
Court Division before FAP 20
In the process of gradual recognition of PIL, the idea of public interest standing 
has grown one step at a time. As the High Court Division examined the topic 
from a case to case basis, the judges resorted to a number of different sets of 
arguments. The line of argument adopted in any particular case depended on the 
facts and the aspects of locus standi in question. But the cases that actually 
examined the principles of locus standi and attempted to formulate new rules are 
extremely limited in number.
While discussing standing, the judges often followed the constitutional 
mandate and the conceptual guideline for PIL discussed in chapter 2.125 
Accordingly, once the element of 'public interest' was recognised, standing was 
allowed, totally disregarding the intricacies of standing in the private law. 
However, more elaborate discussion as to the meaning of 'person aggrieved' or 
’sufficient interest1 in public law can be found in a few cases including Welfare 
AssociationJ26 Parliament Boycott127 and Justice Shahabuddin.128
125 See above chapters 2.4.5 and 2.4.6.
126 Bangladesh Retired Government Employees Welfare Association v. Bangladesh
46 DLR (1994) 426.
127 Anwar Hossain Khan v. Speaker of Bangladesh Sangsad Bhavan and others 47
DLR (1995) 42.
128 Abu Bakar Siddique v. Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed and others 1 BLC (1996) 483.
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4.4.4.1 Liberalising representative public interest standing: Welfare 
Association
In Welfare Association.129 an association of retired government servants 
challenged a discriminatory law involving pensions. The government pleaded the 
traditionally accepted principle that an association can not represent its members 
in a writ. But in spite of the earlier authorities, the Court granted standing. 
However, it must be noted that even in the absence of the association as a party, 
it was a strong case because the co-applicants were aggrieved personally.130
The government relied on a number of traditional authorities from sub­
continental jurisdictions including the leading case of Dada Match Worker Union 
and Sangbadpatra.131 Petitioners pleaded the Indian PIL of DS Nakara and others 
v. Union of India132 which was followed in Pakistan in IA Sharwani and others v. 
Government of Pakistan and others.133 Sangbadpatra was simply ignored on the 
ground that the facts of the two cases are different and as such the principle set 
out in Sangbadpatra can not be applied. As regards the cases on representative 
standing, the judge apparently accepted the earlier authorities including Dada
129 Above note 126.
130 The President and Vice President of the Association, who were retired
government employees themselves, were petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 respectively.
131 From the Bangladesh jurisdiction, other cases discussed were Khulna Shipyard
Employees Union above note 78 and Zamiruddin Ahmed above note 78. The 
Pakistani case of Tariq Transport Company above note 65 was also examined.
132 AIR 1983 SC 130. In this PIL, a society represented a large number of pensioners.
Here as well, the co-petitioners were personally aggrieved and undoubtedly 
had standing.
133 1 991 SCMR1041.
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Match Workers Union as establishing a general rule because he neither declared
these authorities wrong nor overruled them. But he went on to create an
exception. Scattered in the judgement are two broad tests used to determine locus
standi in this exceptional situation.
The first test aims to detect a public interest standing. The judge argues
that the Constitution is not a morbid document but a dynamic instrument capable
of being interpreted and applied in the ever-changing socio-economic
circumstances.134 While so doing, the judiciary is bound to interpret the I
Constitution in favour of socio-economic justice. Thus when someone is unable
to come to the Court due to poverty or otherwise, his representative should not be
denied standing on merely technical grounds. He says:
The judicial function is to interpret it in such a way as to meet the
socio-economic needs of those who are incapable, on account of
poverty or otherwise, to seek assistance of the court which exists 
for safeguarding the rights and interest of all citizens.135
If a Fundamental Right is not enforced and a citizen is kept in perennial
suffering, the Court will fail to discharge its constitutional obligation. So the
'pedantic and lexicographic' interpretation of the words 'person aggrieved' must be 
avoided if there is no conflict with any specific provision of the Constitution.
The second test in determining standing is that as long as an association 
looks after the welfare and common interest of its members "it is entitled to 
ventilate this interest before this Court in the form of public interest litigation".136
134 Welfare Association above note 126 at 435.
135 Id.
136 Ibid at 434.
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This is so because it is an absurd proposition to suggest that each individual 
member must come forward and file a separate writ.
Apparently, if the above tests yield positive results, an applicant will be 
granted locus standi as an exception to the general rule of representative 
standing. Since the earlier restrictive decisions were not overruled, the 
liberalisation in Welfare Association is limited in its scope. It must also be 
remembered that the association in this case was not representing the poor or 
helpless and the co-applicants had standing anyway.
Naimuddin Ahmed J considered Sangbadpatra with much caution. As a 
High Court Division judge, he could not contradict or overrule Sangbadpatra. It 
was generally assumed, when Welfare Association was decided, that 
Sangbadpatra supports traditional representative standing and restricts PIL.137 
Naimuddin Ahmed J's strategy was to refuse to discuss Sangbadpatra on the 
ground that the facts of the two cases are not similar and as such there is no need 
to follow the Sangbadpatra principle. But the difference between the two cases is 
not made clear. This absence of clarification restricted the scope of the principles 
established in Welfare Association.
The distinction between Sangbadpatra and Welfare Association lies in the 
fact that locus standi is a mixed question of fact and law. The Court has a 
discretion to grant standing taking into consideration the circumstances in each 
case. Thus a group of opulent Newspapers owners do not have the same status as 
a group of old middle-class pensioners. The Court itself failed to expressly inform
137 See Sved Mahbub Ali above note 106 and Raufique (Md) Hossain above note 109.
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us that it was exercising its discretion. In FAP 20. this issue has been clarified 
while appreciating the decision in Welfare Association.138
4.4.4.2 Recognising citizen standing: Parliament Boycott
In Parliament Boycott.139 when the opposition MPs started continuous abstention 
from parliamentary sessions, a mandamus was brought by an advocate claiming 
to represent the rights of the public. He claimed that this mass abstention is anti- 
constitutional and the MPs must go back to the Parliament and pay back all the 
salaries and other allowances received during the period of their unauthorised 
absence. The petitioner came as a citizen and voter. He claimed that the MPs 
represent the whole nation and as such any constitutional breach of violation 
committed by any member of Parliament can be questioned by any citizen. It was 
argued that he was not a ’person aggrieved' under Article 102.
While granting standing, as we have already discussed in chapter 3, Qazi 
Shafiuddin J canvassed liberal rules to interpret the Constitution and relied on the 
'people's power1 idea.140 He discussed the Preamble and Article 7 and pointed out 
that^all powers of the Republic are the powers of the people delegated to relevant 
authorities. These authorities must exercise this power constitutionally. If there is 
any violation, any citizen can challenge this since he is a source of power along
138 ATM Afzal J (FAP 20 above note 32 at 4), however, reserved further comments
since an appeal from Welfare Association is pending in the Appellate 
Division.
139 Above note 127,
140 Ibid. at 45-46. For the role of 'peoples power' idea in constitutional interpretation,
see above chapter 2.4.6.
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with all other citizens of the country. This is all the more so because under the 
Preamble, it is the people of Bangladesh who are to safeguard, protect and defend 
the Constitution.
This case apparently argues that there should be no standing requirement 
at all in cases of Constitutional violation when the entire public is affected. This 
is a wide concept and the only real restriction seems to be the discretion of the 
judge to ascertain whether or not there has been a constitutional violation. Still 
this case did not touch all the aspects of public interest standing. One such 
limitation is that it applies only to constitutional Fundamental Rights and not to 
legal rights. Similarly, this case is no authority for cases where someone, whose 
own Fundamental Rights are not in question, brings a writ for a person or class or 
persons.
There are reasons why this case was not taken immediately as an authority 
for the introduction of PIL. The concept of PIL as such was not discussed. In fact, 
it was a highly criticised judgement and was immediately stayed pending an 
appeal.141 Later, due to change in the political circumstances, the case became 
infractuous. But the 'people's power' argument was later adopted and expanded in 
FAP 20. Finally, it must be noted that although the Berubari principle of 
'constitutional issue of grave importance’ could be applied in Parliament Boycott. 
it was not even mentioned. In fact the principle in Parliament Boycott appears to 
be wider than in Berubari. but the arguments are not the same.
141 See above chapter 3.7.1.
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4.4.4.3 Application of the Berubari principle relating to 'constitutional issue 
of grave importance': The case of Justice Shahabuddin
The Berubari principle, liberal standing rule where a constitutional issue of grave 
importance is concerned, was faithfully followed in Justice Shahabuddin.142 A 
citizen challenged the assumption of the office of the President by former Chief 
Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed on the ground that a retired judge can not hold any 
office of profit in the service of the Republic. The applicant's standing was 
disputed.143
Md Mozammel Hoque J first expanded the meaning of 'person aggrieved'. 
He said:
Article 102 of the Constitution provides that a person who is 
aggrieved may file an application under Article 102(2) of the 
Constitution. But it does not provide that a person should be 
personally aggrieved. If the Constitution provides personal 
aggrievement, then the scope of Article 102 would be narrower.144
He agreed with the petitioner's contention that the term 'aggrieved' may be used to 
express different meanings. Thus a grievance may be personal, constitutional, 
mental, economic, political or social. Article 102 shelters a person in any kind of 
aggrievement.
142 Above note 128.
143 The writ, as appears from its cause title and prayer, was filed as quo warranto.
The respondents vehemently argued that it was pre-mature since Justice 
Shahabuddin Ahmed had not even taken oath of office. The judge refused to 
deny the writ on this technical question alone and decided to treat the petition 
as certiorari and proceeded to hear the parties. Hence the relevancy of the 
issue of standing.
144 Justice Shahabuddin above note 128 at 488.
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On this issue, the Court rightly refused to follow Sangbadpatra because it
related to representative standing and the facts and circumstances were different.
The Court considered the facts of the case in determining standing and
emphasised the importance of the questions involved. The President is the Head
of the State and symbol of unity of the entire country. If any constitutionally
disqualified person becomes President, it will touch and affect each and every
citizen of Bangladesh.145 So it was undoubtedly a very important constitutional
issue. The Court, after discussing Berubari. said:
Following the aforesaid principle enunciated by the Supreme Court 
we hold that since several constitutional question of great public 
importance having far-reaching consequences are involved in the 
present case, the present writ petition is maintainable.146
Thus the Court followed Berubari entirely. SP Gupta was examined with 
approval but PIL as a concept was not discussed as such.147 In terms of 
principles, nothing new was introduced except a recognition that the term 
'aggrieved' is wider than personal grievance. But in terms of judicial practice, this 
is the first case that actually used the Berubari principle without any 
qualifications.
In fact, Justice Shahabuddin was decided a month after FAP 20. but the 
Advocates failed to supply a copy of the FAP 20 judgement.148 So it remains the 
last of the cases where the High Court Division judges gradually developed
145 Id.
146 Ibid. at 489.
147 Ibid. at 488.
183
different aspects of public interest standing, carefully avoiding the restrictive 
authorities including Sangbadpatra.
4.4.5 Formulation of the rules for public interest standing in FAP 20
The 'public interest rules of interpretation of the Constitution' were finally
established in FAP 20.149 The result has been a consensus that the entire
Constitution must be taken to interpret any specific provision and since the
Constitution mandates social justice and upholds 'people's power', PIL can not be
denied. On the basis of these rules of interpretation, the four judges of the
Appellate Division gave their separate explanations of public interest standing.
The words used, the ideas expressed and the principles established by them are
more or less the same.130 An excerpt from the leading judgement delivered by
Mustafa Kamal J is representative of all the four versions:
. . . when a public injury or public wrong or infraction of a 
fundamental right affecting an indeterminate number of people is 
involved it is not necessary, in the scheme of our Constitution, that 
the multitude of individuals who have been collectively wronged or 
injured or whose collective fundamental right have been invaded 
are to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 102 in a multitude of 
individual writ petitions, each representing his own portion of 
concern. In so far as it concerns public wrong or public injury or 
invasion of fundamental rights of an indeterminate number of 
people, any member of the public, being a citizen, suffering the 
common injury or common invasion in common with others or any
148 The date of FAP 20 judgement is 25 July while Justice Shahabuddin was decided
on 19 August. But the FAP 20 judgement became available for the lawyers 
only in November and was reported in January 1997.
149 See above chapter 2.4.6.
130 See FAP 20 above note 32 at 4, 19,26 and 31 for the different versions formulated 
by ATM Afzal CJ, Mustafa Kamal J, Latifur Rahman J and BBR Choudhury J 
respectively.
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citizen or an indigenous association as distinguished from a local 
component of a foreign organisation, espousing that particular 
cause is a person aggrieved and has the right to invoke the 
jurisdiction under Article 102.131
These new rules have several significant aspects.
The 'person aggrieved' rule is an invention of the private law and not of 
public law. Latifur Rahman J explains that the traditional rules requiring the 
petitioner to be personally aggrieved is based on the theory that the remedies and 
rights are co-relative and therefore only a person whose own right is violated is 
entitled to seek remedy.132 However, if this doctrine is followed strictly in public 
law, it will be tantamount to ignoring the good and well-being of the citizens in 
many cases, especially poorer sections of the society. It must also be taken into 
consideration, as has been noted by BB Roy Choudhury J, that the Constitution 
neither defines the term 'person aggrieved' nor requires the applicant to be 
personally aggrieved.153
Thus whenever a dispute is in question, the Court must determine whether 
the petitioner is espousing an individual cause or a public cause.134 If an 
individual cause is espoused, the petitioner needs to be a person aggrieved and 
his own interests require to be affected. If, however, he pursues a public cause 
involving public wrong or public injury, he need not be personally affected.
151 Ibid. at 19.
152 Ibid. at 22-23.
153 Ibid.at 29 and 31.
154 Ibid at 19.
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So it appears that the traditional law of private interest standing, which is 
rather conservative, is not touched by FAP 20. Mustafa Kamal J says: "The 
traditional view remains true, valid and effective till today in so far as individual 
rights and individual infraction thereof are concerned."153 As a result, since 
Sangbadpatra was a case of private cause, there was no need to overrule it. FAP 
20 creates a new set of rules only for public interest standing where a public 
cause is espoused. Interestingly, Mustafa Kamal J observes that Sangbadpatra 
was not an authority even for the proposition that an association can never be a 
person aggrieved if it espouses the causes of its members in a representative 
capacity.136 This may be taken as a hint that even in private interest standing, the 
Court is prepared to rule more liberally in future.
A question arises as to whether 'public cause' involves only pre-defmed 
and easily determinable rights. There are many cases of violation or breach of 
such a nature that a wrong or injury to the public is apparent but the 
corresponding right is diffused or very thinly spread. The Appellate Division 
rightly stressed on the violation, breach, wrong or injury rather than the right 
itself.
Thus in the leading judgement, Mustafa Kamal J emphasises not on public 
right but on 'public wrong or public injury or invasion of Fundamental Rights'.157 
Afzal CJ grants standing in cases of 'breach of public duty or for violation of
155 Id.
156 Ibid. at 17.
157 Ibid at 19.
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some provision of the Constitution or the law'.158 Latifur Rahman J merely
requires public wrong or public injury.159 BB Roy Choudhury J is concerned with
'wrong done by the Government or a local authority in not fulfilling its
constitutional or statutory obligations'.160
This also clarifies another important aspect - public interest standing is not
limited to constitutional rights. Latifur Rahman J explains:
The operation of Public Interest Litigation should not be restricted 
to the violation of the defined Fundamental Rights alone. In this 
modem age of technology, scientific advancement, economic 
progress and industrial growth the socio-economic rights are under 
phenomenal change. New rights are emerging which call for 
collective protection and therefore we must act to protect all the 
constitutional, fundamental and statutory rights as contemplated 
within the four comers of our Constitution.161
Once it is established that a public cause is involved, that 'cause' will be a 
determining factor as to the competency of the applicant to claim a hearing. It is a 
question of fact to be decided by the Court. In case of citizen standing, it is 
enough for the petitioner to show an interest or concern common with the general 
public. But in cases of representative public interest standing where the petitioner 
is espousing the cause of a vulnerable section of the society, he must show that 
his concern is real and not illusory.
While Mustafa Kamal J does not use the term, Latifur Rahman J requires 
'sufficient interest' from the petitioner.162 Afzal CJ says:
158 Ibid. at 4.
159 Ibid at 26.
160 Ibid at 31.
161 Ibid at 28.
162 Ibid at 26.
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The liberal interpretation given to the expression any person 
aggrieved in the judgements of my learned brothers, in my opinion, 
approximates the test of or if the same is capsulized, amounts to, 
what is broadly called, 'sufficient interest'.163
He subscribes to the scope of 'sufficient interest’ as explained by Bhagwati J In 
the leading Indian case of SP Gupta, making it clear that the scope of 'sufficient 
interest' in Bangladesh is more or less the same as in India.
Since 'sufficient interest' essentially depends on the co-relation between 
the matter brought before the Court and the person who is bringing it, it is not 
possible to lay down any strait-jacket formula applicable to all cases. It is the 
responsibility of the Court to exercise its discretion wisely in determining this 
issue. None of the judges propose any specific test of'sufficient interest'.164
In ordinary situations, the affected party itself is required to come to the 
Court. So in cases of representative public interest standing, the Court will 
enquire as to why the affected party is not coming before it. Also, a person 
pleading sufficient interest may be able to cross the threshold stage but the 
respondent is free to contest this claim on the facts of the case or question 
whether the petitioner's intentions are bona fide .
The question of the petitioner’s intention is very important in PIL since it 
is the most potent weapon for the Court to check meddlesome interlopers. Giving 
appropriate emphasis on this point, Mustafa Kamal J says:
163 Ibid. at 4.
164 See Harding (1989: 216) to compare this with the English case of IRC. The judges
in that case proposed a bewildering number of tests, for example, whether the 
applicant has a genuine grievance reasonably asserted, whether he is within 
the scope or ambit of the duty or whether he is given by the statute any express 
or implied right.
188
The High Court Division will exercise some rules of caution in 
each case. It will see that the applicant is in fact espousing a public 
cause, that his interest in the subject matter is real and not in the 
interest of generating some publicity for himself or to create mere 
public sensation, that he is acting bona fide , that he is not a 
busybody or an interloper, that it is in the public interest to grant 
him standing and that he is not acting for a collateral purpose to
achieve a dubious goal, including serving a foreign interest.165
This caution has been re-iterated by the other judges as well.166 Even in
traditional cases, a petitioner was required to have bona fide interest. The new
situation only demanded a greater emphasis on this point.
Rules laid down in FAP 20 demonstrates that since the intention of the 
petitioner is relevant, his standing depends largely on the merit of the case. This 
strengthens our argument that frivolous and politically motivated cases brought 
by the elite to further their own interests actually damaged the development of 
public interest standing. While the judges were refusing the elite the right to use 
the judicial arena in the name of the people, it was often wrongly assumed that 
they were denying a PIL approach. Especially, confusions arose because public 
interest standing was a new concept and in a state of initial development. As a 
result, it took a long time to find an appropriate case, the FAP 20. and establish 
public interest standing.
163 FAP 20 above note 32 at 19.
166 Ibid. at 4, 26 and 31 by Afzal CJ, Latifur Rahman J and BB Roy Choudhury J 
respectively.
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4.5 Standing rules in Bangladesh with respect to habeas corpus cases
4.5.1 Habeas corpus under the Constitution of Bangladesh
While clauses 1 and 2(a) of Article 102 are the centre of controversy due to the 
presence of the term 'person aggrieved', there is no such barrier for clause 2(b). 
This includes remedies in the nature of habeas corpus and quo warranto.
In Bangladesh, mainly due to the presence of autocratic regimes, the law 
relating to habeas corpus is regarded as a most important constitutional issue.167 
The Constitution guarantees right to life and liberty as Fundamental Rights under 
Article 31 and 32. Article 33 provides safeguards as to arrest and detention. 
Although there was no provision of preventive detention in the original 
Constitution, the oversight was quickly corrected by the majority party in 1973 
by amending Article 33.168 This was followed by the notorious Special Powers 
Act in 1974.169 These laws in combination with the oppressive periods of martial 
law proved to be devastating for the protection of the right to liberty.170
167 In Bangladesh, due to the importance of the topic, there is no dearth of literature
on personal liberty and preventive detention. See S Malik (1993: 41-57) for a 
short analytical overview. A more detailed recent study by QR Hoque (1995) 
traces the historical and analytical development of the law. He argues that the 
existing penal laws can deal more efficiently with the matters covered by 
preventive detention laws which were introduced to satisfy the whims of the 
authoritarian regimes. See also the analysis by Bari (1988: 53-79) as to 
preventive detention during Martial Law periods and by Patwari (1988) on the 
comparison of the laws of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.
168 Constitution (Second Amendment) Act (XXIV of 1973), section 3.
169 Act XIV of 1974.
170 Constitutionally approved preventive detention statutes form the most important
and problematic aspect of habeas corpus in the sub-continent. See PS Jaswal 
(1993: 71-103) for an overview of the Indian situation and Faqir Hussain 
(1989) for the case of Pakistan.
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The judges responded by taking a very wide view of interpretation. In fact, 
the Court introduced so many exceptions to the general rules and required such 
stringent criteria to be fulfilled that once a detenue managed to come before a 
Court, he had a veiy good chance of being released. As a result of the Supreme 
Court's interpretations of various provision of the Special Powers Act, "it has 
become exceedingly difficult for the Government to sustain an order of 
preventive detention".171 According to QR Hoque, from 1972 till March 1995, 
the total number of habeas corpus petitions filed was 10,372.172 Out of these, 
detainees were released by the Court in 78.3% cases. In a further 9.47% cases, 
the detainees were presumably set free by the authority after the initial rule of the 
Court and before the final hearing. It appears that considering the circumstances, 
the Supreme Court performed veiy well.
Even in the traditional law, the principles of standing in habeas corpus are 
quite liberal.173 Although there is no hard and fast rule, it is generally expected 
that the detenue hiipself should be the petitioner. But the detenue is often unable 
to act due to the nature of his detention. In such a case a person other than the 
detenue can come before the Court. But the Court insists that the petitioner is 
acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.
When the detenue is unable to come to the Court, the proper person to file 
a petition is any of his relations. Thus, in Bangladesh, a mother was allowed to
171 S Malik (1993: 57)
172 QR Hoque (1995: 216: 221).
173 See above chapter 4.1.2.
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apply for her son,174 and a wife for her husband.175 In absence of a relation, a 
friend was allowed to apply.176 In these Bangladeshi cases, however, standing 
was taken for granted and was not contested.177 In case of a minor, the applicant 
must either be entitled to its custody or be interested in its welfare.
Application by a total stranger is said to be allowed only in the rarest of 
cases where the Court has been apprised of material which immediately and 
obviously establishes the illegality of the detention or custody.178 There is always 
a possibility that if a stranger is allowed to apply on the detenue's behalf, there 
will be an abuse of the process of the Court. Complication may arise if, after the 
Court's refusal of the stranger's petition, the detenue applies himself claiming that 
the first petition was made without authority. Thus the Court has discretion to ask 
whether the application made by a stranger is reasonable under the circumstances 
of the particular case.
174 Aruna Sen v. Bangladesh 27 DLR (1975) 122.
175 Nasrin Kader Siddiqui v. Bangladesh 44 DLR (AD) (1991) 16.
176 Dheman Chakma v. Secretary. Ministry of Home Affairs and others (1991)
unreported WP 3276/1991.
177 The authority for the Bangladeshi judges, it appears, is Azizul Huq v. East
Pakistan PLD 1968 Dac 728, a case decided in the Dhaka High Court during 
the Pakistani period. See also Chiraniit Lai Chaudhury v. Union of India above 
note 49 for the leading Indian authority.
17R Ram Kumar v. District Magistrate AIR 1966 Punj 51. Sundaraian v. Union of 
India AIR 1970 Del 29.
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4.5.2 Impact of PIL on standing in habeas corpus
Because of the already liberal rules relating to habeas corpus, the public interest 
approach faced no major bar in such matters and the task was to expand the 
scope of standing even more. But progress in this respect in Bangladesh has been 
very slow. As we have already seen in chapter 3, personal liberty and preventive 
detention cases advanced from a PIL perspective are very few in number. 
Arguing public interest, progress may be made in at least three ways.
First, the definition of personal liberty may be widened thereby granting 
standing in previously unrecognised cases. Thus in Avesha Khanam and others v. 
Major Sabbir Ahmed and others. 179 the Court declared that Article 102 (2) (b) (i) 
applies not only to detention by the authority but also to cases of private 
detention.
Second, the Court may take a more liberal view as to whether a stranger 
should be allowed to proceed in a particular case. This is a question of fact and 
success depends largely on the genuineness of the claim. In Avesha Khanam, a 
voluntary organisation was petitioner No. 1 and helped the mother, petitioner No. 
2, to file the case. The Court is yet to decide a case where a stranger applies for a 
detenue relying solely on PIL arguments. But since PIL has now been recognised 
in principle in FAP 20. it appears that the Court will decide liberally rather than
179 46 DLR (1994) 399. A minor son, abducted by the father, was given back to the 
mother. This decision has been recently followed in Sharon Lailv Begum Jalil 
v. Abdul Jalil and others 48 DLR (1996) 460.
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conservatively.180 In entertaining such a case, the Court will consider the 
circumstances of the case.
Third, the Court may liberalise, on grounds of public interest, the 
procedural aspects of standing in habeas corpus. Thus in Alam Ara H uq v . 
Government of Bangladesh.181 a detenue was re-arrested twice within the jail 
compound after successive orders of release by the Court. The third time, the 
detenue was brought personally before the Court and was released from the Court 
premises itself.
The Indian and Pakistani Courts have long overlooked the procedural 
formalities and treated telegrams, letters and other communications as writ 
petitions.182 In Bangladesh, there are only two such examples: Nazrul Islam183 
and Ehada.184 Nazrul Islam was detained without trial for 12 years and as such 
the public interest element in that case was very strong. In the second case, the 
judge proceeded on the wrong assumption that Eliada, accused of drug- 
trafficking, was underage at the time of trial. In both these cases, the judge 
treated Newspaper reports as writ petitions and acted suo moto. But in these
180 See also obiter in Avesha Khanam above note 179 at 401.
181 42 DLR (1990) 98.
182 In India, the practice started in the early 1980s. See Sunil Batra II v. Delhi
Administration AIR 1980 SC 1579 and Ichhu Devi v. Union of India AIR
1980 SC 1983. In Pakistan, the leading case is Darshan Masih v. the State 
PLD 1990 SC 513.
183 State v. Deputy Commissioner. Satkhira and others 45 DLR (1993) 643.
184 Eliadah McCord v. State 48 DLR (19961495.
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judgements, the judges did not feel it necessary to explain the validity or legality 
of such a suo moto action.
Nazrul Islam and Eliada enables us to draw several conclusions. First, 
there is no bar for the Bangladeshi Court to ignore procedural formalities in 
habeas corpus petitions. Second, the law is already established and does not need 
to be contested, argued or confirmed. The power of the Court is taken for granted. 
Third, as regards the application of new liberal principles, the already established 
rules from India and Pakistan may be freely borrowed. Fourth, the activation of 
the Court will depend on the gravity of the situation and the genuineness of the 
circumstances.
Nazrul Islam is an important PIL case, but it failed to create a trend. This 
is despite the fact that in the constitutional development of Bangladesh, personal 
liberty is the area where the Supreme Court demonstrated its most resolute stance 
for the rule of law. One reason was that social activists and organisations were 
rarely engaged in this field. Also, the Court was already operating under a highly 
tense political situation where the re-emergence of democracy was supported by 
the judges through a series of bold political decisions. They were apparently too 
careful not to clash with the authorities in a new front. It may be argued, 
however, that the real reason is the lack of activist stance by the judges, because 
even after the establishment of democracy, examples of PIL approach in habeas 
corpus petitions remain extremely rare.
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4.6 Standing rules in Bangladesh with respect to Quo warranto  cases
We have already discussed that the traditional English standing rules regarding 
quo warranto and the relevant Indian and Pakistani law are quite liberal.185 The 
main reason is that the enquiry relates to a matter in which the public are 
interested. Subject to the discretion of the Court, the remedy is available to 
private persons. There is no requirement for the petitioner to be an aggrieved 
person or to show that he has a legal right or personal interest in the matter. Due 
to the very nature of this liberal rule, there is a possibility of vexatious 
proceedings or cases by troublemakers with mala fide intentions. So the test of 
the bonafides of the petitioner is veiy important in quo warranto matters.
Article 102 (2)(b) (ii) of the Constitution of Bangladesh, while 
formulating the remedy in the nature of quo warranto, did not deviate from these 
traditions. The High Court Division dealt with the question in the leading case of 
Sikder Mohammad Faruque v. Md Mostafa Hossain and another186 where a 
person holding the office of the chairman of an Upazila Parishad (local council) 
was challenged. The petitioner, having never been a candidate for the challenged 
office, had no personal direct interest as such. His standing was disputed. 
Mahmudur Rahman J granted locus standi relying on R v. Spever and the Indian 
and Pakistani authorities that followed it. Since the petitioner seeks to vindicate 
the right of the public in general and not his personal interest, he must have
185 See above chapters 4.1.2, 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
186 7 BLD (1987) 52.
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standing unless there is some other equally efficacious remedy available.187 On
the bona fldes of the petitioner, Mahmudur Rahman J said:
The grant of relief in a writ jurisdiction is a matter of discretion and 
the High Court Division in issuing of such a high prerogative writ 
is within its province to test the bonafide of the relator in order to 
see whether he has come with a clean hand for the reason that a 
writ of quo-warranto is not to issue "as a matter of course on sheer 
technicalities on the doctrinaire approach".188
On appeal, the decision of the High Court Division was upheld.189 In the
leading judgement, Shahabuddin Ahmed J discussed English, Indian and
Pakistani authorities and said:
It is clear that for issuing of a writ of quo-warranto no special kind 
of interest in the petitioner is required, nor is he required to show 
that he is personally aggrieved at the holding of office by that 
person.190
The public interest element is made even more clear when he says:
.. . there is no room to entertain any doubt as to the maintainability 
of a writ petition by any citizen who questions the title to office of 
any person who is, or purportedly, holding a public office 
whenever it is found that the said functionary is disqualified from 
holding the office and the Court in its extra-ordinary jurisdiction 
will entertain the petition and examine the question on merit.191
Thus the law is now well-settled. The clarification by the Appellate Division did 
not create any new principle. But the viability of using quo warranto for public 
interest purposes was clearly indicated.
187 Ibid. at 59.
188 Ibid. at 60.
189 Md Mostafa Hossain v. SM Faruque and another 7 BLD (ADI (19871 315.
190 Ibid. at 319.
191 Ibid. at 320.
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This opportunity was grabbed by the political activists as Mostafa Hossain 
broke down a psychological barrier and enabled them to challenge even the most 
highly placed offices of the Government. In fact, Mostafa Hossain was followed 
by almost 20 reported cases where they challenged holding of offices by the 
President, Vice-President, Supreme Court judges, government officials and 
elected representatives.192 The locus standi of the petitioner was not disputed at 
the threshold in any of these cases. The standing rules in quo warranto were 
already developed, in pre-PIL cases including Mostafa Hossain. to such an extent 
that the new PIL approach could be facilitated without incorporating new 
principles.
In the present chapter, we have analysed the impact of PIL on the standing 
rules in judicial review petitions. Our discussion demonstrates that initially, the 
judges were reluctant to recognise public interest standing. Since standing is a 
mixed question of fact and law, one reason of the failure of the repeated attempts 
by the petitioners has been the lack of cases with genuine public interest issues. 
Gradual recognition of public interest standing is the result of relentless pressure 
by the petitioners combined with a few cases involving the welfare of the people.
However, once the threshold problem of standing is answered and the case 
is admitted and heard, the Court has an even more difficult problem to solve. The 
demand of PIL to ensure justice through judicial intervention means that the 
Court is often asked to re-defme the boundaries that separate the traditional areas
192 Chapter 3 catalogues the gradual development of these cases over the years. For 
analysis of the effect of these cases on particular constitutional provisions, see 
chapter 5.3.2.
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of the three organs of the government. The next chapter analyses specific 
constitutional provisions to explore the extent to which the elite have used the 
techniques of PIL to participate in the power-relations debate.
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Chapter 5
Use of PIL in re-defining power-relations and the limits of
judicial power
Apart from the threshold problem of locus standi, as has been discussed in the 
previous chapter, a main problem of the development of PIL in Bangladesh is 
the use of the techniques of PIL by the elite to take part in the power-relations 
debate. Political and constitutional activists, in a considerable number of PIL 
cases, have approached the Supreme Court to challenge the jurisdictional 
boundaries that separate the areas of the various organs of the government.
In the Bangladeshi context, these challenges raise several questions. 
What are the specific constitutional provisions challenged by the PIL- 
petitioners? What have been the effects of such challenges on the constitutional 
arrangement? Has there been any enhancement of the status of the judiciary vis- 
a-vis other governmental departments? Is the judiciary, by developing new 
implementation procedures, encroaching upon the province of the executive? 
The present chapter discusses these issues and demonstrates that the judges and 
lawyers are pre-occupied with the concerns of the privileged few and there has 
been little or no benefit for the common people.
While challenging supposed violations of the constitutional arrangement, 
the PIL-petitioners rely upon the so-called scheme of 'separation of powers', 
which is regarded as a fundamental feature of the Constitution of Bangladesh.
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As the guardian of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to 
define and protect the power-separation scheme. But the political activists often 
raise so-called 'political questions' and make it difficult for the Court to project 
its neutral image. In the first part of the present chapter, we analyse the stance 
of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh on these issues. Our analysis demonstrates 
that despite the Court's attempt to project a neutral image, the influence of the 
continuing power struggle in the national politics is often reflected in its actions 
and decisions relating to PIL cases.
The next part of the chapter discusses PIL cases involving jurisdictional 
limits of the legislature. In relation to judicial review of statutes and the 
Constitution, the political activists have actually failed to use the Supreme 
Court to hinder the law making power of the parliament. Our discussion also 
illustrates that they were not concerned with with socio-economic matters but 
with laws involving power sharing arrangements. However, there has been 
some success in defining the scope of the proceedings and privileges of the 
Members o f Parliament.
Finally, the chapter discusses PIL cases involving the domain of the 
executive vis-a-vis the judiciary. By focusing on the definition of the term 
'state', we analyse whether social and economic justice considerations of PIL 
have expanded this definition resulting in more areas being amenable under the 
writ jurisdiction. Use of PIL by the constitutional activists to protect the 
judiciary from supposed executive encroachment has also been analysed,
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especially in relation to appointment, promotion and transfer of acting and 
retired judges. Finally, the chapter includes an analysis of the judicial attempts 
of implementation of PIL that appear to encroach upon the executive's area of 
activities.
5.1 Stance of the Bangladeshi courts on the doctrines o f 'separation 
of powers’ and 'political questions'
As constitutional litigation, success of PIL is closely connected with the scheme 
of 'separation of powers' envisaged by the Constitution. One aspect of this issue 
is that such a scheme enhances judicial independence and status and thus 
indirectly makes it easier for the judges to pursue social or economic justice 
matters. Another aspect is that since the judiciary is the final adjudicator on 
constitutional questions, the judges are often asked to protect any violation of 
the power-separation scheme. This very important role of the judiciary, 
however, has the potential to weaken its position as it often involves cases 
relating to political questions tending to politicise the judges. It is difficult for 
the judges to be PIL activists when the judiciary is politicised and involved in 
controversies. The present sub-chapter analyses the stance of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh on the issues of 'separation of powers' and 'political 
questions' and explores to what extent the Court's views has been influenced by 
the politically motivated PIL cases.
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The principle of 'separation of powers' has been declared a fundamental 
and basic feature of the Bangladeshi constitutional scheme.1 In accordance with 
this principle, the Constitution seeks to achieve a balance ensuring that the 
legislative, the executive and the judicial powers of the government are separated 
into three organs, that each organ is limited to its own sphere and that within the 
designated area of operation, each is independent and supreme.2
The constitutional basis of this separation seems to rest on Article 7.3 It 
says that sovereignty and all powers belong to the people and exercise of all 
powers on behalf of the people shall be effected only under and by the authority 
of the Constitution. This makes the Constitution supreme as opposed to any 
particular organ.4 It also aims to ensure that as regards the three main 
governmental departments, none is superior than the others. The Constitution has 
assigned and distributed powers of the Republic to the three departments of the
1 Of all the features of the Constitution declared to be basic, separation of powers has 
been considered as one of the more important ones in Anwar Hossain 
Chowdhury v. Bangladesh (8th Amendment case) 1989 BLD (Spl.) 1 at 110 
and 156.
7 » »The meaning of the term 'separation of powers' is the same in Bangladesh as it is 
understood in general constitutional law - there is no special or different 
definition. Shahabuddin Ahmed J says in the 8th Amendment case ibid. at 
156: "Principle of separation of powers means that the sovereign authority is 
equally distributed among the three organs and as such one organ cannot 
destroy the others."
3 For the full text of Article 7, see above chapter 2.4.1. See also Mahabub Murshed
(1997: 50-54) for a recent discussion on the relevent articles of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh.
4 Article 7 is unique in the sense that neither the Indian nor the Pakistani Constitution
has a similar Article declaring constitutional supremacy. However, although 
this Article emphasises the point, such supremacy is automatically preserved 
in a written Constitution whether or not expressly declared.
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government providing that they can not transgress the limits prescribed or 
encroach upon each other's territory. Article 65(1) vests the legislative powers of 
the Republic in the Parliament while Article 55(2) provides that the executive 
power of the Republic shall be exercised by or on the authority of the Prime 
Minister.5 Although there is no express vesting of judicial power, it is considered 
a well-established rule of construction that such an absence makes no difference.6 
The reason is that the Constitution has adopted the pre-existing governmental 
structure and has allowed the previously functioning Court to continue its 
operation.7
With respect to power-separation, the judiciary is perhaps the organ that
requires most a well-balanced scheme. Judicial independence and, as a
consequence, social and collective justice depend on it. This need has been
recognised in Article 22 of the Constitution:
The State shall ensure the separation of the judiciary from the 
executive organs of the State.
3 Article 55(2) originally provided that the power was to be exercised by the Prime
Minister. This provision was amended when the Presidential form of 
government was adopted by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act (No. n 
of 1975). But as a result of the re-introduction of the parliamentary system, the
Article has now been restored in its original form by the Constitution (Twelfth 
Amendment) Act (No. XXVIII of 1991),
6 See Mustafa Kamal (1994: 17-18) for a discussion in the Bangladeshi context.
7 Continuity of the services of the Justices from the pre-constitutional Courts to the
Bangladesh Supreme Court, and the transfer of legal proceedings accordingly, 
was provided in paragraph 6 of the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution. It has 
been declared in Muiibur Rahman v. Bangladesh 44 DLR (AD) (1992) 111 at 
128 that the constitutional omission to expressly confer judicial power does 
not effect the Courts' power because " . . .  they have been previously existing 
and the Constitution allows them to function, although in a new form".
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With regard to the Supreme Court, the constitutional court of the Republic, 
Article 94(4) says that, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Chief 
Justice and the other judges shall be independent in the exercise of their judicial 
functions. Similarly, Article 116A says about the subordinate judiciary that, again 
subject to the provisions of the Constitution, all persons employed in the judicial 
service and all magistrates shall be independent in the exercise of their judicial 
functions.
While the sphere of activities of the judiciary is constitutionally protected,
it has the further important responsibility to see that functionaries of the State do
not overstep the limits of their power. The Appellate Division has declared that
the actions of the parliament and the executive are to be watched by the Supreme
Court 'as the guardian of the Constitution'.8 This is due to the fact that in every
system of government having a written Constitution, the function to finally
determine its meaning and scope must be located in somebody or some authority.
The judges are careful to emphasise that the power to interpret the
Constitution does not make the judiciary a superior organ. Qazi Shafiuddin
Ahmed J, delivering a PIL judgement, said:
It is worth to mention that the power to interpret the Constitution has 
been allotted to the superior Courts for safeguarding, preserving and 
upholding the Constitution. Really this power does not give to the 
court any practical or real omnipotence but to see if the other 
functionaries of the Republic are well within their bounds or are 
transgressing their limits and by Article 102 of the Constitution the
8 First Constitutional Reference (MPs Reference) 1995 (III) (Special issue) BLT 159 
at 204.
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power may be exercised to keep the functionaries well within their 
bounds,9
The judiciaiy is neither above the Constitution nor does it have a higher 
jurisdiction and despite the delicate task of ensuring compliance with the 
provisions of the Constitution by all the governmental departments, it is seen as a 
co-ordinate and co-equal organ with the other two departments. However, 
although not omnipotent, the high status of the judiciary under the Constitution is 
apparent from the declaration of the principle of separation of powers in Articles 
22, 94(4) and 116A of the Constitution. As 'guardian of the Constitution' and 
final arbitrator of constitutional issues, the judiciary has considerable power at its 
disposal.
It must also, be noted that the separation of powers incorporated in the 
Constitution is somewhat flexible, especially in comparison with the US 
Constitution, the Constitution of Bangladesh is considered less rigid.10. Most 
notably, the executive power of the Republic is exercised in Bangladesh by the 
Prime Minister who is a member of the parliament commanding the support of 
the majority of parliament members.
9 Anwar Hossain Khan v. Sneaker. Jativa Sangsad (Parliament Boycott) 47 DLR
(1995) 42 at 48. The issue was also raised in another PIL, Raufique fMdl 
Hossain v. Speaker, Bangladesh Parliament and others (MPs Resignation) 47 
DLR (1995) 361 at 373-374, where the judge strongly emphasised that there is 
no conflict between the areas of activities of the judiciary and the parliament 
under the Bangladesh Constitution.
10 MPs Reference above note 8 at 194 and 203 per Mustafa Kamal and Latifur
Rahman JJ respectively. Mustafa Kamal J also points out that inherent in 
Article 22 is the acknowledgement that the separation has not been fully 
enshrined in the Bangladesh Constitution.
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Constitutional recognition of the principle of separation of powers ensures 
judicial independence and thus strengthens the position of the constitutional 
activists. Any new or amended provision of the Constitution or law disturbing the 
power-separation scheme may be challenged on the ground that the spirit and 
letters of the Constitution have been violated. While so doing, political activists 
sometimes approach the Court when their efforts in the legislature and other 
forums have already failed. Hence, the challenges made are often attempts by the 
political and constitutional activists to re-adjust the power-relationship among 
governmental and public institutions through litigation. Our analysis of the 
development of PIL cases in chapter 3 already demonstrates that a considerable 
number of PIL cases in Bangladesh were actually brought either with political 
motives or the issues in question were politically controversial at the time. These 
cases tend to invite the 'doctrine of political question' - that the Court should 
refrain from entertaining certain matters because of their political nature.11 The
11 Not every matter that is an issue in national politics or brought with political 
motive falls under the category of cases involving the doctrine of political 
question. The most widely accepted definition given by Brennan J in Baker v. 
Carr [1962] 369 US 186 217 says:
"Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textualy demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a co-ordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due co-ordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question."
207
doctrine evolved with reference to the Constitution of the US and is seen as "a
12function of the separation of powers".
In 1981, Kemaluddin Hossain CJ said in Dulichand Qmraolal v. 
Bangladesh13 that the Court should refrain from answering a political question if 
the validity or legality of the law could otherwise be decided. This does not, 
however, amount to an indirect recognition of the political questions doctrine. 
Recent observations made by the Appellate Division in MPs Reference14 indicate 
that the Court is reluctant to rely on the doctrine.
There are several reasons why the doctrine is not followed. In the USA, 
the doctrine is based on, and is a consequence of, the rigid separation of powers. 
Since the Constitution of Bangladesh is based on a more flexible power- 
separation scheme, the doctrine is said to be not appropriate for the Bangladeshi 
situation.13 It is also argued that the judiciary, as the guardian of the Constitution, 
is constitutionally obliged to decide constitutional disputes even if the issues 
involved have political overtones.16 A failure by the judiciary to perform this 
constitutional duty would amount to giving limitless freedom to the governmental
12 Ibid. at 210.
13 BLD (AD) (1981) 1 at 7-8. This case actually dealt with a problem dating back
from the Pakistani period. The constitutional legitimacy of General Yahya 
Khan was questioned. In Pakistan, the Court found him a usurper in the 
famous case of Asma Jilani v. Punjab PLD 1972 SC 139.
14 Above note 8 at 171-173. See also Mahmudul Islam (1995: 373-374) for similar
arguments.
15 Ibid. at 373.
16 Id.
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organs undermining the supremacy of the Constitution.17 Finally, it has been 
observed that the doctrine has its problems in other jurisdictions as well.18 In the 
USA, it has been critisised as vague and its importance seems to be in decline.19 
The courts in India regard the theory as incompatible with the scheme of the 
Constitution.20 As a result, there is no definite and established set of rules to 
follow. After discussing the scope of the issue, Afzal CJ says: "there is no magic 
in the phrase 'political question'".21
Instead of the doctrine of political questions, the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh favours the concept of judicial self-restraint - self imposed limitations 
on the exercise of judicial power.22 Mahmudul Islam strongly advocates the view
17 The Indian Court has expressed the same view in Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union
[1971] 3 SCR 9 at 75 where it was said that the constitutional mechanism in a 
democratic polity does not contemplate existence of any function which may 
qua the citizens be designated as political and orders made in the exercise 
whereof are not liable to be tested for their validity before the lawfully 
constituted courts.
18 MPs Reference above note 8 at 172-173.
19 The literature on the doctrine of political question reflects how difficult it is to
reach a unanimous opinion. See for example: Tribe (1988: 96) - the doctrine is 
in a state of confusion; Loss (1987: 201) - the importance of the doctrine is 
declining; Henkin (1976: 597-625) - the case law shows that the doctrine is 
unnecessary in practice. However, the doctrine is still there, albeit in a limited 
form; see Mulhem (1988: 97-176).
20 It was declared in AK Roy v. Union [1982] 2 SCR 272 at 296, that there is no place
in the Indian Constitution for the doctrine since the power-separation scheme 
is not rigid. For examples of cases where the Court opted for the judicial self- 
restraint formula instead of political questions doctrine, see Dinesh Chandra v. 
Chaudhurv Charan Singh AIR 1980 Del 114 at 116 and Madurai Adheena v. 
State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1984 Mad 241 at 245.
21 MPs Reference above note 8 at 172-173.
22 Mustafa Kamal (1994: 139-146) discusses in detail the rules to be followed by the
Bangladeshi judges in exercise of self-restraint. Although it may be argued 
that the political questions doctrine is one of many that invoke judicial self- 
restraint, he does not include it in the list of restraining factors.
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that there is no need to adopt and apply the doctrine of political question when 
judicial self-restraint can do the job in a more satisfactory way.23 Similarly, ATM 
Afzal CJ said:
While maintaining Judicial restraint the court is the ultimate arbiter in 
deciding whether it is appropriate in a particular case to take upon 
itself the task of undertaking a pronouncement on an issue which may 
be dubbed as a "political question".24
One aspect of the judicial self-restraint concept, impartiality, is taken very
seriously. It was earlier said in the 8th Amendment case:
Neither politics, nor policy of the government nor personalities have 
any relevance for examining the power of the Parliament under the 
Constitution which has to be done purely upon an interpretation of the
25provisions of the Constitution with the help of legal tools.
The same view has been expressed in a number of PIL cases. When the former 
Chief Justice's appointment as the President was challenged in Abu Bakar 
Siddique v. Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed.26 the Court explained that the 
petitioner has not shown respect and honour to the President less, but has shown 
respect for rule of law, supremacy of the Constitution and the independence of 
the judiciary more. Similarly, the Court expressed its desire to stay out of a 
politically controversial position in MPs Reference.27 where the validity of 
membership of the opposition Parliament Members depended on the decision of 
the Court.
23 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 373).
24 MPs Reference above note 8 at 173.
25 8th Amendment case above note 1 at 181.
26 1BLC (1996) 483 at 498.
27 Above note 8 at 160.
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The Court is naturally eager not to be seen as taking part in politics. While 
dealing with these cases, judges refer to their constitutional duty to function as 
'ultimate arbiter' and interpreter of the Constitution.28 In practice, however, 
political activists, under the umbrella of PIL, brought a considerable number of 
cases where it was difficult for the Court to project its impartiality. As we have 
already outlined in chapter 3, political questions were rarely dealt with before the 
8th Amendment case of 1988. Since then, however, the number of cases with 
political overtones has steadily increased as the movement for democracy 
coincided with the development of PIL. Political activists have often raised 
questions that involve constitutional interpretation but are essentially political 
issues on which rival forces in national politics are fighting one another.
The most interesting recent examples are the twin cases of Parliament 
Boycott and MPs Resignation.29 Boycotting the parliament by the opposition 
MPs was a purely political decision. The judgement by Qazi Shafiuddin J in 
Parliament Boycott indicates the thin line dividing political and constitutional 
issues.30 As interpreter of the Constitution, he declared the boycott unlawful. 
Standing was granted on the ground that boycotting the parliament involves 
public interest enabling anyone to approach the Court.
28 Parliament Boycott above note 9 at 48.
29 Above note 9. For details of the facts and circumstances of these cases, see above
chapters 3.7.1 and 3.8.
30 Above note 9 at 52.
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The reaction of the political parties was instantaneous and violent.31 The 
judges were accused of being biased and the residence of one of the judges was 
even bombed. So when the same question came before the Court in another form 
in MPs Resignation, as mass resignation of the opposition MPs, the Court was 
naturally unwilling to invite further unsolicited controversy. Mahmudur Rahman 
J decided this time that the petitioners have no standing at all under the 
traditional standing rules.32 Public interest standing was not considered since the 
case was held not to be a PIL.
It is interesting to note that the Court did not apply its discretion to declare 
that the case involved public interest. Instead, it avoided the issue on the ground 
that the petitioners themselves did not claim a PIL standing. However, the 
standing rules enunciated in the Parliament Boycott were neither contradicted nor 
overruled. In fact, there is little difference between boycotting the parliament and 
mass resignation of MPs in terms of involvement of public interest. But while 
such interest was sufficient for standing in Parliament Boycott, it was held not 
sufficient in MPs Resignation.
Apparently, under the pressure of upholding a non-controversial image in 
deciding an essentially political question arising out of a political problem, the 
Court refused to play the part of constitutional interpreter. Refusal of standing 
was a convenient way to avoid political controversy.33
31 See above chapter 3.7.1.
32 For discussion on the rules of standing, see above chapter 4.4.2.2.
33 However, this backsliding was soon halted in MPs Reference above note 8, the
constitutional Reference that subsequently arose from the boycott-resignation
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Another example is Md Asaduzzaman Ripon v. The State.34 A number of 
government officers participated in the movement for Caretaker Government and 
identified themselves with the party in opposition. A writ brought by a member 
of the party in power pointed out that their action was clearly against their service 
rules.35 But a political compromise ensued by the time the Court was ready for 
hearing. The Caretaker government was established and the political parties 
unanimously approved the appointment of one of the accused in the post of a 
non-party neutral Adviser/Minister. Was it then wise for the Court to assert legal 
technicalities and disturb the fragile equilibrium in the newly achieved 
democratic process? The Court did not ignore the political solution of the 
essentially political dispute. The judges started playing a delaying tactic. In the 
High Court Division, the case is still pending hearing. Even an interim order by 
the High Court Division was stayed by the Appellate Division.
This delaying tactic lets the Court buy some time in the hope that the 
problem will be automatically solved. Whether used willingly or unwittingly, it 
often works. First of all, the High Court Division might refuse to issue any 
interim order. Second, the case might be in a queue for months for a full hearing. 
Third, the Appellate Division might stay the judgement or order of the High 
Court Division and itself take a long time to decide it.
controversy. The Appellate Division took a positive view in deciding the 
Reference as interpreter of the Constitution.
34 Unreported Writ Petition 1635/1996.
3:> Government Servants (Conduct) Rules 1979 and Government Servants (Appeal 
and Discipline) Rules 1985.
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Due to the heavy caseload of both Divisions, unless a case is given 
priority, which is the Court’s discretion, it will take months for it to crawl through 
the cause-list where thousands of cases are pending hearing. Awaiting trial, the 
resolution of the issue in question often becomes unnecessary and the case 
becomes infractuous. The judges then follow the time honoured rule that the 
Court will not deal with a case merely for academic interest.36
Thus the demand that the BNP government should stop using the Media 
unconstitutionally for propaganda was kept pending in the Media case37 till that 
party lost the parliamentary election and was no more in government. Similarly, 
the petition seeking leaders of the Awami League not to call strikes in Hartal38 
was kept pending by the Appellate Division till the Awami League formed the 
government and had no reason to call strikes.
The discussion so far illustrates a number of important points. First, the 
recognition and application of the doctrine of separation of powers by the 
Constitution of Bangladesh have given the Supreme Court a very high status. 
This strong position of the Court is favourable for judicial activism including the 
development of PIL. Second, one aspect of the high status of the judiciary is that 
the Court is the ultimate arbiter in constitutional issues. This has opened the 
gates for cases involving political questions. Third, the judges have refused to
36 It was said in Ghvas Siddique v. Bangladesh 43 DLR (1991) 179 that the Courts are
and should be reluctant to decide constitutional points merely as matters of 
academic importance.
37 Dr Mohiuddin Faruque v. Bangladesh (1995) unreported Writ Petition 466/1995.
■3 0
~ Abu Bakar Siddique v. Sheikh Hasina and others (1995) unreported Writ Petition 
2057/1995.
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apply the political questions doctrine and follow the principles of judicial self- 
restraint. They repeatedly assert that the Court deals only with the legal aspects of 
the disputes. The judges find it important to declare a denial of their political role 
in order to preserve their neutral image and credibility; thereby insulating 
themselves from the vulnerability of public criticism.
However, our discussion demonstrates, in relation to the development of 
Bangladeshi PIL, that this neutrality is more observed in theory than in practice. 
There is a relentless pressure from the political activists to involve the judiciary 
in controversial cases. The judges avoid political controversy by refusing a case 
on some other ground or by resorting to a delaying tactic. However, although the 
cases involving political issues highlight the inherently political nature of the 
judicial process, they do not automatically suggest that the Court is biased or 
subservient to some pressure group, regime or political party. Our discussion 
demonstrates that, despite the desire of the Bangladeshi Court to be seen as 
impartial interpreter of the Constitution, the influence of the continuing power 
struggle in national politics has often been reflected in its actions and decisions 
relating to PIL cases. On this premise, we now proceed to discuss the extent to 
which the judiciary is involved in defining and determining the jurisdiction of 
governmental organs, especially from the perspective of PIL.
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5.2 PIL and the jurisdictional boundaries between the legislature and 
the judiciary
PIL has been used by political and constitutional activists to challenge the 
legislature in two main areas. First, in some cases, constitutional and statutory 
law making of the parliament has been challenged. Our discussion aims to 
explore to what extent these challenges have been successful and whether they 
involve laws relating to social and economic justice matters. Second, a number of 
cases dealt with the laws of parliamentary privileges. We analyse the extent to 
which the Court has asserted its role and curbed the powers enjoyed by the MPs 
that were detrimental to the interest of the public.
5.2.1 Judicial review of statutes and the Constitution
The power of the parliament to make or unmake laws, which is its primary 
function, is scrutinised by the Supreme Court when such action is challenged on 
the ground of inconsistency with the Constitution. In Bangladesh the basis of this 
power is found in Article 7(2) of the Constitution. While declaring that the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, it says that if any other law is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, that other law shall be void to the extent of the 
inconsistency. This has been re-iterated in Article 26 with regard to the 
provisions of Part III of the Constitution relating to the Fundamental Rights. It 
says:
(1) All existing law inconsistent with the provisions of this Part 
shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, become void on the 
commencement of this Constitution.
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(2) The state shall not make any law inconsistent with any 
provisions of this Part, and any law so made shall, to the extent of such 
inconsistency, be void.
(3) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this 
Constitution made under article 142.
These provisions expressly limit the power of the parliament to make or change 
laws. Even without these express provisions, in a limited government under a 
written Constitution, judicial review of statutes and the Constitution is implicit. 
As the highest Court and guardian of the Constitution, it is the duty of the 
Supreme Court to deal with these matters. The relevant rules and principles have 
developed over the years and form a significant part of the constitutional law.39 
However, we are concerned only with the impact of the PIL approach to find out 
the extent to which the political activists are using PIL to challenge the making or 
unmaking of laws by the parliament.
One type of cases questions the constitutionality of statutoiy laws. Public 
interest litigants take action when a law is violated or a legal duty remains 
unperformed. But there are very few examples in Bangladesh where citizen 
petitioners approached the Court merely to challenge a statute itself as violative 
of the Constitution.
In AK Muiibur Rahman v. Returning Officer and others.40 a political 
activist approached the Court as a citizen and voter and challenged the 
amendment of certain regulation whereby the then Major General Ziaur Rahman
39 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 368-371) provides an outline of the principles followed by
the Court injudicial review of law in its Bangladeshi context.
40 31 DLR (1979) 156.
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was enabled to take part in the Presidential election despite being an army 
officer.41 The Court rejected the petition on merits. In Mohammad Giasuddin 
Bhuivan v. Bangladesh,42 the Law Reforms Ordinance43 was challenged. The 
statute came into force during a Martial Law and the petitioner questioned the 
validity of the subsequent ratification of the statute by the parliament. The case 
was refused on the ground of standing. In Sangbadpatra,44 certain statutory 
provisions were challenged by newspaper owners as unconstitutional on the 
ground that they were detrimental to the constitutionally guaranteed Fundamental 
Right to freedom of press.45 Again, as this case did not involve public interest, it 
was lost on the preliminary ground of standing.
Another recent example is Ziaur Rahman Khan v. Government of 
Bangladesh.46 In Chittagong hill tracts, indigenous people have long been 
fighting for autonomy. As a result of this political unrest, elections for local 
councils of Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban could not be held for a long 
time. The government repeatedly extended the statutory period within which, 
after the expiration of the term of the elected members, new elections were
41 Regulation No. 293(A) of the Bangladesh Army Regulations Volume 1 (Rules).
42 BCR 1981 AD 80.
43 No. XLIX of 1978.
44 Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad v. The Government of People's Republic of
Bangladesh 12 BLD (AD) (1992) 153.
43 Freedom of thought, conscience and speech are guaranteed by Article 39 of the 
Constitution. The Statutory provisions challenged in Sangbadpatra were 
sections 9, 10(3) and 11 of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) 
Act 1974. These sections provide for a Wage Board to be constituted by the 
government to fix minimum wages for newspaper employees.
46 49 DLR (1997) 491.
required to be held in these three councils.47 In 1997, the government amended 
the law and inserted a new provision declaring that in absence of election, a 
government appointed council will take over for an indefinite period.48
The petitioners claimed that this new provision violates Article 59 and 60 
of the Constitution which provide for local democracy. The Court refused to 
declare the new provision of section 16A anti-constitutional and decided that the 
appointments of the members of the local councils by the government are valid. 
However, the judge also declared that these selected members must arrange for 
an election within 60 days and can not stay in office indefinitely49 For the 
petitioners, this amounted to partial success.
It appears that in all these cases involving challenges relating to the 
validity of the statutory laws, the petitioners pursued their own political/special 
interests, not the interests of the public. No statute relating to socio-economic 
matters has been in question. Consequently, the petitioners' success has been 
limited.
As regards challenging constitutional amendments, the starting point is 
the 8th Amendment30 case. This is the first case where a constitutional
47 The relevant statutes are Rangamati Hill Tract District Local Government Council
Act (No. XIX of 1989), Khagrachari Hill Tract District Local Government 
Council Act (No. XX of 1989) and Bandarban Hill Tract District Local 
Government Council Act (No. XXI of 1989). In all these statutes, section 16 
dealt with the time limit of elections.
48 Section 16A was inserted in all the three hill tracts local council statutes by
Amending Acts Nos. II, III and IV of 1997.
49 Above note 46 at 497.
50 Above note 1.
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amendment was declared invalid by the Court. Although not a PIL, it played an 
important role for the development of PIL.51 Use of public interest standing by 
political and constitutional activists to challenge constitutional amendments 
started much later. The first case where someone approached the Court as a 
citizen is Dr Ahmed Hussain v. Bangladesh and others.32 In its original form, 
Article 65 of the Constitution reserved fifteen parliamentary seats for women for 
ten years. This was in addition to the women members already elected as part of 
the 300 member assembly. By Second Proclamation Order No. IV of 1978, the 
number of seats was increased to thirty and the period was extended to fifteen 
years from the date of the commencement of the Constitution. After the 
expiration of that period in 1987, the Tenth Amendment53 rewrote Article 65(3) 
and the period was extended for ten more years.
The petitioner contended that the Constitution is based on democratic 
principles and as such indirect election is unconstitutional according to Articles 
7, 8 and 11. Special treatment to women, he contended, amounts to 
discrimination which is prohibited under Article 28. The petitioner also relied on 
Article 121 which prescribes a single electoral role for parliamentary elections 
and prohibits classification of electors according to religion, race, caste or sex. 
Also relevant is Article 122(1) providing that parliamentary elections shall be on 
the basis of adult franchise.
51 See above chapter 3.3.
52 44 DLR (AD) (1992) 109.
53 The Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act (No. 38 of 1990).
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These arguments were rejected since they actually go against the spirit of 
the Constitution. Indirect election for women MPs was provided by the 
Constitution from the very beginning, it is not a new invention. Article 10 states 
the Fundamental Principle that steps shall be taken to ensure participation of 
women in all spheres of national life. While Article 28 contains the Fundamental 
Right against discrimination, it also provides that the State is not prevented from 
making special provisions in favour of women, children or other backward 
sections of citizens. Thus, just because the election is indirect, it is not right to 
say that it violates constitutional provisions.54
The reasoning behind the adoption of indirect election is based on 
practical situations and necessity rather than theoretical considerations. In the 
traditionally male-dominated Bangladeshi society, very few women actively take 
part in politics. Less than two per cent of the 300 elected MPs are women. 
Women will remain un-represented in the parliament if a 'no special treatment' 
approach is observed strictly and without qualification. So the petitioner's 
contention was neither in favour of democracy nor beneficial to the right of 
women in the country.55
54 In an earlier case, Fazle (Md) Rabbi and others v. The Election Commissioner 44 
DLR (1992) 14 at 16-17, the Court made an observation to the same effect. In 
that case, three MPs unsuccessfully challenged the election of women MPs on 
the ground that such indirect election can not be held unless the directly 
elected MPs have completed all procedural technicalities of becoming an MP 
including the taking of oath. But the constitutional provisions were not 
questioned.
33 However, Dilara Choudhury (1995: 102) points out that when the siUing MPs elect
the women members, one party gets a solid block of thirty seats for just having 
the majority in the parliament. So the reservation of seats for women is 
nothing but a weapon for the ruling party to further dominate the parliament.
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Certain aspects of the Fourth and Fifth amendments56 of the Constitution 
were belatedly challenged by a group of lawyers through a PIL in Sved Mahbub 
Ali v. Ministry of Law and others.57 Among other things, the Fourth Amendment 
changed the provisions relating to appointment of judges of Supreme and sub­
ordinate courts as contained in Articles 95, 98, 115 and 116; the Fifth 
Amendment effected Article 99 regarding the disabilities of Supreme Court 
judges.38 In 1992, when a number of judges were promoted without consultation 
with the Supreme Court, the petitioners protested on the ground of violation of 
the Constitution. They further claimed that the relevant constitutional provisions, 
after amendments, are themselves violative of the Constitution and must be 
struck down.39 We will later discuss the effect of these amendments on the 
balance of power between the judiciaiy and the executive.60 In the present 
context, it is important to note that although constitutional amendments were
Moreover, women elected in this way are put in a disadvantageous position 
and are mere puppets in the hands of their male colleagues and not concerned 
with women's issues. The validity of these arguments can not be denied. But it 
is unlikely that the women's situation will be improved by discarding the 
system altogether because the parliament will then be an all male affair, A 
better alternative appears to be a proportional representation of women 
members tied to the proportion of the MPs representing various political 
parties.
36 The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act (No. II of 1975) and the Constitution
(Fifth Amendment) Act (No. I or 1979).
37 Unreported WP 4036/1992; later Appeal 317/93.
38 The first Martial Law Regime amended Article 99 relating to disabilities of
Supreme Court judges by Order 4 of the Second Proclamation of 1978. This 
was later ratified by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act (No. I or 1979).
59 The claim that constitutional amendments were ultra vires appears to have been
made as an afterthought - one of the petitioners sworn in a supplementary 
affidavit.
60 See below chapter 5.3.
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challenged, the Court refused to deal with them on the ground of lack of standing. 
It appears that the Court was not convinced that the lawyers were pursuing a 
genuine people's cause. It is also possible that the long gap between the making 
of the amendments and the submission of the writ further weakened the case.
The Seventh Amendment61 of the Constitution was challenged by M 
Saleem Ullah, a constitutional activist. He approached the Court as a citizen in M 
Saleem Ullah v. Justice Mohammad Abdul Ouddus Chowdhurv62 The petitioner 
protested against appointment of a judge as the Secretary of the Law Ministry as 
violative of Articles 22, 94, 99 and 147 of the Constitution relating to separation 
of judiciary and appointment and remuneration of judges. Although such a claim 
would be valid in normal circumstances, the appointment in question was made 
under a Martial Law Proclamation of 24 March 1982.63 An exception in the 
proviso to paragraph 10(2) of the Schedule to the Proclamation provided that the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator was empowered to make and give prospective 
effect to such appointments. After the martial law was withdrawn by the 
Proclamation of Withdrawal of Martial Law, 10 November 1986, the question 
was whether the appointment in question remained protected. The Court 
answered in the positive because the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution, in 
combination with Article 150 and Paragraph 19(1) and 19(2), ratified and 
validated all actions of the Martial Law authority.
61 The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act (No. I of 1986).
62 46 DLR (1994) 691.
63 This was later amended by the Proclamation (First Amendment) Order (No. 1 of
1982) and the Proclamation (Amendment) Order (No. 1 of 1983).
223
At this point, the petitioner challenged the Seventh Amendment itself on 
two grounds.64 First, it was claimed that the procedures for amending the 
Constitution as laid down in Article 142 had not been complied with. This claim 
was not substantiated by any material placed before the Court. Second, the 
parliament's power to amend the Fourth Schedule without amending Article 150 
of the Constitution was questioned.65 This contention is not tenable for the 
simple reason that Article 142(1) empowers the parliament to amend any 
provision of the Constitution and the provisions of the Fourth Schedule, being 
provisions of the Constitution, are not excluded. In any case, these points appear 
not to have been contested with seriousness or vigour.66
What then is the result of the challenges, made by political activists using 
PIL, on the area of judicial review of statutory and constitutional law? As regards 
adoption and amendment of statutory laws, there has been no success. AK 
Muiibur Rahman67 and Mohammad Giasuddin68 are examples where political 
activists attempted to challenge the actions of the martial law authorities. 
Sangbadpatra69 dealt with the interest of the rich and powerful newspaper
64 Above note 62 at 695.
63 Article 150 says that the transitional and temporary provisions set out in the Fourth 
Schedule shall have effect notwithstanding any other provisions of the 
Constitution.
66 Above note 62 at 695.
67 Above note 40.
68 Above note 42.
69 Above note 44.
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owners. Partial success has been attained in Ziaur Rahman Khan.70 where the 
court refused to declared the law anti-constitutional but interpreted it in such a 
way that the government was obliged to conduct local council elections. 
However, this case, like the others, reflect the interest of the politicians rather 
than of the common people. None of these cases deal with socio-economic 
aspects of the law.
Constitutional amendments have been challenged in three cases. Of these, 
the public interest element of the first case, Dr Ahmed Hossain. is doubtful. In 
fact, it appears to go against the interest of women. However, this was the only 
case where the object of the petitioner was to directly challenge a constitutional 
amendment. In Sved Mahbub Ali and M Saleem Ullah v. Justice Mohammad 
Abdul Ouddus Chowdhurv. the petitioners primarily questioned the 
constitutionality of certain actions. Consequent challenges against constitutional 
amendments appear to have been taken less seriously and even as afterthoughts. 
In both cases, the object of the petitioners was to participate in the process of 
appointment of judges rather than advocating any social or economic agenda. The 
lack of success demonstrates that they actually failed to use the judiciary to fulfil 
their objectives.
It appears that, so far, political activists have not been able to use PIL to 
block or hinder parliamentary law making in Bangladesh. Also, the judges have 
not shown any willingness to transgress their limits in this respect. Abdul Bari 
Sarker J summarises the view of the Supreme Court:
70 Above note 46.
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The Court including the Supreme Court can not usurp the powers and 
functions of the legislature in making law or that of the administration 
and other authorities to make rules and regulations. In that event, a 
judicial despotism of the worst type follows and the Court loses both 
its legal and moral authority to adjudicate in such matters.71
5.2.2 Parliamentary privileges and internal proceedings
In a number of occasions, the political activists challenged the limits of 
parliamentary privileges on the ground that the MPs are abusing their power. To 
ensure effective discharge of the functions and responsibilities of the parliament, 
it must be free from any outside interference or obstruction. Parliamentary 
privileges are designed to ensure this freedom. In England, the relevant principles 
have gradually developed over the years and take up an important place in the 
constitutional law.72 Recognition of the same in the Indian Constitution can be 
found in Articles 105 and 194, where the Constitution deals with the powers, 
privileges and immunities of the parliament and state legislatures and their 
members.73 In the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, these principles are stated in 
Article 66 and 127 relating to the parliament and the Provincial Assemblies 
respectively.74
71 Ehsanul Hoque v. General Manager. Agrani Bank 42 DLR (1990) 60 at 65.
72 An authoritative version of the law of parliamentary privilege in England can be
found in the treatise of Erskine May, see CJ Boulton (1989: 69-160).
73 Prititosh Roy (1991) provides a recent detailed study of the law of parliamentary
privilege in India. See also HC Dholakia (1976: 472-482) for a good summary.
74 The Constitution of 1956 secured parliamentary privileges in Articles 56 and 89; in
the Constitution of 1962, the relevant Article was 111.
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In Bangladesh, Article 78 of the Constitution defines the scope and limits 
of parliamentary privilege. The Article declares:
(1) The validity of the proceedings in Parliament shall not be 
questioned in any court.
(2) A member or officer of Parliament in whom powers are vested for 
the regulation of procedure, the conduct of business or the 
maintenance of order in Parliament, shall not in relation to the exercise 
by him of any such powers be subject to the jurisdiction of any court.
(3) A member of Parliament shall not be liable to proceedings in any 
court in respect of anything said, or any vote given, by him in 
Parliament or in any committee thereof.
(4) A person shall not be liable to proceedings in any court in respect 
of the publication by or under the authority of the Parliament of any 
report, paper, vote or proceeding.
(5) Subject to this article, the privileges of Parliament and of its 
committees and members may be determined by Act of Parliament.
Clause 5 provides for an Act of Parliament declaring the details of the law. But 
since there is no such statute in force, it appears that the pre-Bangladeshi laws are 
still operative.75
7~ In Pakistan, the Constituent Assembly (Proceedings and Privileges) Act 1955 
provided that the members of the Constituent Assembly would enjoy the same 
privileges as enjoyed by the members of the British House of Commons. 
There was no change of situation in the Constitution of 1956 and the 
Constitution of 1962. This continuity of the laws of parliamentary privilege 
gained judicial endorsement in Badrul Huque Khan v. Election Tribunal PLD 
1963 SC 704. Later came the National Assembly (Exemption from Preventive 
Detention and Personal Appearance) Ordinance (No. IX of 1963) granting 
certain immunities from preventive detention and civil court proceedings. In 
the then East Pakistan, it was followed by The East Pakistan Assembly 
Members' Privileges Act (No. IX of 1965) securing a number of privileges in 
more detail.
After the emergence of Bangladesh, following the principle of Badrul 
Huque Khan, it was declared in Suraniit Sengupta v. Election Tribunal BLD 
(1981) 132, that all pre-Bangladeshi laws relating to parliamentary privileges 
will be applicable to the Bangladeshi parliament. Mahmudul Islam (1995: 
347-350) severely criticised this decision on the ground that the emergence of 
Bangladesh created a new legal regime where the old law relating to privileges
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An advocate came as a citizen to file a contempt case in Cvril Sikdar v. 
Nazmul Huda,76 The facts of the case are that a debate took place in the 
parliament as to whether or not the First Information Report in a criminal case 
incriminated a member of parliament. Mr Nazmul Huda, a minister, took part in 
the discussion and said that the order granting the bail had been concocted and 
the judge was open to bribes. Contempt of Court was alleged as the matter was 
sab-judice before the criminal court. It was claimed that Mr Huda’s statements 
vilified and scandalised the judges, shook public confidence in the administration 
of justice and was actuated by malice and ill-will. The question was whether 
Article 78(3) protected Mr Huda.
To start with, Rahman J considered the facts and found that the Speaker 
had expunged the relevant portions of the parliamentary proceedings on the 
ground that the matter was sub-jndice. So the petitioner relied on newspaper 
reports only and could not provide clear evidence of any derogatory remark. Even 
if the remarks alleged had been made, the Court observed, there was hardly 
anything contemptuous of any court or judge.77
As regards the constitutional provisions, the Court found that clauses 3 
and 4 of Article 78 are relevant as they ensure freedom of speech in the
can not apply. It is argued that the Constitution and the parliament of 
Bangladesh are dissimilar to those of Pakistan, and as Bangladesh is not a 
successor State, its parliament cannot be called a successor to the legislature 
of Pakistan. It must be noted here that although the Assembly Member's 
Privileges Ordinance (No. Ill of 1980) sought to repeal the Ordinances of 1963 
and 1965, it was not ratified by the parliament and lapsed.
76 46 DLR (1994) 555.
77 Ibid. 557-558.
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parliament. It was observed that in the Indian Constitution, the same principles 
are stated in Article 105(2). Also, Articles 121 and 211 provide that there can be 
no discussion in the parliament regarding the conduct of a judge in relation to the 
discharge(ofhis^luties. The combined effect of these rules is that the Speaker of 
the Indian parliament will not allow any such discussions, but if something is 
said inadvertently or otherwise, no action lies in a court of law.78 In Bangladesh, 
there is no express provision comparable to Articles 121 and 211. But Rahman J 
declared that the law is the same as in India and as such Mr Huda was protected 
under Article 78(3).79
Another attempt by a political activist to question parliamentary privilege 
was made in the Parliament Boycott case.80 The question was whether boycotts, 
walk-outs and similar other measures are all parliamentary and democratic 
activities and are protected as parliamentary privilege under Article 78 of the 
Constitution. The Court made several observations.81 First, the English or Indian 
cases do not offer a precise definition of 'internal proceedings'; these proceedings 
do not extend to each and every thing that has been done or committed within the
I
four walls of the parliament. Second, privileges under Article 78 do not allow the 
destruction or obstruction of fundamental constitutional processes including the 
obligation to participate in parliamentary proceedings. Third, in cases where the 
provisions of the Constitution are violated, the Court is bound to exercise its
78 Special Reference case No. 1 of 1964 AIR 1965 SC 745.
79 Above note 76 at 560-561.
80 Above note 9.
81 Ibid. at 47-48.
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jurisdiction unless there is a clear constitutional bar. Thus it was declared that 
abstention from parliamentary session without leave of the parliament cannot be a 
privilege. Qazi Shafiuddin Ahmed J said:
i
s ' ;While it can fairly be conceded that internal proceeding of the House ;! 
relating to its proper business is immune from challenge in Court, it 
cannot be conceded that indulging in strike, hartal and street 
propaganda for realisation of the demand for a caretaker government 
shunning the constitutional obligation in participating in parliamentary 
proceedings and destroying the fundamentals of the Parliament, in 
other words, affecting the constitution of the House can by any stretch 
of imagination be called internal proceeding to be barred under Article 
78 of the Constitution. This abstention for realisation of the demand is 
a matter which pertains neither to the regulation of the procedure of 
the House nor the conduct of its business or the maintenance of order 
in the National Assembly or affecting any of its privileges.
In the MPs Resignation case,83 another PIL case brought by political 
activists, parliamentary privilege was dealt with in more detail. The question was 
whether the en mass submission of the resignation letters by the opposition MPs 
is a matter of internal proceedings of the parliament and protected under Article 
78. Both Mahmudur Rahman J and Kazi Ebadul Haque J extensively dealt with 
English, Indian and Pakistani laws.84 It was observed that the terms ’proceedings- 
in-parliamenf and ’parliamentary privilege’ are hard to define.8:> Mahmudur 
Rahman J held that Article 78 applies only with respect to internal proceedings.85 
Even if it relates to parliamentary business, submission of resignation letters do 
not form a part of internal proceedings until the Speaker brings the fact to the
82 Ibid. at 47.
83 Above note 9.
84 Ibid; at 374-378 and 395-397.
85 Ibid at 376-377.
86 Ibid at 377-378.
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notice of the House in session. Accordingly, the Court's jurisdiction was declared 
not barred. Kazi Ebadul Haque J agreed with these observations.87
Although not a PIL, MPs reference88 requires to be mentioned briefly as it 
followed the twin cases of Parliament Boycott and MPs Resignation. It was 
argued that the absence of the MPs from the parliamentary sessions is a matter 
relating to the parliament only - it can not be decided in a Reference because the 
issue is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. ATM Afzal CJ denied that the absence 
of the MPs constitutes formal transaction of business of the parliament or its 
internal proceedings.89 Mustafa Kamal J agreed and found that the Court is free 
to deal with constitutional interpretation involving the composition and 
constitution of parliament which is not an internal proceeding.90
It appears from the discussion that the political and constitutional activists 
repeatedly challenged the limits of parliamentary privileges and the legislature 
was urged not to use them to step out of its domain. The Court, in its part, acted 
wisely and showed restraint and courage at the same time. It granted privilege in 
Cyril Sikdar but refused protection in Parliament Boycott and MPs Resignation 
and made Parliament conform to its constitutional limitations. The judicial view 
as to parliamentary privileges culminated in MPs Reference. The position taken 
by the Court in this case suggests at least two broad principles enhancing the 
Court's authority.
87 Ibid. at 397.
88 Above note 8.
89 Ibid. at 173-174.
90 Ibid at 197.
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The first principle states that since there is no definite categorisation, the
Court, as the interpreter of the Constitution, has the ultimate authority to decide
what are or are not parliamentary privileges. Mustafa Kamal J said:
In respect of Parliament, I know of no other principle of judicial self- 
restraint than the one that the Court will not interfere with the "internal 
proceedings" of Parliament, What is an "internal proceedings" of 
Parliament is also for this Court to decide, if it requires a decision, and 
it is well-settled that these words cannot be fitted into a straight jacket 
of complete categorisation.91
The second principle asserts that judicial scrutiny is not barred when the
Constitution is violated and parliamentary privilege is sought to be used as a
protection. Latifur Rahman J says:
The internal and proper businesses of the proceeding of the Parliament 
is beyond the purview of the constitutional Court, but while acting in 
the name of internal proceeding, if any violation of constitutional 
provision takes place then this Court is certainly competent to 
interfere.92
As regards the law relating to parliamentary privilege, the influence of the PIL 
challenges by the constitutional and political activists appear to have achieved 
some positive results. The Court has been activated to assert its role and has 
proven its stance as a guardian of the Constitution. But these cases represent 




92 Ibid. at 203.
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5.3 PTL and the jurisdictional boundaries between the executive and 
the judiciary
Development of P1L in Bangladesh has been closely connected with several 
issues relating to the jurisdictional boundaries between the executive and the 
judiciary. Political and constitutional activists have often attempted to re-defme 
these boundaries through PIL cases. We aim to analyse the results of these 
attempts.
Our discussion proceeds in three stages. Chapter 5.3.1 discusses the 
definition of the term 'state'. The aim is to explore to what extent the judiciary has 
extended this definition so that it can exert more control, through writs, over 
social and economic functions of the government. Chapter 5.3.2 examines the 
attempts by constitutional and political activists to curtail the executive power of 
the appointment, tenure and retirement of judges. Chapter 5.3.3 discusses certain 
aspects of implementation of PIL judgements in Bangladesh to explore the extent 
to which the judiciary is encroaching upon the province of the executive.
5.3.1 Definition of the 'State* and other relevant terms
In theory, private interests are sufficiently protected by the ordinary law of the 
land. So the primary concern of the special provisions of constitutional writs is to 
protect the individual from the might of the State. But the situation differs 
depending on whether a constitutional or legal right is in question. As regards the 
constitutional Fundamental Rights, writ may issue under Article 102(1) against 
any person or authority including any person performing any function in
233
connection with the affairs of the Republic. But in cases involving legal rights 
under Article 102(2), except habeas corpus, a writ lies only against any person 
performing any function in connection with the affairs of the Republic or of a 
local authority or a person holding or purporting to hold a public office.93
This means that the enforcement through writs of some of the 
Fundamental Rights and almost all of the legal rights depend on the scope and 
limit of the terms 'Republic1, 'local authority' and 'public office'. The more these 
definitions are extended, the more areas become amenable under the writ 
jurisdiction.
The result is that the judiciary is able to monitor a wider area if the 
definition of the term 'state' is wider. This is especially important in the light of 
the ever-widening sphere of state activities touching social and economic issues 
relating to the common people. This includes governmental participation in 
various types of financial and commercial activities where certain company or 
corporation is declared by the government to be outside the public domain. The 
executive has an inherent tendency in these matters to avoid judicial scrutiny. 
Expansion of the definition of state can ensure that the judiciary monitors these 
cases as public law issues, whether or not the petitioner approach the court with a 
special grievance of his own.
93 It was held in Maniurul Huq v. Bangladesh and others 44 DLR (1992) 239 that a 
writ petition for orders directing persons performing any functions other than 
those of the Republic or of a local authority is not maintainable.
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The term 'Republic' in Article 102 means the People's Republic of
Bangladesh - generally referred in the Constitution as the 'State'. The term is used
to differentiate between public and private authorities. Article 152(1) says:
"the State" includes Parliament, the Government and statutory public 
authorities.
In the Indian Constitution, 'State' has been defined in Article 12 at the 
beginning of Part III relating to the Fundamental Rights. The definition of'state' 
includes central and provincial governments and legislatures and all local and 
other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Indian 
government. Article 36 follows this definition for the purpose of Part IV 
relating to the Directive Principles of State Policy. The Bangladeshi definition 
of the State not only reflects the unitary character of the Republic, it has also 
opted for the simple term of 'statutory public authorities' instead of a longer 
description.
5.3.1.1 Components of the 'State'
One component of the State here is the parliament. The only relevant case is
Parliament Boycott.94 where it was argued that the MPs are not persons
performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Republic and as such
no writ lies against them. The Court denied this argument and said:
The word 'any person' appearing in Article 102 of the Constitution also 
includes a member of the Parliament as legislature is one of the 
component and main organs of the Republic, and Executive, 
Legislature and Judiciary, these 3 organs taken together constitute the 
Republic of Bangladesh, as such, respondent Nos. 3-5 are persons
94 Above note 9.
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within the meaning of Article 102 of the Constitution and they are 
performing their functions in connection with the affairs of the 
Republic . . .9:5
Another component of the State is the government. This primarily means 
the executive department.96 Since the parliament has been mentioned and the 
judiciary has not, the question arises whether the judiciary is impliedly included 
in the definition of the State. A positive answer was given in Shamsul Huq 
Chowdhurv v. Justice Md Abdur Rouf.97 One of the reasons advocated was that 
the State is defined using the word 'includes' instead of the word 'means'. This 
indicates that the definition is not exhaustive.98 But the main argument was that 
the meaning of the term 'government' depends upon the constitutional set up of a 
particular state and the laws and rules framed thereunder. Since the overall 
scheme of the Bangladesh Constitution is to provide a democratic tripartite
95 Ibid at 46-47.
96 The meaning of the term 'government' was discussed in Government of the People's
Republic of Bangladesh v. Md Habibur Rahman 31 DLR (AD) (1979) 152. 
The definition given in this case was not with respect to the Constitution but 
related to certain statutory law. It was said that the enactment in question used 
the tenn to mean a body of persons governing the State. The word was thus 
used in a real and concrete sense in identification of a distinct authority to 
discharge certain statutory functions. It was also observed that the true 
construction of the word depends upon the constitutional set up of the country.
97 49 DLR (1997) 176 at 182-185. In India, the same view was taken by the Court in
Sheikrivammada Nalla Kova v. Administrator. Union Territory of Laccadives 
AIR 1967 Ker 259 at 266. In that case, it was thought reasonable to presume 
that the Constitution makers intended to include the judicial organ in the 
concept of the State even though it was not expressly mentioned in Article 12.
98 In Bangladesh, the different effect of the use of the terms 'includes' and 'means' has
been discussed in Dira Dockyard and Engineers Ltd. and others v. Bangladesh 
Shilpa Rin Sangstha and others 39 DLR (AD) (1987) 59 at 65, where the 
Court said that the use of the word 'includes' does not exclude other possible 
meanings besides what have been expressly mentioned.
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system of government," . . .  it can not be said that the judiciary is not intended to 
be an independent organ of the state".99
Although the judiciary is recognised as an independent organ, the judges 
of the constitutional court, i.e. the Supreme Court, do not fall in the category of 
agents and servants of the State to whom writs may issue. This aspect will be 
further discussed in sub-chapter 5.3.2.3. But the law is different as to the judges 
and magistrates of lower courts and tribunals. Writs may be issued against them 
under Article 102(5) subject to two exceptions. First, courts or tribunals 
established under laws relating to the defence services of Bangladesh or any 
disciplined force.100 Second, a tribunal to which Article 117 applies. This article 
applies to administrative tribunals which are mainly concerned with service of 
government officers and government property.101
99 Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv above note 97 at 183.
100 The law on this point developed mainly after the lifting of the first Martial Law in
the early 1980s, Initially, the Court took a narrow view in Bangladesh v. Md 
Abdur Rab 33 DLR (AD) (1981) 143 and held that even a Screening Board is 
a 'court or tribunal'. But later, a wider interpretation in Bangladesh v. AKM 
Zahangir 34 DLR (AD) (1982) 173 held that a body must perform some quasi­
judicial function to be a tribunal. Thus, it was held in Major Hafizur Rahman 
v. Bangladesh 29 DLR (1977) 34 and Fazlur Rahman v. Secretary of Home 
Affairs 41 DLR (HCD) (1989) 459 that writ lies against orders by individual 
officers not enjoying any quasi-judicial authority. Further progress was made 
in Jamil Huq v. Bangladesh 34 DLR (AD) (1982) 125. Relying on Khandker 
Ehtashamuddin v. State 33 DLR (AD) (1981) 154 it was stated that a writ lies 
if the action taken is mala fide or corum non judice, Jamil Huq also declared 
that the decision of the Court will depend on the character of the authority 
exercising power, the purpose for which the power is exercised and the 
intention of the legislature to grant immunity to that authority from judicial 
review. Apparently, the Supreme Court has gradually extended its authority to 
a considerable extent.
101 The status of administrative tribunals created under Article 117 was analytically
discussed in Muiibur Rahman v. Bangladesh 44 DLR (AD) (1992) 111. MH 
Rahman CJ {Ibid. at 120) observed that an administrative tribunal may act
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Two more terms associated with the definition of the State are 'public
office' and 'persons in the service of the Republic'. Public office is a right,
authority and duty, for a specific term and tenure, to exercise some portion of the
sovereign power of the government for the benefit of the public.102 It is created
by the Constitution, statute or statutory power. Under Article 102(2)(b)(ii), a writ
may issue requiring a person holding or purporting to hold a public office to show
under what authority he claims to hold that office. A wider definition enables the
citizens to challenge unlawful usurpation of public office.
A public office is occupied by a public officer. Article 152(1) says that a
public officer is a person holding or acting in any office of emolument in the
'service of the Republic'. The same Article defines:
"the service of the Republic" means any service, post or office whether 
in a civil or military capacity, in respect of the Government of 
Bangladesh, and any other service declared by law to be a service of 
the Republic.
There are a number of factors that determine whether a person is in the service of 
the Republic. These have been authoritatively declared in Justice 
Shahabuddin.103 The summary of the observations is that these persons:
i) render their services to the State and not to any other person or 
institution;
ii) hold posts in the permanent structure of the administration;
iii) are controlled by different Ministries;
judicially, but still remains an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a 
court.
102 See Mahmudul Islam (1995: 464-465) for further elaboration in the Bangladeshi
context.
103 Abu Bakar v. Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed above note 26 at 497.
238
iv) have their remuneration, salaries, retirement and other benefit 
drawn directly from the public exchequer;
v) are subject to statutory laws and regulations determining their 
appointment, terms of employment and retirement; and
vi) are constitutionally protected from arbitrary removal, dismissal etc. 
under Article 135, backed by provisions of Administrative Tribunals 
under Article 117.104 The presence of this alternative remedy means 
that no writ lies in these cases unless a Fundamental Right is 
concerned which can attract Articles 44 and 102.105
The list of persons in the service of the Republic consists of secretaries, 
gazetted and non-gazetted officers and employees of the government serving in 
the Secretariat, various departments, sections, directorates and other branches of 
different Ministries. Also included are officers and staff of all other government 
offices including the offices of constitutional post holders. Although the phrase 
’public servants' includes all employees of governmental, corporate and statutory 
bodies, not all of these persons are in the service of the Republic.106
There are two major exceptions. The first exception involves 
constitutional post-holders. A considerable number of PIL cases involved this 
issue, it will be analysed in detaile in chapter 5.3.2.3 below. The second
104 The protection under Article 135 relating to dismissal is not applicatble to persons 
holding military posts. See Major Hafizur Rahman v. Bangladesh 29 DLR 
(1977) 34 and Abdul Latif v. Bangladesh 43 DLR (1991) 446.
1(b The significant exception regarding Fundamental Rights was pointed out in 
Shafiuddin Ahmed v. Bangladesh 47 DLR (1995) 81 at 133. The Court relied 
on the peculiar features of the Bangladesh Constitution and held that the 
guarantee provided by Article 44 ensures the enforcement of the Fundamental 
Rights through Article 102.
106 This definition of 'public servants' is given in Section 2(d) of the Public Servants 
Retirement Act (No. XII of 1974). In the Indian Constitution, Article 16 is not 
confined to 'persons in the service of the Republic' and is applicable to all 
public employments.
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exception relates to the employees and officers of statutory public corporations 
and bodies. They are not 'persons in the service of the Republic', even though 
'statutory public authority' is included in the definition of the State.107 The result 
is that they are vulnerable to governmental arbitrary decisions and can not resort 
to the protection of Article 135.108 However, for the purpose of public interest 
cases, the situation has little relevance.
Finally, most important in relation to the social and economic functions of 
the state, are the scope of the terms 'statutory public authority' and 'local 
authority*.
5.3.1.2 'Statutory public authority’ and 'local authority'
The counterpart of the tenn 'statutory public authority' in Article 12 of the Indian 
Constitution is "local and other authorities within the territory of India or under 
the control of the Government of India". Initially, the Indian Court took a 
restrictive position and applied the principle of ejusdem generis in determining 
'other authorities'. Thus only authorities exercising government or sovereign
107 The basic argument is that the statutory corporations approximate business
management and are not involved with the governance of the State. See 
Bangladesh Small Industries Corporation v. Mahbub Hossain v. Mahbub 
Hossain 29 DLR (1977) 41 at 48 and Bangladesh Bank v. Mohammad Abdul 
Mannan 46 DLR (AD) (1994) 1 at 9.
108 The leading case on this issue is Bangladesh Small Industries Corporation above
note 107. It was declared that these officers are protected by relevant statutoiy 
provisions and their service contracts. However, the employer, i.e. the 
government, is in a dominant position and there is scope for injustice. The 
result has been a greater emphasis by the Court on the principles of natural 
justice. See Managing Director. Janata Bank v. Hafiiuddin Ahmed and others 
29 DLR (SC) (1977) 39 and AZ Rafique Ahmed v. Bangladesh Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research 32 DLR (AD) (1980) 83.
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functions were included.109 But this principle was questioned in Uiiam Bai110 
where the Court pointed out that the ejusdem generis rule can not be applied 
because in Article 12, there is no common genus or category running through the 
named bodies.
This resulted in the expansion of the definition in Electricity Board. 
Rajasthan v. Mohan Lai111 where it was held that other authorities include all 
authorities created by the Constitution or statute and on whom powers are 
conferred by law.112 Finally, in RD Shettv v. International Airport Authority.113 
the definition was further enlarged by declaring that 'other authorities' includes 
any body which is an 'agency or instrumentality of the State'.114 Especially, the 
explanation by Mathew J is very wide and aims to prevent a large-scale evasion 
of the Fundamental Rights by the government through transferring work done in 
governmental departments to statutory corporations, while retaining 
governmental control. Thus the Indian situation shows a continuous progress
109 University of Madras v. Shant Bai AIR 1954 Mad 67; BW Devadas v. Karanataka
Engineering College AIR 1964 Mys 6.
110 Uiiam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 1621.
111 AIR 1967 SC 1857.
112 This was followed in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram AIR 1975 SC 1331 where the
Court stressed on the legislative intention of creating the authority instead of 
the mode of creation.
113 AIR 1979 SC 1628.
114 This was followed in numerous cases including the leading case of Aiav Hasia v.
Khalid Muiib AIR 1981 SC 487 and AL Karla v. Project and Equipment 
Corporation of India Ltd. AIR 1984 SC 1361.
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towards a liberal interpretation.115 Also, these developments went on hand in
hand with PIL developments.
In Bangladesh, the term 'statutory public .authority' has been defined in
Article 152( 1) of the Constitution:
"Statutory public authority” means any authority, corporation or body 
the activities or the principal activities of which are authorised by any 
Act, ordinance, order or instrument having the force of law in 
Bangladesh.
Apparently, the framers of the Constitution of 1972 adopted a principle almost 
similar to that established in India in 1967 by the Electricity Board. Rajasthan. 
To be a component of the State, an authority does not need to have any particular 
mode of creation or method of operation and even the legislative intention is 
irrelevant. Apparently, the main test is that its activities or principal activities are 
authorised by some document, statutory or not, having the force of law. This very 
liberal approach is further expanded by the definition of law provided in Article 
152(1):
"law" means any Act, ordinance, order, rule, regulation, bye-law, 
notification or other legal instrument, and any custom or usage, having 
the force of law in Bangladesh.
The PIL petitioners in Bangladesh Retired Government Employees 
Welfare Association v. Bangladesh116 relied on these liberal provisions. The 
question was whether an association can act as a legal person capable of filing a 
writ petition under Article 102. Naimuddin Ahmed J observed that the
115 A complete review of ihe law and the present position can be found in Central
Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Broio Nath AIR 1986 SC 1571.
116 46 DLR (1994) 426 at 434.
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association in question is registered under an Ordinance.117 Apparently, its 
activities are authorised by that Ordinance and as such, the association can be 
deemed to be a body within the meaning of the definition of statutory public 
authority. Since Article 102(5) states that, for the purpose of Article 102, a 
person includes a statutory public authority, the association in question is a 
person by operation of law. Consequently, it is allowed to ask for remedies in 
writs.
As regards the term 'local authority', the Indian position can be found in
the definition given in Section 3(28) of the General Clauses Act118 and a number
of relevant cases.119 The same statute applies in Bangladesh.120 But at the same
time when the term statutory public authority was introduced, the lawmakers
extended the definition. In Bangladesh, Section 3(28) says:
“local authority” shall mean and include a Paura Shava, Zilla Board,
Union Panchayet, Board of Trustees of a port or other authority legally 
entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control or 
management of a municipal or local fund, or any corporation or other 
body or authority constituted or established by the Government under 
any law.
117 The Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control) Ordinance
(No. XLVIof 1961).
118 No. X of 1897.
119 The leading case is Rashid Ahmed v. MB Kairana AIR 1950 SC 163. See also
State of Guiarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas and others (1969) 1 SCC 509 and 
Masthan Sahib v. The Chief Commissioner. Pondicherry and another AIR 
1963 SC 533.
120 Under Article 152(2) of the Bangladesh Constitution, the General Clauses Act
(No. X of 1897) applies in relation to the Constitution and the statutues. So the 
definitions and rules of construction laid down in the Act are to be used in 
constitutional as well as statutory interpretations.
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The amendment made by the Presidential Order 147 of 1972 included the words 
"or any corporation or other body or authority constituted or established by the 
Government under any law" - these words can not be found in the Indian version 
of the statute.121
The most noticeable effect of this change is that some of the bodies that 
fall in the category of other authorities in India are included in the list of local 
authorities in Bangladesh. In Bangladeshi law, local and statutory public 
authorities are very closely linked concepts. They cover a huge area, especially 
when considered with the wide definition of the term 'law'. It appears that the 
lawmakers attempted to establish a very liberal definition of the State. So the 
absence of the term ’other authorities’ in the Bangladeshi definition of the State 
does not necessarily restrict the Court's scope of creative interpretations. Yet, it 
must be admitted that the extensive efforts by the lawmakers give the judges less 
reason to make or propagate new concepts. The liberal Indian doctrine of 
instrumentality of the State has been discussed by the Appellate Division, but 
was not followed on the ground that the Bangladeshi constitutional and legal 
provisions are different.122
121 Constitutionally speaking, local authority is distinct from local government. While 
the former is a purely administrative unit consisting of officers appointed after 
a selection process, the latter is composed of the representatives of the people 
democratically elected. In Bangladesh, the Fundamental Principle of local 
government is laid down in Article 9 and their mode of election, functions and 
powers have been provided for in Articles 59 and 60.
177" See for example the discussion by Shahabuddin Ahmed CJ in Bangladesh Bank v. 
Mohammad Abdul Mannan above note 107 at 6-7.
The law applied in Bangladesh to determine whether or not a body is a 
local authority thus follows its own route of development. Apart from the bodies 
that are already mentioned in the General Clauses Act, Paura Shava, Zilla Board 
etc., the primary rule is that a body is a local authority if it is constituted by a 
statute. Accordingly, it was declared in Abdul Hague Sikder v. Divisional 
Manager ('Fertilizer) BADC123 that a statutory corporation is a local authority. 
This was extended in Conforce Limited v. Titas Gas Company Limited124 where 
the Court held that a writ lies not only against a statutory corporation, but also 
against a company which is a subsidiary of a statutory corporation performing 
functions assigned by law to that corporation.
Further liberalisation was made in AZ Rafique Ahmed v. Bangladesh 
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research.12^ where a body was created by a 
resolution of a Ministry. Initially, it was held not a local authority by the High 
Court Division. The argument was that a resolution is not a law because it is not 
made in exercise of any law making power of the President. But the Appellate 
Division liberally held that the resolution was covered by the expression 'other 
legal instrument' used in the definition of law in Article 152(1). Being thus 
created by law, the authority in question was a local authority.126
123 48 DLR (1996) 574.
124 42 DLR (1990) 33.
125 Above note 108. This was an appeal from AZ Rafique Ahmed v. Bangladesh
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 31 DLR (1979) 222.
126 It appeas that only a governmental order made pursuant to a Statute has the force
of law. In the present case, the Appellate Division based its decision on the 
ground that the resolution was subsequently followed by a Statute establishing 
the Council and revoking the resolution. Mahmudul Islam (1995: 387,
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The wider definition accepted by the Appellate Division is more in 
harmony with the constitutional approach. It operates within two limitations. 
First, a body must be created by law to be a local authority. Societies127 and 
associations128 are thus excluded. Bodies created by executive instructions fall in 
the same category.129 Second, the Court is very quick to distinguish the 
commercial activities of the government as distinct from its sovereign or 
executive functions. It has been said that a local authority implies a public duty 
authorised by law to carry on some administrative activities and the body is 
entrusted with some portion of the sovereign functions of the State.130 Thus pure 
commercial business ventures of the government, even if the government is the 
sole owner, are not local authorities.131
footnote 2) takes a rather narrower view and criticises the decision on the 
ground that the resolution, when passed, was an administrative act and was 
not in exercise of any power under any statute.
127 It was held in Jiban Kumar Barman v. M Abdul Hve 48 DLR (1996) 569 that a co­
operative society is not to be considered as created by law merely because it is 
registered as a body-corporate under the Co-operative Societies Ordinance 
1984.
128 The Bangladesh Diabetic Association was held not a local authority in Maniurul
Huq v. Banglandesh and others above note 93. Bangladesh Football Federation 
had the same position in Shahabuddin v. Secretary, Ministry of Youth and 
Sports 45 DLR (1993) 360.
129 In Keramat Ali Talukdar v. Election Tribunal 31 DLR (1979) 1, the vested and
non-resident property cell, created by an instruction of Additional Divisional 
Commissioner, was held not a local authority.
130 Bangladesh Small Industries Corporation above note 107.
131 Lutful Kabir v. Secretary' Agaz Rubber Industries 29 DLR (1977) 45. Bangladesh
Consumer's Supplies Company Ltd. v. Registrar. Joint Stock Companies 46 
DLR (1994) 552.
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Our discussion so far demonstrates that the constitutional and legal 
provisions involving the definition of the State are wide and liberal in 
Bangladesh. After the independence, the lawmakers incorporated various 
progressive elements from the sub-continental jurisdictions. Thus the wider term 
'statutory public authority' has been used in the Constitution and section 3(28) of 
the General Clauses Act has been amended to widen the meaning of 'local 
authority'. In India, however, the law has been further liberalised in the late 1970s 
by adopting the doctrine of the instrumentality of the state. This development 
more or less coincided with the introduction of PIL. In Bangladesh, the courts 
have gradually advanced towards recognising a more liberal stance. But still, in 
comparison with India, the definitions are narrower in scope. The doctrine of 
instrumentality of the state has not been followed and the scope of the term local 
authority remains somewhat restricted.
The use of the words 'statutory public authority' is a new technique and not 
a carbon copy of the Indian words 'local and other authorities'. Yet, the basic 
assumptions of the definitions in both the countries are the same and thus the 
difference is one of scope rather than content. There is still room for the 
Bangladeshi judges to consider these terms more liberally. Functions involving 
important social and economic interests of the people are often performed by 
societies, associations or bodies created by executive instructions. Sometimes 
corporations and companies created by the government, although operating as 
commercial ventures, affect the welfare of the entire populace, especially because 
of the monopoly granted by the state. A wider definition of 'state' will enable the
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judges to monitor the activities of these organisations when socio-economic 
issues are concerned. This will prevent the government to avoid judicial scrutiny 
by creating bodies and corporations and placing them outside the public domain 
even when their functions involve welfare of the people.
5.3.2 Impact of PIL on judicial independence: Problems of appointment, 
tenure and retirement of judges
The power of the executive to appoint and discipline judges, including their post­
retirement re-appointment in various other offices, has been a major issue of 
controversy in Bangladesh in recent years. This power has been abused not only 
by the autocratic regimes, but even after the restoration of democracy in 1991, 
successive democratic governments continue to use it to influence the 
judiciary.132 The party in power use the opportunity to make controversial 
appointments to serve its interests. Several attempts in the parliament by the 
opposition to restrict this power have failed as the proposals were not supported 
by the government.133
As a result, political activists used PIL to challenge such appointments 
whenever they disagreed with the government's decision, indirectly raising 
political issues in the judicial arena. Thus appointments of the President, the
132 For example, see MI Farooqui’s (1996b: 65-68) discussion relating to the 1991- 
1995 government of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. He analyses several 
instances to illustrate that, not unlike the previous autocratic regime of 
General Ershad, the democratic government continued to harass the judiciary
Ll3 In 1991, opposition MP Mr Salahuddin Yusuf introduced a constitutional bill 
proposing more power for the Supreme Court, as opposed to the executive, to 
appoint and discipline judges. But as the government did not agree, the bill 
ultimately expired. See MI Farooqui (1996b: 66) for further discussion.
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Vice-President, Election Commissioner etc. has been debated in the Court on the 
ground of public interest. In all these cases, the core of the argument is that the 
executive has disproportionate power to appoint and discipline judges and has 
been using this power to curb judicial independence. It goes against the 
obligation of the State under Article 22 to ensure separation of the judiciary from 
the executive.
An interesting case is Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh, represented 
bv the Secretary. Ministry of Law. Justice and Parliamentary Affairs.134 The 
petitioner claimed that the failure to appoint judges in the vacant posts in the 
Supreme Court is in violation of the constitutional obligation of the appointing 
authority, the executive. At that time, thirteen out of the forty posts of the 
Supreme Court judges were vacant. The case was dismissed on the preliminary 
ground of standing. The attempt appears to be a bit sensational and the petitioner 
was perhaps concerned less about winning the case and more about publicising 
the importance of the issue.
The following discussion focuses on two major problems. The first 
problem arise when the executive ignore to consult the judiciary with respect to 
appointment, promotion and discipline of judges. The second problem relates to 
the appointment of ex-judges in various constitutional posts. Our aim is to 
analyse to what extent the political and constitutional activists have succeeded in 
challenging the arbitrary decisions of the government and whether PIL has 
brought any significant change in this area benefiting the people.
134 48 DLR (1996) 433.
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5.3.2.1 Consultation relating to the judges of the Supreme Court
The practice of consultation with the Supreme Court regarding appointment, 
promotion, discharge etc. of the judges has been followed since the British period 
even when there was no specific legal or constitutional requirement. It is regarded 
as a convention and a part of the constitutional law.135 Furthermore, in the 
Constitution of India, consultation is an obligatory feature.136 But in any case, 
consultation is not a mere formality but must be effective and the opinion of the 
Court must be given full weight. It must be consensus-oriented, ensuring 
effective exchange of view in case of difference of opinion. 137 Although earlier 
Indian cases held that consultation does not mean concurrence, recent law is that 
the recommendation of the Chief Justice should have primacy over the opinions 
of other functionaries and must not be by-passed unless there is an exceptional 
circumstance.138 In Bangladesh, public interest standing has been repeatedly used 
by the constitutional activists to question the executive attitude that undermines 
the importance of consultation. The situation is discussed below in two stages 
involving the Supreme Court and the lower judiciary.
135 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 363).
136 See Articles 217 and 233 of the Indian Constitution.
137 For Indian cases, see Hari Datt v. State of HP AIR 1980 SC 1426; SP Gupta v.
Union of India AIR 1982 SC 149; Chandramouleswar v. Patna High Court 
AIR 1970 SC 370.
138 An authoritative exposition of the earlier law was given in SP Gupta v. Union of
India above note 137. This was later overruled by Supreme Court Advocates- 
on-Record v. India AIR 1994 SC 268.
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As regards the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice and other judges of both
the divisions are appointed by the President under Article 95(1). Except while
appointing the Chief Justice, under Article 48(3), the President acts in
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. As regards the role of the
judiciary in such appointments, the original Article 95(1) provided that the
President will appoint the other judges "after consultation with the Chief Justice".
But this requirement of consultation was omitted by the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution.139 At the same time a similar requirement for consultation
regarding Additional Judges of the Supreme Court was omitted from Article 98.
In the absence of constitutional provisions, the question is whether
consultation is still an absolute requirement. This depends on the status of the
constitutional practice of consultation and the extent to which the practice is
accepted as a convention. There are two arguments in favour of an established
convention. First, the historical background and the practice of consultation as
obligatory in India. Second, the fact that the government continued the practice in
spite of suspension of democracy after the Fourth Amendment. Thus Hamiduddin
Khan observed in 1989:
Apparently, there is a deviation, but as briefly mentioned, the 
consultative practice followed earlier is conventionally followed, and 
if convention is entrenched firmly, it will furnish more effective 
safeguard than a mere written precept.140
In practice, however, the convention was not entrenched firmly. In 1994, 
the practice was ignored for the first time in the middle of the process of
139 The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act (No. II of 1975).
140 Hamiduddin Khan (1989: 32).
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restoration of democracy. The government appointed nine judges of the Supreme 
Court without prior information or consultation with the Chief Justice. This was 
seen as a serious attack on the authority of the judiciary and the Chief Justice 
objected to this decision. He even publicly declared that he is considered as a 
'Mr. Nobody'.141 The Bar Associations vehemently protested the appointment and 
started to pressurise the government.142 The government ultimately came to a 
compromise and changed the names of a number of judges from the list of 
appointment.143
In spite of this success, the government has, in a subsequent instance, 
again refused the necessity of consultation while a judge was re-appointed in the 
Appellate Division. This was challenged by an advocate in Shamsul Hua 
Chowdhurv v. Justice Md Abdur Rouf and others.144 The case was decided on 
other grounds and the Court did not comment on the matter. But the government 
argued vehemently that the practice has not yet 'ripened' enough to be a 
convention. This points out, on the one hand, that the judiciary is still in danger
141 The Chief Justice was inaugurating The Lawyers Conference of the Bangladesh
Bar Council on 4/2/94.
142 Abdur Rashid (1994: 14-16) provides a full description of the crisis. He points out
that the reaction of the bar was inevitable, especially because of the 
questionable competence of the persons in the list.
143 The Bar was not entirely happy with the compromise. On a meeting on 10/2/94, it
was declared that effective and meaningful consultation had not taken place. 
Consequently, the Bar decided not to accord any felicitation to any of the 
newly appointed judges.
144 49 DLR (1997) 176 at 186.
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of being outweighed by the executive.145 But on the other hand, any such !
appointment is likely to be challenged by the constitutional activists through PIL * 
as violative of conventional constitutional practice.
5.3.2.2 Consultation relating to lower court judges
As regards the appointment of sub-ordinate judges, the constitutional provisions 
are to be found in Articles 114 to 116A. Originally, Article 115 provided that the 
district judges would be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the 
Supreme Court and all other civil judges and magistrates exercising judicial 
functions would be appointed by the President in accordance with the rule made 
by him after consulting the Public Service Commission and the Supreme Court. 
Article 116 declared that the control, including the power of posting, promotion, 
grant of leave, and discipline of the persons employed in the judicial service and 
magistrates exercising judicial functions vested in the Supreme Court.
The Fourth Amendment increased the power of the executive 
considerably. Thus under Article 115, there is no requirement for the President to 
obtain recommendations or consultations. The control under Article 116 is given 
to the President instead of the Supreme Court. Article 116A was inserted 
declaring that all judicial officers shall be independent in the exercise of their 
judicial functions. But it appears to be without any substance in the light of the 
provisions of Articles 115 and 116.
145 MI Farooqui (1996b: 65-68) discussed how the attempts by opposition Members 
of Parliament failed to restore the original constitutional position regarding 
consultation.
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To a certain extent, the situation was improved by the Second
Proclamation Order of 1978.146 It provided that the President must exercise this
power of control under Article 116 'in consultation with the Supreme Court'. This
is only a partial restoration since it is not applicable to appointments. This must
be read with Article 109 which says that the High Court Division shall have
superintendent powers and control over all courts and tribunals subordinate to it.
In spite of the amended provision requiring consultation, this was not
generally followed by the executive. As a result, the lower judiciary became an
extension of the civil service. Mahmudul Islam observes:
Consultation with the Supreme Court cannot bring about any change 
unless a tradition to abide by the opinion of the Supreme Court is 
developed. Furthermore, the control and discipline of the members of 
subordinate courts and magistrates exercising judicial functions is not 
being truly complied with.147
The advent of PIL resulted in a number of challenges by the constitutional 
activists pointing out the failure of the constitutional duty of the executive to seek 
consultation and abide by it. In Sved Mahbub Ali and others v. Ministry of Law 
and others148 a number of sub-ordinate court judges were promoted disregarding 
the recommendations of the Supreme Court. The challenge failed on the ground 
of standing. In Md Idrisur Rahman v. Shahiduddin Ahmed and others149 an 
advocate claimed that the appointment of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
146 No. IV of 1978.
147 Mahmudul Islam (1995: 56).
148 Above note 57.
149 Unreported Writ Petition 1381/94.
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without prior consultation with the Supreme Court violated Articles 115 and 116.
This case was awaiting trial before becoming infractuous.
Some success was achieved in Aftab Uddin (Md) v. Bangladesh150 where
three District judges were promoted as Joint Secretaries in the Ministry of Law.
The government contended that there is no tradition to consult with the Supreme
court in appointing District judges in the Law Ministry. It was argued that Article
116 applies only when a person is promoted or transferred from one judicial post
to another, not when the posts are administrative.151 But the Court observed that
the literal interpretation of Article 116 is in consonance with the spirit and
scheme of the Constitution regarding separation of the judiciary from the
executive.152 As a result, the Article was interpreted liberally and it was said:
So, in our view, Article 116 applies in case of posting and promotion 
of persons in the judicial service to any post or position outside the 
judicial service in the same manner as their posting and promotion to 
any post in the judicial service.153
The Court also emphasised that past instances of promotion without consultation 
cannot cure the unconstitutionality of such acts.
150 48 DLR (1996) 1.
151 Ibid. at 5-6. According to Article 152 of the Constitution, ’judicial service1 means a
service comprising persons holding judicial posts not being posts superior to 
that of a district judge. Thus the post of a secretary in the law ministry is not a 
judicial post.
152 Ibid. at 10-12. The Court refused to follow the Indian case of State of Assam and
another v. Kuseswar Saikia and others AIR 1970 SC 1616, because the 
context, purport and language of Article 116 do not correspond to Article 233 
of the Indian Constitution.
153 Above note 150 at 13.
255
The achievement of Aftab Uddin is limited because it does not deal with 
the appointment of subordinate court judges. In that respect, the judiciary has no 
role at all. Even on questions of posting, promotion etc., there is a long tradition 
of ignoring the recommendations made by the Supreme Court. It is apparent that 
the attempts by the constitutional activists are bound to produce limited success, 
unless the original constitutional provisions are re-instated and the executive is 
more responsive to established constitutional conventions rather than seeking to 
create its own.
5.3.2.3 Re-appointment of retired judges: Whether constitutional posts are 
in the 'service of the Republic'
A very important weapon in the arsenal of the executive is its power to appoint 
retired judges in constitutional posts. There are two types of PIL cases 
challenging such appointments. The first type, discussed here, involves the 
principle that a retired constitutional post-holder is eligible for appointment in 
another constitutional post because such a post is not a 'service of the Republic'. 
The second type, discussed in chapter 5.3.2.4 below, deals with the prohibition of 
Article 99 of the Constitution which restricts the re-appointment of judges.
A constitutional post is one that is created by the Constitution and the 
Constitution itself determines, either directly or indirectly, the mode of 
appointment, conditions of employment and retirement.154 The holders of these
154 Constitutional posts include offices of President, Prime Minister, Minister, State 
Minister, Deputy Minister, Member of Parliament, Speaker and Deputy 
Speaker of Parliament, Judges of the Supreme Court, Chief Election 
Commissioner, Election Commissioner, Chairman and Members of the Public
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posts perform vital constitutional functions which reflect the power relationship 
of the three organs of the government. The spirit of the Constitution and the 
constitutional scheme of separation of powers, already discussed in chapter 5.1, 
dictate that the balance of power should not be in favour of any particular organ. 
Thus the Constitution declares various limitations on the appointment of a retired j
f
constitutional post-holder into another constitutional post.
However, since the separation of powers in the Bangladesh Constitution is 
not rigid, the executive enjoys a considerable amount of freedom to make such 
appointments. In some cases, the constitutional provisions have been amended to 
enhance this power. Thus in practice, appointments made by the government are 
sometimes protested by its opponents. Constitutional and political activists, 
claiming that the principle of separation of powers has been undermined, 
approach the court through PIL and express concern that the balance of power is 
tilting too much in favour of the executive.155
In a number of PIL cases, it was argued that the new office of the 
appointee, although a constitutional post, is a 'service of the Republic' and as such 
the appointment from another constitutional post is invalid. In 1987, the first 
challenge was made by a political activist in Saivid Munirul Huda v. AKM Nurul
Service Commission, Auditor General, Comptroller General and Attorney- 
General for Bangladesh.
155 For expressions of this concern, see Shamsul Hua Chowdhurv v. Justice Md 
Abdur Rouf and others above note 144 at 178 and 181; M Saleem Ullah v. 
Justice Mohammad Abdul Ouddus Chowdhurv above note 62 at 691-692.
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Islam.156 The appointment of a former Chief Election Commissioner as the Vice- 
President was questioned.157 The ground was that, under Article 118(3)(a), a 
person who has held office as Chief Election Commissioner is disqualified for 
appointment as a person in the service of the Republic including the post of the 
Vice-President.
In 1995, a Chief Election Commissioner returned and re-joined as a judge 
of the Appellate Division.158 This was challenged in Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv v. 
Justice Md Abdur Rouf and others159 relying again on Article 118(3)(a). Also 
mentioned was Article 147(3) which prohibits holding of office of profit by 
persons mentioned in Article 147(4) including the Chief Election Commissioner. 
Although not a PIL case, another relevant case is Kazi Abdul Wahab v. 
Bangladesh160 where the question was whether the Deputy Attorney General, 
who is not a constitutional post-holder, is in the service of the Republic.
156 1 BLC (1996) 437. In a comparable case, parliament members in India challanged
the election of President Dr Zakir Hossain on the ground of constitutional 
disability in Baburao Patel v. Dr Zakir Hossain AIR 1968 SC 904.
157 The appointment was made in 1986 by the President under Article 49 of the
Constitution. At that time, the system of government was presidential. After 
the re-introduction of the parliamentary system by the Constitution (Twelfth 
Amendment) Act (No. XXVIII of 1991), there is no vice-presidential post in 
the Constitution at present.
158 Justice Abdur Rouf took oath as a judge in 1984. He was appointed as the Chief
Election Commissioner in 1990. He returned in 1995 and took oath to a new 
office of the judge of the Appellate Division.
159 Above note 144.
160 31 DLR (1979) 332.
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The leading case on the status of the constitutional post holders came in 
1996. In Justice Shahabuddin,161 a former Chief Justice was appointed as the 
President. This was challenged on the ground that this appointment violated 
Article 99(1) which prohibits subsequent appointment of any justice in any office 
in the sendee of the Republic, including the office of the President. The question 
in all these cases was whether constitutional posts, including the offices of the 
President, Vice-President and Supreme Court judges, are to be considered as 
services of the Republic.
It was argued that the constitutional posts are part and parcel of the 
government and the holders of these posts discharge functions towards the 
State.162 So all the functions of these persons including the President may be 
construed as rendering services to the Republic.
This argument is too simplistic. Being created by the Constitution, 
constitutional post holders enjoy a special status for at least two reasons. First, 
they are not to be controlled directly by the Ministers who might exercise undue 
control over persons performing important constitutional functions. Second, these 
posts often combine the functions of more than one governmental department. 
The Prime Minister, for example, is involved with both legislative and executive 
functions. Thus treating constitutional post holders alongside with general 
government officers and civil servants would be unduly restrictive and would 
hinder smooth operation of the Constitution.
161 Above note 26.
162 Ibid. at 490.
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It has been observed accordingly that different constitutional provisions 
apply to persons in the service of the Republic and constitutional post-holders.163 
The definition of 'service of the Republic' given in Article 152(1) must be read 
with Part IX of the Constitution. Articles 133-141 of this part, under the title 'the 
services of Bangladesh', declare the rules and methods of appointment, conditions 
of service and constitutional protection.164 For relief, complaints must be made to 
the administrative tribunal under Article 117.
The appointment, conditions of service and removal of constitutional post 
holders are dealt with separately by various Articles of the Constitution, generally 
in combination with Article 147.16;> For example, Articles 48-54 together with 
Article 147 concern appointment, conditions of service and remuneration of the 
President.166 By providing two distinct types of provisions, the Constitution 
clearly indicates that the constitutional post holders have a special status and are
I6j Saiyid Munirul Huda above note 156 at 437-438, Justice Shahabuddin above note 
103 at 490-491 and Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv above note 159 at 179-180.
164 Article 133 says that the parliament and the President by law and rules regulate 
appointment and conditions of service of the republic. They hold office, says 
Article 134, upon the pleasure of the President. Art 135 grants constitutional 
protection as to dismissal or reducal in rank by appointing authority. Provision 
as to reorganisation is allowed under Article 136. Furthermore, Articles 137- 
141 provide for a Public Service Commission to conduct tests and 
examinations to select persons in the service of the Republic.
16d Article 147(4) includes the President, the Prime Minister or Chief Adviser, the 
Speaker or Deputy Speaker, Minister, Adviser, Minister of State or Deputy 
Minister, Judge of the Supreme Court, Comptroller and Auditor-General, 
Election Commissioner and Member of a public service commission. Vice 
President was omitted by the Twelfth Amendment.
166 Similar matters relating to the Supreme Court judges can be found in Articles 94- 
99 and 147. As regards the Vice-President, the relevant provisions could be 
found in Articles 49 and 51 before the Twelfth Amendment of the 
Constitution.
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neither 'public officers' nor 'persons in the service of the Republic' within the 
meaning of these terms as defined in Article 152(1) of the Constitution.
Persons in the service of the Republic are in the permanent cadre service 
of the government regulated by the Public Service Commission constituted under 
Article 137.167 They hold their office, according to Article 134, during the 
pleasure of the President. Constitutional post holders, on the other hand, hold 
their office for the period fixed by relevant constitutional provisions.168 In fact, it 
appears that the President is the constitutionally controlling authority and makes 
rules and regulations for appointment and removal of persons in the service of the 
Republic. It is unlikely that the makers of the Constitution intended to put the 
elected office of the President on the same footing with the selected government 
officers.
Both in Saivid Munirul Huda and Justice Shahabuddin. the petitioners
relied on Article 66.169 Under clause 2(dd), a person is disqualified to be a
Member of Parliament if he holds any office of profit in the service of the
Republic. Article 66(2A) further says:
For the purposes of this Article a person shall not be deemed to hold an 
office of profit in the service of the republic by reason that he is a 
President, Prime Minister, Ministers, Minister of State or Deputy 
Minister.
167 Justice Shahabuddin above note 103 at 491.
168 For example, the President is elected for a term of five years under Article 50. A
Supreme Court judge, under Article 96, holds office until he attains the age of 
sixty five years. Government officers also serve until they attain the retiring 
age. But while the concerned Ministry can remove a government officer, 
constitutional post-holders can be removed only through the mechanism 
provided by the Constitution.
169 Sved Munirul Huda above note 156 at 438 and Justice Shahabuddin above note
103 at 493-496.
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It follows that since the persons mentioned are excluded for this specific purpose, 
they are persons in the service of the Republic in all other cases. Also, since some 
other constitutional posts are not mentioned, persons holding these posts are in 
the service of the Republic.
There are several counter-arguments. First, clause (2A) is only a proviso 
of Article 66 and was inserted for the limited purpose of election of MPs. It does 
not define the nature of offices of the President or other constitutional post 
holders for other purposes used in the Constitution. In this sense, it must be read 
in a limited way and should not go beyond Art 66. Second, the interpretation of 
this Article historically varied in accordance with the will of the ruling regime.170 
This indicates that the words used in the Article were drafted to serve some 
purpose of the authorities according to the need of the circumstances. Any 
interpretation must take this into account and refrain from using the clause as a 
general rule applicable to the entire Constitution. Third, a general rule of 
constitutional construction is attracted in this case. The exclusion in clause 2A 
does not automatically include the posts mentioned there as those in the service
170 In the Constitution, in its original form of 1972, a similar provision was contained 
in Article 66(3). In 1978, by the Second Proclamation (13th Amendment) 
Order, the Chief Martial Law Administrator was declared a person not in the 
service of the Republic for any purpose whatsoever. This was followed by the 
Second Proclamation (15th Amendment) Order, which provided in clause 2A 
that for the purpose of Article 66, a person shall not be deemed to hold an 
office of profit in the service of the Republic by reason that , he is a Prime 
Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers, Minister of State or Deputy 
Minister. In 1981, the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act added the 
President and Vice President. Subsequently, the Vice President was dropped 
by the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution.
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of the Republic in all other cases. The inclusion must be inferred from other 
provisions and from a reading of the Constitution as a whole.
Another very important factor influenced the Bangladeshi Court to 
differentiate constitutional post-holders from other officers. A similar status has 
been given to these persons in India and Pakistan. Indian cases have generally 
relied on certain tests to determine service of the Government.171 These persons 
must perform their duties for the government and the government must make 
their appointment, have right to removal, pay remuneration and control their 
perfonnance.
Under the Constitution of Pakistan, the definition of'service of Pakistan' is 
similar to Bangladesh with the only exception that certain persons including the 
President, Speaker, Ministers, Supreme Court judges etc. are excluded.172 
Apparently, concludes Md Mozammel Hoque J, constitutional post-holders are 
not in the 'service of the Government' of India or in the 'service of Pakistan'.173 So 
by analogy, constitutional post holders do not come within the purview of the 
definition of'the service of the Republic' in Bangladesh.
The cases analysed demonstrate that the Court relied on the interpretation 
of specific Articles to determine the qualitative difference between constitutional
171 Leading Indian cases include Abdus Shukur v. Rikab Chand AIR 1958 SC 52;
Guru Gobinda Basu v. Sankari Proshad Ghosal AIR 1964 SC 254; Bhaaawati 
Proshad v. Raiib Gandhi AIR 1986 SC 1534 (MPs not in the service of 
Government); Union of India v. Sankalch and Nimatal Shoth and another AIR 
1977 SC 2328 (High Court judges are not government servants).
172 Article 260 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.
173 Justice Shahabuddin above note 103 at 493.
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posts and services of the Republic. The special nature of these posts has been 
emphasised with respect to their constitutional functions. While so doing, the 
judges refused to make any exceptions in cases of appointment of retired persons. 
A strict application of the principle of separation of powers contained in Article 
22 was refused on the ground that it is a non-enforceable Fundamental 
Principle.174 The Court was also influenced by the fact that separation of powers 
is not absolute or rigid in the Bangladesh Constitution.17:5 As a result, the 
appointments in questions were declared valid and the petitioners were 
unsuccessful in their attempts.
S.3.2.4 Re-appointment of retired judges: Prohibition of Article 99
In the cases so far discussed, the crux of the argument was whether a
constitutional post is to be considered as one in the service of the Republic. In
some other cases, however, the argument revolved around the scope and extent of
the prohibition, declared in Article 99 of the Constitution, regarding subsequent
appointment of retired judges.
Article 99 originally provided that a person who has held office as a judge,
after his retirement or removal, can not be appointed as a person in the service of
the Republic. Back in 1989, it was observed in the 8th Amendment case:
The purpose of the prohibition was to keep a Judge independent all 
through his service as a Judge. Opening up of opportunities for
174 Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv above note 144 at 180.
175 See above chapter 5.1.
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appointment after retirement may serve as a temptation and tamper
with his independence during the concluding period of his service.176
Subsequently, however, the Article has been amended and the restriction partially 
withdrawn. Now an appointment in a judicial or quasi-judicial office is 
allowed.177
Appointment of Supreme Court judges injudicial or quasi-judicial posts is 
thought to be a necessity for the administration of justice. In fact, creation of 
Courts and Tribunals outside the general hierarchy of the superior courts is an 
established practice of modem governments. Bangladeshi judges, after 
retirement, function as chairmen of Labour Appellate Tribunal, Administrative 
Tribunal, Court of Settlement and so on.
However, enabling the retired or removed judges to be appointed in 
judicial or quasi-judicial posts has actually increased the power of the appointing 
authorities in Bangladesh. The first problem is that although Article 99(1) allows 
these appointments, it does not declare any procedure of appointment, terms or 
conditions of office or security of service. To put it briefly, there is no specific 
constitutional protection for the judges. In the absence of specific provisions, the
176 Above note 1 at 151. For similar observations, see Abdul Bari Sarker v.
Bangladesh 46 DLR (AD) (1994) 37 at 38.
177 Martial Law Proclamation Order 12/12/75. Article 99 says:
(1) Except as provided in clause (2), a person who has held office as a Judge
otherwise than as an Additional Judge shall not, after his retirement or 
removal therefrom, plead or act before any court or authority or hold any 
office of profit in the service of the Republic not being a judicial or quasi- 
judicial office.
(2) A person who has held office as a Judge of the High Court Division may, after his
retirement or removal therefrom, plead or act before the Appellate Division.
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Court could in theory resort to general principles including the principles of 
natural justice.
The second problem comes here - the appointments are made under 
contracts of employment. The government relies on section 5(3) of the Public 
Servants Retirement Act178 which says that the President may employ a public 
servant on contract after his retirement. As a result, neither the principles of 
natural justice, nor any statutory provisions can be invoked to ensure relief or 
security of the service of the employee. Employment contracts tend to be unequal 
in favour of the executive. The Supreme Court has observed that section 5(3) 
does not apply in the case of retired judges because they are not public servants 
or persons in the service of the Republic.179 But instead of rendering the 
employment contracts invalid, this only makes them independent of any statutory 
provisions in relation to their formation.
Thus in Abdul Bari Sarker.180 it was apparently established that the 
removal of Justice Abdul Bari from the post of the Chairman of the Court of 
Settlement was the result of his independent stance against the executive.181 But
178 Act XII of 1974.
179 Abdul Bari Sarker v. Bangladesh above note 176 at 39.
180 Ibid. at 38.
181 The High Court Division, in Unreported Writ Petition 95/1993, found that the
government's order cancelling the petitioner's appointment was mala fide. The 
petitioner had annoyed the government by deciding unfavourably in 136 out of 
217 cases. He even issued a contempt proceeding against the Secretary of the 
concerned Ministry for non-compliance with the order of the Court. The 
government's annoyance was reported in national dailies before the 
cancellation of the appointment.
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since his termination did not violate the contract of employment, the action of the 
government could not be challenged.
This problem is even worse than it first appears because the appointment 
of a retired judge is made solely by the executive. There is no provision 
whatsoever that requires any sort of permission, advice or approval from the 
Supreme Court. So the government, autocratic or democratic, has the freedom to 
pick the retired judge of its choice.
Another aspect of Article 99(1) is that it applies only after a judge of the 
Supreme Court ceases to hold office. Thus the Court refused to apply the Article 
in Justice Quddus Chowdhurv182 because the respondent was a sitting judge of 
the High Court Division. But this situation raises the question whether it is 
possible for a person to hold two posts simultaneously.183
The petitioners in Saleem Ullah v. Md Abdur Rouf and others184 and 
Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv185 claimed that a judge can not at the same time hold 
the office of the Chief Election Commissioner. In these cases, Justice Abdur Rouf 
did not draw a salary from both offices but had a lien to return. Apparently, he 
was given a lien because he might otherwise be unwilling to hold the office of the
182 Above note 62 at 692.
183 Justice Mohammad Abdul Quddus Chowdhury was serving as a joint Secretary in
the Law and Parliamentary Affairs Division of the Ministry of Law and Land 
Refonns. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of the High Court Divion 
in 17/1/83. Immediately after this appointment, in 1/3/83, he was appointed as 
Secretary in the same Division of the same Ministry. From an Additional 
Judge, he was appointed a Judge of the High Court Division on 2/8/84. 
Apparently, he was holding two posts simultaneously.
184 Unreported Writ Petition 1087/94 and 48 DLR (1996) 144.
183 Above note 159.
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Chief Election Commissioner, a contractual service providing lesser retirement 
benefit and protection. The challenges in the two cases were not answered. 
Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv was decided on other grounds and Saleem Ullah v. Md 
Abdur Rouf and others became infractuous before a judgement could be 
pronounced.
Determination of quasi-judicial posts as distinct from administrative posts 
is another controversial issue. In fact, appointment in administrative posts is 
barred not only by Article 99(1), but also by Article 147(3). The latter says that 
certain constitutional post-holders, listed in Article 147(4), shall not hold any 
office, post or position of profit or emolument or take any part whatsoever in the 
management or conduct of any company, association or body having profit or 
gain as its object.
The general principle that appointments in administrative posts are invalid 
has been recognised in Quddus Chowdhurv.186 The same grounds were taken by 
the petitioner in M Saleem Ullah v. Justice AKM Sadeque.187 It was claimed that 
the office of the Chief Election Commissioner is neither judicial nor quasi­
judicial and the appointment of Justice AKM Sadeque as the Chief Election 
Commissioner violated Article 99(1). Before the question could be answered, the 
case became infractuous. But the claim does not appear to be sustainable. The
186 Above note 62 at 692-693.
187 Unreported Writ Petition 1010/95.
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power of the Chief Election Commissioner to decide election disputes under
various provisions of law and the Constitution is quasi-judicial in nature.188
It may be concluded that the provisions of Article 99 continue to favour
the executive. Repeated attempts by the constitutional and political activists to
challenge this have failed to bring any substantial change. The Court has neither
declared it anti-constitutional nor been able to restrict its scope effectively.
Making statutory provisions to ensure security of office is perhaps the most
obvious and easy solution. But it was observed in Abdul Bari Sarker that:
If it is not thought to be expedient to make any statutory provision in 
the case of such appointment, it is better that the original Article 99 be 
restored putting total ban on appointment of a retired Judge to any
189public office whatsoever.
Another recommendation has been made in the 8th Amendment case. 
Shahabuddin Ahmed J said:
If this provision for appointment after retirement is retained, its bad 
effect may be countered if a reasonable period, say two years, elapses 
from the date of a Judge's retirement to the date of his fresh 
appointment to any purely judicial office.190
So far, there is no indication that these recommendations are being considered by 
the law-makers.
It may be observed that in general, the attempts to question the validity of 
appointments of retired judges and constitutional post holders in other 
constitutional posts have failed. The result has been encouraging in one respect.
188 For example: see Article 66(4) of the Constitution and section 5 of the Members
of Parliament (Determination of Dispute) Act (No. 1 of 1980) and Article 
14(5) of the Representation of the People Order (PO No. 155 of 1972).
189 Above note at 39.
190 Above note 176 at 151.
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Petitioners with hidden political agenda actually failed to manipulate the Court 
and the appointments made by the elected government were not rendered invalid. 
Also, there is little doubt that when judges secure high constitutional posts, 
including that of the President and the Vice-President, it increases their profile 
and indirectly increases the prestige of the judiciary. They are seen as competent 
neutral persons performing important functions.
However, the situation remains unsatisfactory for several reasons. As the 
law now stands, judges or Chief Election Commissioners about to retire might 
find it tempting to appease the government in order to secure a post-retirement 
job. This is violative of the dignity and independence of the judiciary and re­
enforces the executive's privileged position. There is also a danger that when the 
judges accept post-retirement jobs, they indirectly give legitimacy to an otherwise 
autocratic or unpopular regime. Finally, the number of cases discussed above 
clearly indicates that post-retirement appointments in constitutional offices 
indirectly make the judges controversial figures and thus politicise the judiciary.
5.3.3 Judiciary doing the work of the executive: Certain aspects of 
implementation of PIL decisions
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh acknowledges the established constitutional 
principle that the court can not intervene in administrative functions or direct the 
executive to implement its policy.191 But due to the very nature of PIL, when
191 For recent leading cases re-iterating this principle, see Yunus Mia fMdl and others 
v. The Secretary. Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development 45 DLR 
(1993) 98 (allocation of plots to displaced persons) and Abul Hashim (Md) v.
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frustrated by the indifference of the executive to perform its functions, the 
petitioners ask the same from the judiciary. So far, we have two cases where the 
judiciary in Bangladesh has ventured beyond the traditional methods and has 
declared specific implementation procedures.
In the suo moto case of State v. Deputy Commissioner. Satkhira and 
others.192 a person detained unlawfully for twelve years was freed and the cases 
against him were declared illegal and void. The Court also directed the Secretary 
of the Ministry of Home Affairs to appoint a senior officer to inquire into the 
matter. The purpose was to ascertain the involvement of the Zila Parishad 
Chairman and relevant police officers so that appropriate legal steps could be 
taken against these persons in proportion to their carelessness, negligence and 
malice.
The Court gave some other directions as well.193 A copy of the judgement 
was ordered to be sent to the Prime Minister to inform her of the situation. 
Another copy went to the Secretary of the Ministry of Law and Justice. He was 
directed to inform all the subordinate court judges so that there can not be a 
similar type of miscarriage of justice.
The Court further ordered the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs to 
direct the Inspector General of Prisons to inquire and ascertain as to whether any 
other accused or person has been suffering in the same way in any other jail in
Election Commission of Bangladesh 48 DLR (1996) 490 (delimitation of 
constituency according to statutory law).
192 45 DLR (1993) 643.
193 Ibid. at 650-651.
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Bangladesh. If such persons are found, the Court ordered the Ministry to take 
appropriate legal steps. Finally, the Secretaries of the Ministry of Home and the 
Ministry of Justice were directed to submit reports within three months. They 
were told to report the steps that had been taken in pursuance of the Court's 
directions and the progress upon their action. The Registrar of the Court, upon 
receiving the reports, was directed to submit them before the Court.
The directions of the Court clearly intended to construct a mechanism to 
monitor the prisons with regard to innocent detainees. This is nothing new in the 
exercise of judicial power in PIL in the sub-continent. Yet, apart from the fact 
that this is the first and only case in Bangladesh, there are certain other elements 
to note. The government officers helped the Court to reach the decision, there 
was no obstruction.194 Even after the judgement, there was no complaint or 
dissatisfaction on the part of the executive. Apparently, the executive did not feel 
threatened by this exceptional solitary case. The Court monitored the matter for 
some time, but did not actually set up any permanent mechanism. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that there has been no similar subsequent case.
Recently in Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh, represented by the 
Secretary. Ministry of Commerce195 the Court ordered the government to contest 
a civil suit. The issue in question in the civil suit was whether radio active milk 
should be sent back from Bangladesh to the exporting country. A problem arose 
as to the method of testing radioactivity by the Atomic Energy Commission under
194 Id. The Court observed this co-operation with satisfaction.
195 48 DLR (1996) 438.
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the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Act 1993196 and the Import Policy 
Order 1993-1995. There was no specific rule as to the number of samples to be 
taken for testing, as to the name of the laboratory where test would be conducted 
or as to whether re-testing is allowed. Confusion arose because the officers of one 
laboratory tested the milk as radioactive, the officers of another laboratory re­
tested it as safe.
The Court directed to collect one sample per container and test the 
samples in the Radiation Test Laboratory of Chittagong. It was declared that 
there should be no re-testing and no sample should be sent directly to the Head 
Office at Dhaka unless sent by the Chittagong branch. The Court directed these 
methods to be followed till new rules or regulations are framed by the 
government under the Act of 1993. If this amounts to judicial law making or 
assumption of responsibility originally belonging to the executive, there is little 
that is revolutionary. In fact, this type of directions are sometimes given in non- 
P1L matters.
The two cases discussed above illustrate the current situation relating to 
the new techniques of implementation of PIL decisions and the expansion of 
judicial authority in this regard. First, there is no encroachment by the judiciary 
in the domain of the executive in any real sense. Especially, the orders of the 
judges in these cases are temporary in nature and no attempt has been made to 
play the role of the executive. Second, there has been, so far, no direct 
confrontation with the executive. One reason is that the number of cases is too
196 Act XXI of 1993.
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small to make the executive feel threatened. Another reason is that these cases 
deal with concerns of the unlawfully detained persons and consumers rather than 
challenging any power or privilege of the government. Third, lack of relevant 
cases demonstrate that there has been very little development in the introduction 
of new implementation techniques of PIL. This indicates that the activists as well 
as the judges in Bangladesh are rather conservative in this respect compared to 
their Indian and Pakistani counterparts.
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Chapter 6: Concluding analysis
In this thesis, we have examined and analysed the development of PIL in 
Bangladesh from a constitutional perspective. The process of recognition of PIL 
as an integrated feature of the Bangladeshi law has been analysed in order to 
explore who has been using the techniques of PIL, for what purposes, the extent 
of their success and who has actually been benefited. The main thesis of our
discussion has been that the techniques of PIL have been taken over by the elite
\
to further their own agenda. As a result, the emphasis in Bangladeshi PIL to date 
has been mainly on the participation of a privileged few in the power-relations 
debate rather than socio-economic justice for the poor and the deprived.
In chapter 2, certain relevant conceptual issues and the constitutional basis 
of PIL were analysed. We traced the background of PIL in the USA and other 
western jurisdictions by outlining the developments of relevant ideas, theories 
and concepts relating to PIL.1 In modem societies, traditional litigation often fails 
to ensure relief where diffuse or community rights of the citizens are involved. 
PIL is generally seen as an attempt to represent the unrepresented so that the 
rights of all citizens may be ensured.
In the sub-continent, PIL has been the result of social activism on the part 
of a dedicated band of volunteers, lawyers and especially judges. In fact, in India,
1 See above chapter 2.1.
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it has been observed, PIL is to some extent judge-led and judge-induced.2 Some 
Indian judges were genuinely concerned about the problems of governmental 
lawlessness, social and economic deprivation and the failure of the traditional 
legal procedure to provide adequate relief. They resorted to social, activism and 
validated their arguments through creative interpretation of the Constitution. 
Especially the status of the non-justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy 
was emphasised in favour of social justice. A considerable number of PIL cases 
in India, from the very beginning, dealt with genuine social problems and 
involved problems of bonded labourers, pavement-dwellers and unlawfully 
detained helpless individuals.3 Once recognition was given, encouragement and 
invitation by the judges resulted in a great number of PIL petitions.
The Pakistani situation resembles the Indian one, where a strong sense of 
social consciousness fuelled judicial activism.4 However, the most important 
distinguishing feature of the Pakistani PIL is its emphasis on Islam. The main 
reason is that PIL developed in the middle of the process of Islamisation of the 
laws. While drawing the validity of PIL from the constitutional provisions, which 
conveys the Islamic character of the Constitution, it was declared that PIL is not
2 See above chapter 2.2. For discussion on the respective contributions of different
activist judges, see Baxi (1985a: 291) and Ahuja (1996: 277- 284).
3 Early examples of such cases include: Husssainara Khatoon and others v. Home
Secretary. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 (detention); Sunil Batra (III v. 
Delhi Administration AIR 1980 SC 1579 (detention); Ratlam Municipality v. 
Vardhi Chand AIR 1980 SC 1622 (contaminated water supply); Bandhua 
Mukti Morcha v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802 (bonded labour) and Olga 
Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180 (pavement- 
dwellers). Ahuja (1997) provides a comprehensive list of Indian cases.
4 See above chapter 2.3.
only compatible with the Islamic provisions, but such provisions mandate a PIL 
approach.3 As' in India, the judges practically invited PIL and the courts soon 
received a huge number of PIL petitions.6 Many of these initial cases related to 
socio-economic issues including problems of bonded labourers, police excesses 
and unlawfully detained individuals.7
In Bangladesh, the socio-economic situation is very much similar to India 
or Pakistan. But the provisions of the Constitution as well as the constitutional 
developments are distinct enough for the Bangladeshi judges to have proceeded 
in a somewhat different direction. Our analysis illustrated that the Constitution of 
Bangladesh contains social and economic justice provisions comparable to 
similar provisions in the Indian and Pakistani constitutions.8
However, the social justice bias in the Constitution of Bangladesh is less 
pronounced than it is in India.9 Also, while PIL was being advanced, the social 
justice bias in the Indian Constitution was on the increase; in Bangladesh, as a 
result of a number of constitutional amendments, such bias is on the decline. As
3 See Khan (1993: 48-53) for an analysis of the assertion that Islamic principles have
played a most important role in the development of PIL in Pakistan.
6 In the Quetta Conference (1991: 126-152), a formal declaration by the judges
invited PIL cases as they constructed a procedural framework for receiving 
and deciding PIL petitions.
7 See Khan (1993: 60-91) for a discussion on the initial PIL cases. Examples of such
cases include: Darshan Masih alias Rehmatav and others v. The State PLD 
1990 SC 513 (bonded labourer); Shahnaz Begum PLD 1971 SC 677 
(detention) and The State v. SSP PLD 1991 Lah 224 (suo moto investigation 
by the Court into oil stove blasts).
8 See above chapter 2.4.1.
9 See above chapter 2.4.3.
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regards the Islamic provisions in the Bangladeshi Constitution, it must be noted 
that there is no Islamisation of laws in the Pakistani style.10 The Constitution 
started as a secular one and was later amended to contain certain Islamic 
provisions. But these changes represent a compromise between the ideas of 
fundamentalist Islam and pure secularism rather than a commitment to any 
particular ideology.
The result has been an assertion by the Bangladeshi lawyers and judges 
that, with respect to the Constitution, the Bangladeshi situation is unique and 
distinct from Indian or Pakistani circumstances.11 This uniqueness, reflecting the 
spirit and objectives of the Constitution, is to be gathered from the entire 
document, especially from the Preamble, Article 7 (supremacy of the 
Constitution), Part II (Fundamental Principles) and Part III (Fundamental Rights). 
Accordingly, the basis of legitimacy of a PIL approach will depend on the 
compatibility of PIL with the constitutional spirit.
In some cases, this constitutional spirit has been interpreted in favour of 
mandating a social justice approach. Thus in Welfare Association12 and in the 
judgement of Latifur Rahman J in FAP 20.13 the demand of the Constitution to 
ensure socio-economic justice is seen as the basis that inspires and validates PIL.
10 See above chapter 2.4.4.
11 See above chapters 2.4.5 and 2.4.6.
12 Bangladesh Retired Government Employees Welfare Association v. Bangladesh
(Welfare Association) 46 DLR (1994) 426 at 435.
13 Dr Mohiuddin Farooaue v. Bangladesh (FAP 20117 BLD (AD) (1997) 1 at 24.
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BB Roy Choudhury J also argues in this line in FAP 20.14 This social justice 
approach is very akin to the Indian or Pakistani approach and, in the light of the 
constitutional provisions, is a sufficiently strong argument for judicial activism.
However, we argue that while interpreting the spirit of the Constitution, 
the primary focus is often on the notions of constitutional autochthony and 
people's power rather than on social justice. This line of thinking has been 
developed over the years by a number of lawyers, activists and judges and 
ultimately gained its final expression in the recent judgement of Mustafa Kamal J 
in FAP 2Q.15 Apart from the fact that continuous reliance has been placed on this 
theme by the Bangladeshi judges and lawyers, its importance has been enhanced 
because Mustafa Kamal J’s judgement supporting this notion is the leading 
judgement of FAP 20.
Accordingly, it is emphasised that the Constitution of Bangladesh is 
autochthonous in nature and is distinct in this respect from Indian or Pakistani 
constitutions. It is not only a product of a 'historic war for national 
independence',16 its provisions clearly emphasise the supreme place of the people 
in the constitutional arrangement. Thus, it is the power of the people that looms
14 Ibid at 25-26 and 31.
15 Ibid. at 16-19. For earlier developments of the theme, see for example Anwar
Hossain Chowdhurv v. Bangladesh (8th Amendment case) 1989 BLD (Spl) 1 
at 59; Anwar Hossain Khan v. Speaker of Bangladesh Sangsad Bhavar. :.~A 
others (Parliament Boycott) 47 DLR (1995) 42 at 45-46 and Mohiuddin 
Farooquc (1994-1995: 1).
16 See the Preamble of the Constitution of Bangladesh 1972.
279
large behind the constitutional horizon and consequently, the interest of the 
people must take precedence over any individual or special interests.17
The themes of autochthony and people's power distinguish the 
Bangladeshi interpretation from the other sub-continental countries. There is a 
continuous assertion by the Bangladeshi lawyers and judges as to this 
uniqueness.18 It is a matter of pride for the Bangladeshis that the country, and the 
Constitution, were achieved through a war of liberation involving the general 
people. Constitutional recognition of the supreme place of the people thus is not 
merely an ideological declaration, but has its roots in the political and 
constitutional history of the country as well as in the national psyche. The 
importance and profound impact of the 1971 liberation movement on the 
Bangladeshi people can not be overestimated. Bangladesh is still a young nation, 
surrounded by big and strong neighbours, in the process of building a sense of 
national identity. Consequently, the gradual structuring of a national 
jurisprudence is bound to play a leading part in any new legal development.
However, the fact remains that the main focus is on the power of the 
people, mainly implying the participation of the people in the modalities of 
power-sharing. Emphasis is not on social or economic justice for the poor and the 
deprived. To some extent, it may be argued, the people's power approach by 
Mustafa Kamal J is a clever manoeuvre by a traditionally-oriented judge to avoid 
pronouncing too strongly on the themes of social justice. Latifur Rahman J's
17 Above note 13 at 18.
18 id. See also Mohiuddin Farooque (1994-1995: 1).
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social justice approach appears to have been outshone by the more nationalistic 
themes of autochthony and people's power.
In chapter 3, our analysis included the development of the cases, issues 
and activities relating to PIL in Bangladesh over the years. The discussion 
demonstrated that one of the main reasons of the delay of the development of PIL 
was due to the absence of democracy and constitutionalism during the long 
periods of martial laws. While the Constitution was either suspended or partially 
operative, the environment was not conducive for creative constitutional 
interpretations. The situation began to improve after the fall of the last autocratic 
regime of General Ershad in 1990.
However, the constitutional developments that followed were not only 
major and substantial in nature, they were accompanied by serious political 
developments.19 This situation influenced the lawyers and the judges and they 
were, to some extent, pre-occupied with the transition to democracy. Political 
activists grabbed this opportunity and co-opted the techniques of PIL to claim 
their own share in the political power struggle. Almost every constitutional 
development, our discussion demonstrates, was accompanied by litigation 
brought in the name of the people.
19 There are three major recent constitutional amendments. The Constitution 
(Eleventh Amendment) Act (No. XXIV of 1991) ratified the actions of the 
caretaker government that followed General Ershad; The Constitution 
(Twelfth Amendment) Act (No. XXVIII of 1991) re-introduced the 
parliamentary system of government and The Constitution (Thirteenth 
Amendment) Act (No. 1 of 1996) provides for a system of interim 
governments during the times of parliamentary elections.
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An examination of the types of cases brought as PIL confirms the claim 
that socio-economic issues were outnumbered by elitist causes.20 Of the cases 
that have been discussed in chapter 3, a surprisingly large number are political in 
nature - 27 out of a sample of 47. These cases were brought either with political 
motives or the issues in question were politically controversial at the time of trial. 
Including M Saleem Ullah's relentless attempts, there are 13 cases where the 
government was opposed by its political opponents from appointing its chosen 
people in various constitutional posts.21 In contrast, merely five consumer and six 
environmental cases can be found in the lis t22 Less than five cases relate to the 
poor and helpless situation of the downtrodden and suppressed.23 Only one 
habeas corpus case broke new ground of PIL and this was not followed by any
20 In practice, many public interest applications are pending trial or have become
infractuous. One reason is the delay caused by the overwhelming number of 
cases competing for the Court's attention. But generally this is due to 
negotiated settlements, necessary steps taken by the government or reluctance 
of a judge to deal with a controversial issue. The result is the failure to get a 
favourable pronouncement on PEL in an otherwise good case. It was said in 
Ghvas Siddique v. Bangladesh 43 DLR (1991) 179 that the Courts are and 
should be reluctant to decide constitutional points merely as matters of 
academic importance.
21 For an analysis of these cases, see above chapter 5.3.2.
22 Leading consumer cases include Sved Borhan Kabir v. Bangladesh and others
(Paracetamol) unreported Writ Petition 701/1993 and Dr Mohiuddin Farooque 
v. Bangladesh represented bv Secretary Ministry of Commerce and others 
(Danish Milk) 48 DLR (1996) 438. The leading case on environment is FAP 
20 above note 13.
23 The most important of these cases are Rokeva Khatun v. Sub-Divisional Engineer
and other (Slum-Dwellers) unreported Writ Petition 1789/1993 and Issa 
Nibras Farooque and others v. Bangladesh represented bv Secretary. Foreign 
Affairs and other (Child Trafficking) unreported Writ Petition 278/1996.
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other cases.24 This clearly indicates the extent to which the movement of PIL was 
dominated by the elite.
For further elaboration, we may consider who has actually brought these 
PIL cases. In a number of instances, petitions were filed by individuals not 
claiming to represent any particular organisation or association.25 These efforts 
were generally random in the sense that they did not systematically pursue further 
PIL cases subsequently. Lawyers filing petitions of this type include Ahmed 
Hossain in Women MPs.26 Shamsul Huq in Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv.27 Anwar 
Hossain in Parliament Boycott28 and Kafiluddin in Charmonai Pir.29 Among non­
lawyers, SB Kabir, a journalist in Paracetamol30 and MA Ripon, a politician in 
Md Assaduzzaman Ripon31 also fall in this category. Except for the Paracetamol 
case, all the other cases relate to issues that were politically significant and
24 State v. Deputy Commissioner. Satkhira and others (Nazrul Islam) 45 DLR (1993) 
643.
23 Generally these petitioners did not act for any financial gain. Almost without 
exception, the activists, young lawyers or organisations filed PIL petitions and 
approached the senior and established members of the bar for help. The list of 
senior lawyers involved includes a number of top ranking high-eamers of the 
Bar: Ashrar Hosain, Ishtiaq Ahmed, Kamal Hossain, Khondokar
Mahbubuddin, MI Farooque, Amir-ul Islam and others. Sometimes affiliation 
with one or more voluntary sector organisations led the senior lawyers to 
represent a petitioner. Amir-ul Islam, for example, fought a number of cases 
filed by Bangladesh Mohila Parishad, a leading NGO.
26 Dr Ahmed Hussain v. Bangladesh and others 44 DLR (AD) (1992) 109.
27 Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv v. Justice Md Abdur Rouf 49 DLR (1997) 176.
28 Above note 15.
29 Md Kafiluddin v. Maulana Sved Fazlul Karim and another (1994) unreported
Dhaka CMM Court, Petition Case No. 1998/1994.
30 Above note 22.
31 Md Asaduzzaman Ripon v. The State (1996) unreported Writ Petition 1635/1996.
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disputed at the time.
More than half of the cases discussed in chapter 3 were brought by various 
associations and organisations. The first type of organisations includes those that 
are formed for the benefit of a particular group or community. Bangladesh 
Retired Government Employees Welfare Association in the Welfare Association 
case and the Bangladesh Newspaper Owners Association in Sangbadpatra32 fall 
into this category. In both these cases, PIL was used to safeguard the interest of 
the members, middle-class ex-officers and opulent business magnets. In contrast, 
a number of organisations formed to benefit the lawyers' community claimed to 
advocate public causes through PIL. The Young Lawyers Forum, Committee for 
the Protection of Lawyers Rights and Bangladesh Legal Rights Trust brought 
consumer cases.33 But the public interest elements of these cases were not very 
strong. Also, since advancement of PIL does not fall within the main objects and 
purposes of these organisations, PIL was not pursued by them seriously or in any 
subsequent cases.
The second type of associations includes political and pressure groups that 
aim to promote their own socio-economic or political agenda in the national life. 
They used PIL frequently and sometimes quite effectively. ADCAB (Association 
for Democratic and Constitutional Advancement of Bangladesh), represented by
32 Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad (BSP) v. The Government of Bangladesh
(Sangbadpatra) 12 BLD (AD) (1992) 153.
33 These include KM Zabir v. Amanullah and ethers unreported CMM Court, Dhaka
Case No. 1097A1/1988 and Bangladesh Ain Odhikar Trust v. Tabani 
Beverage & others. (Tabani Beverage) (Civil) 2nd Assistant Judge Court, 
Dhaka, TS 324/1993.
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M Saleem Ullah, focused solely on constitutional activism. M Saleem Ullah 
began to approach the Court in 1989 and has fought eight constitutional cases 
since.34 Muslim Millat Party, an obscure political party, was represented by AB 
Siddiqui who has brought two writs in 1995-96.35 Similarly, Bishwa Islam 
Mission, a religious organisation, was represented by ABM Nurul Islam who has 
brought three cases since 1993.36 All of these persons are lawyers and, directly or 
indirectly, political activists.
In the third category are voluntary sector organisations whose object is to 
promote social and economic justice. Avesha Khanam37 was advocated by a 
leading women's rights organisation, Bangladesh Mohila Parishad, Also in this 
category is BELA, Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association, which is in a 
unique position. Until recently, it was led by the energetic Dr Mohiuddin 
Farooque.38 BELA is not only well-organised, it has better resources through 
international funding. The first NGO to seriously take test litigation as a method 
to achieve its aim, it researched these case thoroughly and pursued them
34 Most of these cases related to re-appointment of retired judges. See above chapter 
5.3.2.
•> r
Abu Bakar Siddique v. Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed and others (Justice 
Shahabuddinl 1 BLC (1996) 483; 17 BLD (1997) 31 and Abu Bakar Siddique 
v. Sheikh Hasina and others fHartal) unreported Writ Petition 2057/1995.
36 Important among these are ABM Nurul Islam v. Government of Bangladesh
(Kadianil unreported Writ Petition 298/1993 and Md Aminul Gani Titu v. 
Election Commission (Voters' Registration Forml unreported Writ Petition 
1154/1995.
37 Avesha Khanam and others v. Major Sabbir Ahmed and others 46 DLR (19941399.
38 The sudden demise of Dr Farooque in December 1997 has been a serious setback
for the PIL movement in Bangladesh.
relentlessly.
BELA has filed more than ten PIL cases. Most of the cases fought by 
BELA involves the environment, consumerism and the rights of the deprived and 
poor. Its successes include Doctor's Strike.39 Danish Milk4p and FAP 20. This 
may be contrasted with the efforts of Mr Saleem Ullah who confined himself to 
political issues and judicial structure. BELA is also instrumental in the 
propagation of the idea and concept of PIL through continued publicity, 
especially within the lawyers' community. Among the activists, Dr Farooque 
played the leading role and if a single organisation is to be identified for the 
success of PIL in Bangladesh, it is BELA.
Our analysis demonstrates that, from the very beginning, the movement of 
PIL has been dominated by lawyers and political activists. Unlike India, there is 
no example of telegrams or letters by the poor even though there is no legal 
obstacle. Only in one or two instances have the socially minded individuals come 
before the court. The attempts by BELA have been the most successful. But even 
this is a lawyers' organisation and could not resist the temptation to fight cases 
relating to political issues 41 Interestingly, legal aid organisations, including the 
leading legal aid NGO Madaripur Legal Aid Association, did not file any PIL
39 Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh represented bv Secretary Ministry of Health
and Family Welfare & Others (Doctor's Strike! unreported Writ Petition 
1783/1994.
40 Above note 22.
41 See Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association v. Election Commission &
Others (Election Environment) 46 DLR (1994) 235 and Dr Mohiuddin 
Farooque v. Bangladesh represented bv Secretary Ministry of Law. Justice and 
Parliamentary Affairs (Appointment of Judges! (1996) 48 DLR 433.
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case. Neither did the scores of voluntary sector organisations. It is interesting to 
note that the even though there is no example of foreign organisations attempting 
to use PIL for their purposes, the Court is already very cautious in this respect. 
Mustafa Kamal J has cautioned that petitioners serving foreign interests or local 
components of foreign organisations will not be granted public interest 
standing.42 Apparently, this stance threatens to prevent foreign-funded human 
rights organisations to petition the court. But the success of BELA, which is to a 
great extent foreign-funded, indicates that the judges are concerned with the 
merits of the case and the intention of the petitioner and not the source of 
funding.
Our analysis illustrates that the Bangladeshi developments of PIL have not 
been facilitated by any grass-root movement for social justice. These facts verily 
the argument of this thesis that the movement of PIL has been initiated and 
controlled by the privileged, especially constitutional and political activist 
lawyers.
The role played by the Bangladeshi judges may also be explored from the 
discussion produced in chapter 3. In January 1997, the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh comprised of only 42 Justices for a country of 120 million people.43 
Only two writ benches operate at any given time.44 This means that the
42 See FAP 20 above note 13 at 19.
43 There are five Justices in the Appellate Division, the rest are in the High Court
Division.
44 A writ bench consists of two justices. But generally, it is the senior member who
determines the character of the bench. The Chief Justice may constitute 
special benches where a case so demands.
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constitutional activists have very limited scope for 'judge shopping’.
In the High Court Division, since 1991, more or less ten justices have 
dealt with PIL cases.45 Abdul Jalil J, from 1991 to 1993, refused standing in Sved 
Mahbub Ali46 but allowed the petition in Kadiani.47 Ismailuddin. Sarkar dealt 
with seven PIL cases in 1994 out of which four cases remain undecided. While 
he refused standing in FAP 20, it was granted in Election Environment.48 
Mahmudur Rahman J, from 1994 to 1996, dealt with six PIL cases. Apart from 
the three pending cases, he refused standing in MPs Resignation49 and 
Appointment of Judges50 but allowed it in Haiti Troops.51 Kazi Ebadul Hoque 
refused standing in MPs Resignation but granted it in Danish Milk. Habibur 
Rahman Khan J refused the petitioner in Voters' Registration Form52 but has 
recently granted standing in Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv. Apparently, these judges 
decided in a conservative way and found it difficult to pronounce favourably on 
PIL. But numerous exceptions show that they were responding to the changing 
circumstances. Whenever the locus standi of the petitioner was not seriously
43 This number includes the judges who gave rulings or delivered judgements and
excludes their silent counterparts.
46 Sved Mahbub Ali and others v. Bangladesh unreported Writ Petition 4036/1992;
Later (1993) unreported Appeal Petition 317/1993.
47 Above note 36.
48 Above note 41.
49 Raufique (Md) Hossain v. Speaker. Bangladesh Parliament and others (MPs
Resignation! 47 DLR (1995) 361; 15 BLD (1995) 383.
30 Above note 41.
51 M Saleem Ullah v. Bangladesh 47 DLR (1995) 218.
52 Above note 36.
contested, as in Election Environment, Haiti Troops or Kadiani. they granted 
standing.
In the High Court Division, significant victory for PIL came from a 
number of different judges. Anwarul Hoque J in Avesha Khanam. Naimuddin 
Ahmed J in Welfare Association and Quazi Shafiuddin J in Parliament Boycott 
boldly advanced the cause of PIL. But these were the only PIL cases that came 
before them. An exception is MM Hoque J, who had the opportunity to deliver a 
series of favourable judgements. He suo moto decided Nazrul Islam33 and set 
another significant precedent in Doctor's strike. Although Hartal54 was rejected 
due to its political overtone, standing has recently been granted in Justice 
Shahabuddin.^ 5 Child Trafficking56 and Ziaur Rahman Khan.57 MM Hoque J is 
liberal in his interpretation of PIL, but his presence on the writ bench has not 
been continuous. It is not difficult for the activists to identify a liberal judge but 
unless such a judge is actually presiding over a writ bench, that knowledge is of 
little use.
In the Appellate Division, a considerable number of appeals are pending 
trial or have become infractuous. Judgements were given only in three cases. In 
1992, MH Rahman J refused the petition in Women MPs but standing was not 
discussed. Sangbadpatra is the only example where Mustafa Kamal J of the
33 Above note 24.
34 Above note 35.
^  Above note 35.
56 Above note 23.
57 Ziaur Rahman Khan v. Government of Bangladesh 49 DLR f 1997J 491.
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Appellate Division refused standing. This was clearly not a PIL case. But the 
negative impact of the confusion created by Mustafa Kamal J's judgement 
persisted till 1996.58 The decision in the appeal of FAP 20 finally established 
authoritatively the principles of PIL. In this appeal, as we have already seen, the 
judges were unanimous but on the Chief Justice's request, the leading judgement 
was delivered by Mustafa Kamal J. He now used this opportunity to shed his 
conservative image. The judgement claimed that the Supreme Court was never 
conservative or anti-PIL, it was the lawyers and High Court Division judges who 
had 'misunderstood' Sangbadpatra.^ 9
The discussion so far illustrates that, instead of one or two judges inviting 
PIL petitions, the development of PIL in Bangladesh Supreme Court has gone 
through the hands of a number of High Court Division judges all working more 
or less simultaneously. It was the liberal interpretation of these High Court 
Division judges, combined with the mounting pressure from the activist 
petitioners that finally led the Appellate Division to recognise and establish PIL 
in FAP 20.
This situation may be contrasted with the Indian situation where the
38 For a discussion on the indication given in favour of PEL in Sangbadpatra but not 
detected by the High Court judges, see above chapter 3.4. Mustafa Kamal J 
(1994: 159-166) gave even clearer approval for PIL in a 1994 lecture. His 
growing enthusiasm for PIL appears to be the result of relentless pressure from 
the activists coupled with a greater exposure to the developments of India and 
Pakistan. He describes (1994: 168-169) the experience gathered in a 
conference "Law as an instrument of social justice" organised in 1993 by 
SAARC Law, Pakistan. Although he appreciated the developments, he 
believed that 'there were some twisting of procedure somewhere to achieve 
this result'.
59 Above note 32 at 3, 16 and 27.
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pioneer judges, especially justices Krishna Iyer and Bhagwati, were pre-occupied 
with social justice. They considered themselves as social activists and have often 
been identified as populist and socialist judges.60 In Bangladesh, neither the 
judges consider themselves as socialists, nor have their judgements revealed 
social activism in any serious manner. There is also no indication of judicial 
populism.61 We do not question the social consciousness or commitment of the 
Bangladeshi judges, but merely point out that there is less emphasis on social 
activism and the movement of PIL has not been judge-led or judge-induced. The 
motivation of the judges came not primarily from their commitment to any 
ideology of social justice, but from their eagerness to modernise and update the 
domestic law in line with the latest developments elsewhere in the sub-continent.
In chapter 4, we discussed the initial and most important problem of the 
development of PIL in Bangladesh, the question of locus standi of the petitioner. 
The focus is on the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 102 of 
the Constitution of Bangladesh. In this respect, as the law has been inherited 
from the colonial and Pakistani periods, Bangladeshi judges are influenced by 
English, Indian and Pakistani developments.
60 Baxi (1985a: 290) uses the term judicial populism. Bhagwati ((1987: 20-31)
declares that the pro-PIL judges were social activists. See above chapter 2.2.1.
61 While analysing the problems of democracy and authoritarianism in the sub­
continent, Ayesha Jalal (1995: 66-121) has identified the populist periods of 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Accordingly, the Indian populist period was 
in the late 1970s during the leadership of Indira Gandhi. In Bangladesh, the 
populist period was from 1971 to 1975, under the leadership of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman. While in India, PIL developed in the immediate aftermath 
of the populist era, there is no direct connection between the populism of 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the development of PIL in Bangladesh.
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Thus in the very beginning, we briefly outlined the background of the writ 
jurisdiction, along with the developments of the law of standing, in the English 
courts.62 Historically, the laws of locus standi were not uniform and varied for 
different writs. Even for the same writ, the rules were complex and confusing. 
However, the law has been liberalised and advanced considerably in the direction 
of simplicity and uniformity, especially during the period of 1977-1981.
In the sub-continent, the English principles were adopted, in the 
constitutions of India and Pakistan, at a time when the standing rules in English 
law were conservative.63 Thus the Indian and Pakistani courts began with a 
narrow view of standing. We have examined how the courts have gradually 
adopted a more liberal interpretation and recognised public interest standing in 
both jurisdictions.
In Bangladesh, Article 102 of the Constitution declares the writ 
jurisdiction. Since there was no barrier for a petitioner to approach the Court in 
habeas corpus and quo warranto cases, no controversy arose.64 But the writ of 
quo warranto has been used by the political and constitutional activists to 
question a considerable number of governmental appointments. As regards the 
writs of certiorari, prohibiton and mandamamus, the PIL petitioners stumbled on 
a threshold problem of standing.65
As a result of the use of traditional standing rules, the term 'person
62 See above chapter 4.1.
63 See above chapter 4.2.
64 See above chapters 4.5 and 4.6.
63 See above chapter 4.4.
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aggrieved’, as contained in Article 102, was very conservatively interpreted and 
the petitioner required direct personal interest in the subject-matter. 
Liberalisation of these strict rules was needed when public issues and interests, as 
opposed to private rights, were concerned. However, the issue of standing is not 
merely a question of law, but a mixed question of law and fact. Thus whenever 
the merits of a case are doubtful, the petitioner's standing is on shaky grounds. 
This rule has been important in relation to the development of public interest 
standing in Bangladesh.
In Sangbadpatra, when the standing of the petitioners was refused, the 
Court declared that as the Indian Constitutional provisions are different, Indian 
developments are not relevant and the traditional meaning of 'person aggrieved' 
has to be followed which has received a meaning and dimension over the years.66 
This judgement raised such confusions that, for the next few years, a number of 
PIL cases were rejected on the ground that the Constitution of Bangladesh is 
incompatible with a more liberal approach of public interest standing rules.67 The 
lower courts and the lawyers often overlooked the fact that there was sufficient 
indication in the judgement that it was not a PIL case and the scope of such a 
case was not barred.
However, we argue that in Sangbadpatra, the issue of standing was 
considered as a mixed question of law and fact and as such the Court did not find 
any reason to grant public interest standing to a group of rich newspaper owners
66 Above note 32 at 155.
67 See above chapter 4.4.2.2.
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so that they could reduce the wages of their employees. Even the majority of the 
subsequent cases where standing was refused, the subject matters did not relate 
to the problems of the poor or the deprived, but dealt with the interests of the 
privileged. In Sved Mahbub Ali. the appointment of judges was challenged and in 
MPs Resignation, en masse resignation of parliament members was questioned. 
There were a number of cases where the rules of standing were liberalised 
including Welfare Association and Parliament Boycott. But these achieved partial 
success and did not amount to a full recognition of public interest standing. The 
situation was finally clarified by FAP 20. a case involving an environmental 
problem relating to the livelihood of millions of poor and uneducated village 
people.
Thus the delay in the recognition of standing was not due to any real legal 
bar, but mainly because the cases brought before the court were not involved with 
genuine concerns of the people. Since standing is a mixed question of law and 
fact, these elite-led cases were refused, apparently denying recognition of PIL. 
Thus the development of public interest standing rules have been actually 
hampered by the fact that the concerns of the privileged have dominated the PIL 
movement.
In chapter 5, we analysed the use of PIL by the political and constitutional 
activists in re-defining the power-relations in light of the extent of judicial power 
in Bangladesh. Judges and lawyers in Bangladesh attach great importance to the 
doctrine o f ’separation of powers' despite the fact that the Constitution envisages 
a rather flexible power-separation scheme. Also, the courts refuse to follow the
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doctrine of 'political questions' and instead observe the concepts of judicial self- 
restraint. As guardians of the Constitution, the judges declare themselves to be 
neutral. But our analysis demonstrates that the actions and judgements of the
Court have, form time to time, been influenced by the political nature of the PIL
68cases. In the light of these observations, we next analysed the effects of PIL 
cases on the jurisdictional boundaries between the three governmental organs.
As regards judicial review of statutes and the Constitution, challenges 
through PIL so far have concentrated on political issues.69 The cases involved 
questioned the limits of power of the martial law authorities, local elections and 
the interests of privileged groups.70 Amendments in the Constitution or statutes 
were not questioned on the ground of social or economic welfare of the people.
With respect to parliamentary privileges and internal proceedings, 
however, the petitioners were more successful.71 Thus the Court, even when 
denying standing on different grounds, pronounced in favour of the petitioners in 
MPs Resignation. It was declared that the Court is the ultimate authority to
68 See above chapter 5..1.
69 Chapter 5.2.1.
70 Sangbadpatra dealt with the interest of the newspaper owners; powers of marital 
law authorities were challenged in Mujibur Rahman v. Bangladesh 44 DLR 
(AD) (1992) 111 and Mohammad Giasuddin Bhuivan v. Bangladesh BCR 
1981 AD 80; Ziaur Rahman Khan dealt with local election; Sved Mahbub Ali 
and M Saleem Ullah v. Justice Mohammad Abdul Quddus Chowdhurv 46 
DLR (1994) 691 involved appointments of judges. Women MPs related to the 
rights of the women, but the petitioner wanted to abolish their reserved seats 
in the parliament.
71 See above chapter 5.2.2.
295
decide what are or are not parliamentary privileges and in cases of violation of 
the Constitution, the judiciary can intervene.72
In relation to the executive, one of the relevant issues is the problem 
relating to the definition of the 'state' and other associated terms. We analysed to 
what extent the judiciary has extended this definition so that it can exert more 
control, through writs, over social and economic functions of the government.73 
Our analysis demonstrates that the basic constitutional and legal provisions are 
quite liberal. However, compared to India, the judges are conservative in 
Bangladesh in this respect. As a result, there is further scope to widen the areas 
amenable to writ jurisdiction through PIL cases.
We also discussed various aspects of implementation of PIL judgements 
in Bangladesh to explore the extent to which the judiciary is encroaching upon 
the province of the executive.74 Our discussion demonstrates that there are only 
two cases, Danish Milk and Nazrul Islam, involving progressive implementation 
procedures. There are no legal restrictions, but the development of new 
techniques of implementation of PIL judgements has been very limited mainly 
due to a lack of cases and the conservative stance of the judges.
A considerable number of PIL cases involved the issue of judicial 
independence and dealt with the problems of appointment, tenure and retirement
72 First Constitutional Reference (MPs Reference) 1995 (III) (Special issue) BLT
(HCD) 159; 47 DLR (AD) (1995) 111.
See above chapter 5.3.1.
74 See above chapter 5.3.3.
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of judges, including their re-appointment after retirement.75 A demand to appoint 
judges in the vacant posts of the Supreme Court failed on the ground of 
standing.76 As to the consultation relating to the appointment of Supreme Court 
judges, the position is somewhat unclear. An amendment of the Constitution has 
removed the provision obliging the executive to ensure such consultation.77 
However, the opinion of the constitutional activists is that there is still a 
constitutional convention to consult. Through united pressure, the government 
has been made obliged to follow the convention. But Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv 
demonstrates that the government is still trying to ignore the obligation to consult 
and thus there is still tension with respect to this issue.
As regards consultation involving sub-ordinate court judges, there has 
been only partial success. Although a number of PIL cases dealt with this issue, 
the rigid constitutional provisions, coupled with the unwillingness of he 
executive to relinquish the power it traditionally enjoys, prevents any 
liberalisation.78 Even after the partial success in Aftab Uddin.79 according to 
which the executive must consult the judiciary with respect to posting and 
promotion of judges, the government in practice is ignoring its duty to consult.
73 See above chapter 5.3.2.
76 Appointment of Judges above note 41.
77 Article 95(1) has been amendment by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act
(No. II of 1975).
78 See above chapter 5.3.2.2.
79 Afiab Uddin (Md) v. Bangladesh 48 DLR (1996) 1.
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Another focus for the PIL petitioners has been the problems relating to the 
appointment of retired constitutional post holders, including judges, in other 
constitutional posts. Political and constitutional activists have attempted through 
a considerable number of cases to challenge such appointments. Appointments of 
the President, Vice-President, Supreme Court judges, Chief Election Commission 
etc. have been questioned on the ground that the power-separation scheme have 
been violated.80 In many cases, the hidden agenda was to oppose the appointment 
of a person chosen by the party in power.
These cases have failed in general. The Court declared that constitutional 
posts are not in the service of the Republic and as such these re-appointments 
were valid. Similarly, provisions of various Articles allowing re-appointment of 
judges were construed in favour of the government. As a result, the petitioners 
have actually failed to use the courts to prevent controversial appointments. The 
judges remain vulnerable to temptations of future appointments and thus their 
neutrality is at stake.
It appears that the considerable number of cases by the political and 
constitutional activists that aimed to re-defme the arrangement of power have 
achieved very limited success. It may be argued that rather than ensuring success, 
the political activists often aimed to raise the profile of the issue in question, if 
not their own profile. In any case, there have been several effects of these 
attempts.
80 Leading cases include Justice Shahabuddin. Shamsul Huq Chowdhurv. and Saivid 
Munirul Huda v. AKM Nurul Islam 1 BLC (1996) 437.
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First, these cases often related to highly controversial issues that were 
being debated in the political arena at the time. Raising these issues in the 
judicial arena helped to politicise the judiciary. In fact, certain cases related to re­
appointment of judges in important constitutional posts indirectly made the 
judges controversial figures.81 Second, these PIL cases have achieved very 
limited success in the advancement of political or democratic rights and the 
tensions between the executive and the other two organs have not been alleviated. 
Adjustment of the power-relations scheme through judicial intervention alone is 
bound to be counterproductive unless there are political will and favourable 
circumstances. Third, as to the extent to which success has been achieved, the 
real beneficiary is not the people, but the privileged few representing the interests 
of the elite.
Development of PIL in Bangladesh is undoubtedly one of the most 
significant legal developments in recent years. The term 'public interest' itself 
gives rise to the assumption that PIL cases are initiated, advocated and 
implemented for the interest of the people. Although the term people include 
anyone and everyone, in the socio-economic context of Bangladesh, it is the 
majority of the public, poor, deprived and unrepresented, who are the 'real 
people’. The present thesis attempted to ascertain to what extent public interest 
litigation actually has worked as litigation of the people.
81 See especially the discussion relating to several cases involving justice Abdur Rouf 
in chapter 3.8.
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Our analysis demonstrates that in terms of emphasis on the constitutional 
basis, the focus is on the power-relations game rather than on social justice. In 
practice, this game is. being played between different sections of the elite and the 
general people are not the beneficiary. PIL petitioners are mainly lawyers 
representing the elite of the society and concerned about their own place and 
share in the constitutional arrangement. Thus the majority of the PIL cases so far 
dealt with special/political interest of the elite. This was not levelled off by social 
activism or populism of the judges. No grass-root movement facilitated the 
development of PIL. Since cases filed as PIL were often concerned with the 
problems of the privileged, the courts were reluctant to grant standing or relief. 
This in turn was often seen as failure to recognise PIL by the Bangladeshi courts. 
In fact, this use of PIL to participate in the power-relations debate has diminished 
the potential power of PIL to sway the minds of the judges and lawyers in favour 
of social and economic justice. Attempts by political and constitutional activists 
to use PIL to re-adjust power arrangemenfjhave achieved limited success. There 
has been very limited real benefit for the general people.
PIL undoubtedly reflect the politicaLrole of the judges, especially as it 
enables the public to take part in the decision making process of the government 
and relates to socio-economic and political issues. However, in the development 
of PIL in Bangladesh, the political role of the courts has mainly been employed to 
decide power-relations disputes concerning different sections of the elite rather 
than to enhance the position and power of the 'common man'. The argument that 
PIL is essentially initiated and controlled by the elite and responsive to their
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sense of priorities has often been made with respect to India and other 
jurisdictions.82' Yet in India, there has been a large number of cases involving 
socio-economic issues and the activist judges emphasised on the problems of the 
poor and the deprived. Recently, Ahuja has argued that the initial agenda in India 
was to introduce social justice considerations of poverty and inequality into the 
courts that was later replaced, to a considerable extent, by the cases involving 
political and other interests of the elite.83 In Bangladesh, our analysis illustrates, 
the development of PIL has been dominated, from the very beginning, by the dlite 
and there was neither an initial period of social activism nor a substantial number 
of pioneering cases involving socio-economic issues. It appears that the 
Bangladeshi PIL cases do not reflect a stage of judicial social activism and from 
the very beginning, the situation in Bangladesh resembled the latter stage of 
Indian development where PIL has become an establishment strategy.
Even after the full recognition of PIL in FAP 20. the effects of the factors 
discussed above dominate the scene. After more than a year of the authoritative 
judgement of FAP 20, the number of cases filed and reported remains very 
limited.84 While in India and Pakistan, the authoritative interpretations of PIL in
82 In the Indian context, see Singh (1986: 336-347). See also Galanter's observation in
Shetret (1992: 3).
83 See Ahuja (1996: 330-347) who reached her conclusion after analysing in detail a
huge number of Indian decisions. She observed {Ibid. at 338) that emphasis on 
using law for political struggle has been ultimately disappointing, and, in 
some instances, may have postponed mobilisation at the grassroots level.
84 See above chapter 3.9. Only two major cases have been reported since FAP 20,
Ziaur Rahman Khan and Danish Milk.
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leading cases were followed by a flood of petitions, the situation remains 
markedly calm in Bangladesh.
Similarly, the development of PIL has so far failed to initiate or influence 
a liberal programme of law making.83 A number of statutes relating to public 
interest matters have come into force in the last few years. The most important is 
the Environment (Pollution Control) Act.86 This statute fulfils the long-standing 
demands relating to environmental problems and creates a directorate of pollution 
control. However, as to the adjudication of offences under the Act, section 17 
states that no court shall accept any complaint under the Act unless a written 
petition is made by a person authorised by the director of pollution control. This 
section actually represents a traditional saver clause and restricts the rights of the 
citizens to directly participate in the compliance procedure. Similar standard 
clauses can be found in section 8(1) of the Nuclear Safety and Radiation 
(Control) Act87 and section 51 of the Sewerage Authority Act.88
These developments confirm our argument that the use of the techniques 
of PIL by the elite to participate in the power-relations debate has actually 
undermined the much-needed focus on social and economic justice for the poor
83 In India, PIL movement has influenced wider standing rules in a number of existing
and new statutes where concerned citizens, consumers etc., with bona fide 
intent, can file complaints. See for example, the Child Labour (Prohibition and
Regulation) Act 1986, section 16(1); the Consumer (Protection) Act 1986, 
section 2(1) and the Environment (Protection) Act 1986, section 19.
86 No. I of 1995.
87 No. 21 of 1993.
88 No. VI of 1996.
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and the deprived, and hindered the opening up of the field for the active 
involvement of the general public.
The future of PIL, however, is not entirely bleak. Whatever may be the 
present situation, the recognition of the principles of PIL and public interest 
standing in FAP 20 is (^jte-l-iberaLand jwide. So the problem, if any, is not a real 
or imagined legal bar, to use the techniques of PIL for
socio-economic justice.
It appears unlikely that there will suddenly be a torrent of PIL cases in the 
near future. But as the techniques of PIL have come to stay, further progress is 
almost certain. First, test cases will continue opening up new grounds for PIL. At 
the moment, a number of public interest cases relating to the environment, 
consumer protection and women's right, pursued by BELA and BLAST 
(Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust), are waiting to be brought before the 
Court.89 Second, the government has recently established a Law Commission.90 
This is the first permanent Law Commission in the history of Bangladesh and is 
headed by Justice Naimuddin Ahmed, an active supporter of PIL. There is thus 
reason to hope that the activities of the Law Commission will positively influence 
the development of PIL. Third, there has been some attempts by various 
voluntary sector organisations to co-ordinate their efforts and share
89 At the moment, BELA has more than 20 such matters under consideration. BLAST
is also considering a number of future cases through its PIL-cell.
90 This has been done under the Law Commission Act (No. XIX of 1996).
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experiences.91 This is an indication that the movement for PIL is gradually 
moving towards maturity.
The legitimacy and respectability of PIL is dependent on its use for 
genuine social and economic justice purposes for the public. In Bangladesh initial 
shortcomings and problems have been sorted out to a great extent since PIL has 
been recognised as an integral part of the legal system. The stage has been set - 
the demand of the time now is litigation for the people, not in the name of the 
people.
91 This has recently been stressed by the participants in the National Workshop on 
PIL, held in Dhaka on July 26-27, 1996 titled 'Public interest litigation: 
Sharing experiences and initiatives'.
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